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 In my thesis, I evaluate certain powers conferred on the 
Commissioner: SARS under the fiscal statutes against five rights available to 
taxpayers. This analysis establishes whether a taxpayer is likely to succeed 
in challenging the constitutional validity of the powers available to the 
Commissioner. Further, I consider the remedies available to taxpayers in 
South Africa by reviewing current statutory provisions to establish whether 
the remedies are adequate. 
 In my research I reviewed South African texts, articles and cases in 
the context of constitutional law and tax law. I also drew on my experience of 
dealing with the Commissioner on behalf of clients who consulted with me on 
tax matters. The web sites of international revenue authorities yielded useful 
material, as did several other countries‟ texts, articles and cases on 
constitutional and tax law. 
 I conclude that taxpayers in South Africa do not have a cost-effective 
remedy in seeking redress from the Commissioner where his officials breach 
their rights. In addition, taxpayers‟ rights are meaningless unless there is an 
appropriate remedy for breaches of those rights. The relief available from the 












independent of the Commissioner and does not have the legal authority to 
direct the Commissioner‟s officials to rectify matters. Thus, I suggest that the 
legislature create a specialised and independent ombudsman‟s office to deal 
with taxpayer‟s complaints, drawing on the principles followed in other 
democratic societies. Further, current legislation requires amendment to 
allow taxpayers to recover damages and wasted costs from the 
Commissioner in specific cases.  
 I also conclude that taxpayers and the Commissioner are not fully 
aware of the impact of the procedural rights contained in the Constitution, Act 
108 of 1996. The Commissioner has a duty to educate taxpayers and his 
own officials about these rights and their effect on the application of fiscal 
laws. The Commissioner may achieve this by means of correspondence and 
other documents. The performance of the Commissioner‟s officials should be 
evaluated by, inter alia, referring to their knowledge of taxpayers‟ rights and to 
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‘A good shepherd should shear his flock not skin it.’1 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 Governments around the world impose taxes on their citizens to fund 
the services they deliver. Tax, in some form or another, has been around 
for many centuries. In the time of the Pharaohs, the Egyptians paid tax 
calculated by measuring the rise and fall of the Nile.2 In Roman times, the 
main burden of taxation did not fall on Roman citizens but on those living 
in the provinces controlled by the Roman Empire.3 Wars instigated by the 
Romans allowed them to seize the wealth of the conquered people 
enabling them to impose taxes to finance the government in Rome.4 
 Today, legislation regulates the taxes payable by a country‟s citizens 
to their government to enable it to meet its constitutional obligations.5 The 
relationship between taxpayer and revenue authority is, therefore, 
unequal, and is different from that of a consumer and a business where 
the consumer may choose freely what goods and services to buy. The 
taxpayer regularly seeks to minimise the tax payable while, at the same 
time, the State seeks to extract the maximum amount possible from its 
citizens.6 If taxpayers entered voluntarily into a relationship with the fisc 
                                                 
1
 The Emperor Tiberius to certain governors who wanted to increase the taxes. Suetonius: Tiberius, 
ch xxxii as quoted in J Coffield A Popular History of Taxation, From Ancient to Modern Times (1970) 
1. 
2
 V Davies & R Friedman Egypt Uncovered (1998) 13. Reference is made to a stella used during the 
reign of Amenemhet III of the Middle Kingdom (1831 BCE) to mark the level of the Nile: „Taxes 
were levied according to the height of the inundation and the amount of land that would be watered 
and fertilised by it.‟ See also I Brega Ancient and Modern Egypt (1998) 65 regarding the use of 
Nilometers for purposes of measuring „the level of the river for setting of the tax rates‟. 
3
 Coffield (note 1 above) 1. 
4
 Ibid 4. 
5
 The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English (1992) defines tax as: „A contribution to State 
revenue compulsorily levied on individuals, property or businesses‟. The definition contained on p 
896 in T Blackshield & G Williams Australian Constitutional Law and Theory – Commentary and 
Materials 3 ed (2002) is useful: „tax … “is a compulsory exaction of money by a public authority for 
public purposes, enforceable by law, and is not a payment for services rendered”.‟ 
6
 Many governments have introduced anti-avoidance legislation to combat the perceived abuse of the 













there might be some justification in arguing that they must simply submit 
to the Commissioner‟s powers and accept that they have few rights.  
 
II OBJECTIVES AND APPROACH OF THESIS 
 The purpose of this thesis is to weigh up the powers conferred on 
the Commissioner: South African Revenue Service (the „Commissioner‟) 
under various fiscal statutes and to determine whether the powers 
granted can withstand constitutional scrutiny.7 In addition, it evaluates 
existing remedies available to taxpayers and makes recommendations 
about enhancing those remedies. 
 The fiscal statutes are subject to the constraints of the Constitution. 
Ackermann J stated this requirement as follows: 
„… it is first necessary to emphasise that even fiscal statutory 
provisions, no matter how indispensable they may be for the 
economic well being of the country – a legitimate governmental 
objective of undisputed high priority – are not immune to the 
discipline of the Constitution and must conform to its normative 
standards.‟8 
 I will consider the canons of taxation before reviewing the powers 
conferred on the Commissioner.9 The State‟s power to impose and 
collect tax before the advent of the current constitutional democracy in 
South Africa will also be reviewed. I will specifically review the provisions 
of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993 (the 
„Interim Constitution‟) and the reports of the Katz Commission of Enquiry 
                                                                                                                                          
taxpayer‟s right to lawfully reduce his or her fiscal obligations and G S Cooper Tax Avoidance and the 
Rule of Law (1997). 
7
 Under the South African Revenue Service Act 34 of 1997 the Minister of Finance must appoint a 
Commissioner as the chief executive officer of the South African Revenue Service responsible for the 
enforcement of the national legislation listed in Schedule 1 to the Act. In this thesis, the person 
holding the office of „Commissioner‟ refers to the person so appointed who may be either male or 
female. This thesis refers to „he‟ purely to save space, while recognising that the reference to one 
gender includes reference to the other gender. 
8
 First National Bank of S.A Limited t/a Wesbank v The Commissioner for the South African Revenue 
Service and Another 2002 (7) BCLR 702 (CC); [2002] 64 SATC 471 para 31. 
9
 See T S Emslie et al Income Tax Cases and Materials (1995) 1, where the following is stated: „In 
this context, certain so-called canons of taxation (e.g. equity, certainty, convenience, efficiency and 














into the Tax System in South Africa.10 It is appropriate to compare this 
background with the position in South Africa today since the introduction 
of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 (the 
„Constitution‟). Reference to direct and indirect taxation will place both the 
former and current constitutional dispensations in perspective.  
 The Bill of Rights contained in the Constitution has a direct bearing on 
the powers conferred on the South African Revenue Service (SARS) in 
enforcing the fiscal statutes administered by the Commissioner. The 
thesis will evaluate the manner of achieving the required balance 
between the powers conferred on the Commissioner and the rights 
taxpayers enjoy in South Africa and the obligations they face. 
 In identifying deficiencies in the fiscal statutes and how to address this 
problem I will refer to foreign experience. There will be an evaluation of 
remedies available to taxpayers in South Africa in enforcing their rights 
vis-à-vis the Commissioner, as well as of the benefit of introducing an 
ombudsman for the tax industry and the need to enact a taxpayers‟ 
charter. Several countries, including South Africa, have published such a 
taxpayers‟ charter.11 Such documents typically set out the rights of 
taxpayers in relation to the respective revenue authority as well as the 
obligations of taxpayers in dealing with the fisc.12 Invariably the charters 
are statements of intent and have no legal effect.13 
 I will consider the right of taxpayers to recover damages and 
professional fees incurred in their dealings with the Commissioner should 
a violation of their constitutional rights occur. 
 The specific focus of this thesis is to determine whether the powers 
of the Commissioner to act in a particular way violate the taxpayer‟s 
                                                 
10
 The Commission of Enquiry Into Certain Aspects Of The Tax Structure of South Africa, later to 
become known as the Katz Commission, and the various reports issued by that Commission created 
under the Commissions Act 8 of 1947 and in accordance with Government Gazette 15924, Regulation 
Gazette 5378 of 1994. 
11


















specific rights to property, privacy, access to information, administrative 
justice and access to courts.  
 These rights are contained in ss 25, 14, 32, 33 and 34 respectively 
of the Constitution. Other rights contained in the Bill of Rights of the 
Constitution may also affect the fiscal statutes of the country (for 
example, the right to equality in s 9, the right to freedom of religion found 
in s 15 and so on). These rights are beyond the scope of this thesis. The 
use of domestic and foreign judicial pronouncements and related 
materials will assist in determining whether the powers conferred on the 
Commissioner violate the rights referred to. This thesis deals with the law 
as at 31 October 2007. The question, „Is the Commissioner 
constitutionally empowered to act in a particular way?‟ therefore 















‘… the power to tax involves the power to destroy …’1 
 
I CANONS OF TAXATION 
  In managing a country‟s economy the government will seek to 
improve economic growth by regulating and influencing, inter alia, the rate 
of inflation, levels of employment and budget deficit. This will determine 
the levels of taxation levied on the country‟s citizens. Government makes 
decisions and choices about both fiscal and monetary policy. The 
National Budget, when introduced in the National Assembly, reveals 
these policies. The 1995 Budget Review on fiscal policy stated the 
following: 
„As a powerful political instrument and the central core in the 
government‟s activities, the Budget impacts on the allocation of 
resources, the distribution of income and wealth, economic 
stabilisation and economic growth (including the level of 
employment). 
Fiscal policy entails the conscious and deliberate use of the 
budget (expenditure, taxes and borrowing) to achieve one or more 
of these economic development goals. Not all of these objectives 
can be reached simultaneously and difficult choices must often be 
made …‟2 
  Fiscal policy is but one tool used by a government in its overall 
economic policy. It integrates with monetary policy, international 
economic relations, and other policies. The 1995 Budget Review states 
that: 
„Monetary policy attempts to achieve macro economic balance 
(especially stability) through control of the monetary system by 
means of influencing the supply of money, the level and structure 
of interest rates and other measures affecting the availability of 
credit. The central bank (The South African Reserve Bank) is 
responsible for monetary policy, and has as its mission the 
protection of the external and internal value of the Rand. The main 
instruments of monetary policy are interest rates charged by the 
                                                 
1 Chief Justice John Marshall M’Culloch v The State of Maryland et al 1819 4L ed 579 p 607,Wheat 4 
316. 
2













central bank, reserve ratios and open market operations – the so-
called indirect instruments – as well as credit ceilings, interest rate 
control and moral suasion – the so-called direct instrument.‟3 
  To ensure proper management of an economy a government should 
ensure an ideal mix of monetary and fiscal policy.4 Taxation is an 
instrument used by government to achieve certain economic objectives. 
 On the subject of the tax structure in place in Roman times Coffield 
writes: 
„Cicero‟s reference to letters of requisition may be a convenient 
point to say something of the system of requisitioning of men and 
materials which the Romans inherited from the East and which 
they were never able to abolish. This, although not strictly a tax, 
was worse than a tax. It had all the features that a good tax should 
not have. It was sudden, unpredictable, arbitrary and oppressive.‟5 
  He states that requisitioning was a significant part of the Roman 
approach to tax, where payments made became the main revenue of the 
State.6  
 Adam Smith was the first recorded writer to refer to the fact that the 
canons of taxation, namely equity, certainty, convenience, efficiency and 
neutrality, internationally represent the characteristics of a good tax 
system.7 
 More recently, the report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Tax 
Structure of the Republic of South Africa contained the following 
statement: 
„For an adequate tax structure the basic characteristics (where the 
one does not conflict with the other or others) are equity, neutrality, 
simplicity, certainty, administrative efficiency, cost effectiveness, 
flexibility, stability, distribution or effectiveness, and a fair balance 
from the point of view of taxpayers between the respective burdens 
of direct and indirect tax. Tax reform measures must also be tested 
                                                 
3
 Ibid ii. 
4
 R L Heilbroner The Making of Economic Society 5 ed (1975). On p 161 the following is stated: „In 
economic circles, there is a continuing debate between “monetarist” and “fiscal”‟ views; the first is 
emphasising the importance of monetary controls, the second giving priority to tax and budgetary 
policy. Nonetheless, a large measure of agreement exists as to the usefulness of the main control 
mechanism. The debate is largely about which mechanisms are the most effective.‟ 
5
 J Coffield A Popular History of Taxation, From Ancient to Modern Times (1970) 5. 
6
 Ibid 6. 
7
 See T S Emslie et al Income Tax Cases and Materials (1995) 1, where reference is made to Adam 













against these criteria, and must be examined for transitional 
feasibility. The ideal, both for direct and indirect imposts, is a 
broad-based, widely distributed, low-rate, high-yield tax, 
conforming to these other requirements as far as possible.‟8 
 In designing a tax system, it is therefore necessary to apply the 
canons of taxation to ensure economic success and the optimisation of 
revenue collected by the State.  
 The State will seek to collect revenue by a mixture of direct and 
indirect taxes. Direct taxes are those taxes levied on income earned and 
paid to the fisc by each individual taxpayer.9 Indirect taxes comprise taxes 
payable on goods and services bought by a taxpayer and paid to the fisc 
by the service provider.10 Individuals pay direct taxation at progressive 
rates, while a flat rate fixes indirect taxes. In deciding the mix of direct and 
indirect taxation, the Government should adhere to the canons of taxation 
referred to above. Furthermore, Government should consider the level of 
taxation derived as a proportion of the gross domestic product. If the total 
tax „take‟ exceeds the gross domestic product by an unacceptable 
percentage, this discourages economic activity.11  
 
II THE STATE‟S POWER TO TAX PRIOR TO 1994 
 Before the first democratic elections in April 1994, South Africa was 
a „parliamentary state‟, that is, Parliament reigned supreme.12  
  Section 81(1) of the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act 110 of 
1983 provided as follows: „There shall be a State Revenue Fund into 
                                                 
8
 The Commission later became known as the Margo Commission, RP34/1987 (1987) para 1.28 5. 
9





 See Department of Finance Budget Review (15 March 1995) para 2.1.2 p 24, where the following 
was stated: „Under present fiscal policy, thus, 25 per cent of GDP may be taken as the ceiling on tax 
revenue of the consolidated central and provincial government.‟ See also National Treasury, Budget 
Review (2003) 54, where the general government tax to GDP ratio is expected to stabilise at 
approximately 28 per cent. 
12
 In accordance with s 34(3) of the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act 110 of 1983: „No court 
of law shall be competent to enquire into or pronounce upon the validity of an Act of Parliament.‟ 
Act 110 of 1983 did not contain a Bill of Rights and it was therefore possible for Parliament to 
introduce whatever legislation it thought fit and legislation could only be set aside on the ground that 
it had not been introduced in accordance with the legal procedures required by Act 110 of 1983 or in 













which shall be paid all revenues as defined in s 1 of the Exchequer and 
Audit Act, 1975.‟ 
 The Exchequer Act 66 of 1975, since repealed, defined „revenue‟ as 
follows: 
„(a) The State Revenue Account means all monies received by 
way of taxes, imposts or duties and all casual and other 
receipts of the State, whatever the source, which may be 
appropriated by Parliament, and includes monies borrowed 
in terms of the provisions of this Act, but does not include 
the amount of any fine not exceeding R50 imposed upon 
any person by any court of law, insofar as such amount 
has not been paid, or revenue accruing to the accounts 
referred to in s 2(1)(b) or to 2(1)(c);‟ 
  The 1983 Constitution did not specifically provide the State with the 
power to tax its citizens but granted this power by implication, by 
compelling the State to provide certain services.13 Before 1994 the 
Constitution of South Africa contained no Bill of Rights and taxpayers had 
limited rights against the fisc. A taxpayer could not challenge the revenue 
authorities‟ powers in a court of law because such powers, contained in, 
inter alia, the Income Tax Act, Act 58 of 1962 („the Income Tax Act‟) 
violated their rights.14 The only basis for challenging revenue‟s powers 
was found in certain narrow common law grounds of administrative justice 
(which did not result in any reported cases). 
 
III THE INTERIM CONSTITUTION 
 Significant political changes took place in South Africa in 1994 after 
the introduction of the Interim Constitution.15 South Africa became a 
constitutional State, that is, a State where the constitution is supreme and 
any laws in breach thereof may not remain in force.16 The Interim 
                                                 
13
 See, eg, chs 7,9,10,12,13 and 14 of the 1983 Constitution. 
14
 R C Williams „Taxpayers‟ Rights in South Africa‟ in D Bentley Taxpayers’ Rights: An 
International Perspective (1998) refers to the supremacy of Parliament in South Africa prior to 1994 
and confirms that the courts had no power to review and strike down legislation. 
15
 South Africa became a true democratic state in which all persons of qualifying age could vote. See, 
eg, the Preamble and s 6 of the Interim Constitution. 
16
 In accordance with s 4 of the Interim Constitution it was specifically provided that the Constitution 













Constitution did not contain a specific provision conferring power on the 
State to impose tax.17 I contend that it is not essential for a constitution to 
confer such a power on the State. As Hyatali CJ, drawing on Cooley’s 
Constitutional Law, says:  
„Taxes are defined to be burdens or charges imposed by the 
legislative power upon persons or property to raise money for 
public purposes. The power to tax rests upon necessity, and it is 
inherent in any sovereignty. The legislature of every free State will 
possess it under the general grant of legislative power, whether 
particularly specified in the Constitution among the powers to be 
exercised or not. No constitutional government can exist without 
it.‟18 
 Section 185 of the Interim Constitution provided for the 
establishment of the National Revenue Fund into which all revenues 
raised or received by the national government had to be paid. Parliament 
could only appropriate funds therefrom under the Constitution or any 
applicable Act of Parliament. 
 The Interim Constitution regulated the three levels of government in 
South Africa: the national,19 provincial20 and local.21 Section 155 entitled a 
province to an equitable share of revenue collected nationally. This 
enabled the province to provide services and to exercise its powers in 
conformity with the Interim Constitution.  
 Section 156 dealt specifically with taxes levied by provinces. 
Provinces could impose certain taxes, levies or surcharges other than 
income tax or Value Added Tax („VAT‟).22 Parliament could only enact 
legislation introducing a provincial tax after considering the Financial and 
Fiscal Commission‟s recommendations on the draft text of the statute 
                                                                                                                                          
provided for expressly or by necessary implication in the Constitution, shall be of no force and effect. 
See, eg, M Chaskalson et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (1996) para 16 p 11. 
17
 Other constitutions provide that people shall be liable to taxation. See, eg, Art 30 of the Constitution 
of Japan (Nihonkuku Kempo) 1947, which states: „The people shall be liable to taxation as provided 
by law‟. L W Beer & J M Maki From Imperial Myth to Democracy – Japan’s Two Constitutions, 
1889-2002 (2002) 197. 
18
 Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago v Ramesh Dipraj Kumar Mootoo (1976) 28 WIR 326. 
19
 See, inter alia, ch 6 of the Interim Constitution. 
20
 See ch 9 and Schedule 6 of the Interim Constitution. 
21
 See ch 10 of the Interim Constitution. 
22













imposing such tax.23 Section 178 (2) of the Interim Constitution permitted 
local government to impose and recover such property rates, levies, fees, 
taxes and tariffs as were necessary to exercise its powers and perform its 
functions.  
 The Bill of Rights contained in the Interim Constitution prescribed 
how the State and its organs interacted with persons in the country.24 
Section 33 limited the fundamental rights contained in Chapter 3 of the 
Interim Constitution in terms of a law of general application. Any limitation 
of rights had to be reasonable, and justifiable in an open and democratic 
society based on freedom and equality.25 Furthermore, s 33(1)(b) 
required that the limitation not detract from the essential content of that 
right and that such limitation be necessary.  
 The Interim Constitution, which was a temporary measure to allow 
time for the negotiation and formulation of the final Constitution, required 
the State to establish various bodies to remedy any breach of the 
fundamental human rights contained in the Interim Constitution. Among 
these bodies are the Commission for Gender Equality, the Constitutional 
Court, the Human Rights Commission, and the Public Protector‟s Office.26  
 Before the introduction of the Interim Constitution the Commissioner 
could act against taxpayers without fear of judicial intervention. The old 
s 74 of the Income Tax Act conferred on the Commissioner certain 
powers of gathering information from taxpayers. The section provided that 
the Commissioner could authorise any of his officers to search a 
taxpayer‟s premises or seize records without prior notice to the taxpayer 
and without independent review. The taxpayer had no means of 
preventing such search and seizure operations. This law was valid and 
incontestable because Parliament reigned supreme.27 
                                                 
23
 Ibid s 156(1)(a). 
24
 Ibid ch 3. 
25
 Ibid s 33(1)(a). 
26
 Section 98 of the Interim Constitution provided that a Constitutional Court must be established and 
ch 8 provided for the establishment of the Office of the Public Protector, the Commission for  Gender 
Equality and the Human Rights Commission. 
27













 The introduction of the Interim Constitution made it necessary for the 
provisions of the Income Tax Act and, indeed, all fiscal statutes, to comply 
with the Interim Constitution. 
 
IV KATZ COMMISSION 
 In his 1994 budget speech the Minister of Finance announced the 
appointment of a Commission of Inquiry into Certain Aspects of the Tax 
Structure of South Africa (the Katz Commission).28 The Interim Report of 
the Katz Commission dealt with the rule of law as follows: 
„The Commission notes that the tax system is subject to the 
Constitution and must conform to society‟s commitment to the 
Rule of Law. This means not only that the system should be 
effective in the enforcement of all tax laws, equally and 
irrespective of status, but also that citizens‟ right to be taxed 
strictly in accordance with the terms of those laws should be 
scrupulously protected both in the design of those laws and in their 
implementation.‟29 
 The Katz Commission, in ch 6 of its Interim Report, dealt with some 
of the implications of the Interim Constitution for the country‟s fiscal 
statutes.30 Chapter 6 sought to weigh up various provisions of the fiscal 
statutes in South Africa vis-à-vis the Interim Constitution. 
 Section 8 of the Interim Constitution contained the fundamental right 
to equality. At that stage, the Income Tax Act contained several 
provisions that discriminated on the grounds of sex and marital status. 
Separate rates of tax were payable by married or unmarried persons, and 
those regarded as married women. A rebate was available to married 
persons. Further, s 10(1)(x) of the Income Tax Act, for example, referred 
to different ages, depending on the taxpayer‟s sex. 
 Para 6.3.19 of the Katz Commission‟s Interim Report concluded that 
discrimination based on sex or marital status was unconstitutional and 
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was inappropriate in income tax legislation.31 South Africa subsequently 
introduced a unitary rate of tax for all persons, regardless of sex or marital 
status.32  
 The Commission reviewed the provisions of the Income Tax Act 
dealing with the recovery of tax, in particular s 91(1)(b), whereby the 
Commissioner may file with any competent court a statement certified by 
the Commissioner as correct and specifying the tax or interest due from 
the taxpayer. Such statement constitutes a civil judgment lawfully given in 
favour of the Commissioner for a liquid debt of the amount specified.33 
Section 92 of the Income Tax Act precludes a taxpayer from challenging 
an assessment in the ordinary courts.34 A taxpayer may only challenge an 
assessment by adhering to the objection and appeal procedures set down 
in s 81 and s 83 of the Act.35 The Commission‟s view was that s 91 
breached s 22 of the Interim Constitution, which conferred the right to 
have legal disputes settled by a court of law.36 Although government 
suggested it would deal expeditiously with the various constitutional 
issues raised by the Katz Commission it did not amend s 91 of the 
Income Tax Act.37 Section 40(2)(a) of the Value Added Tax Act 89 of 
1991 („the VAT Act‟), was in many respects similar to s 91 of the Income 
Tax Act. The Constitutional Court in Metcash Trading Ltd v C: SARS 
[2001]38 ruled that the provisions of s 40(2)(a) did not violate the 
taxpayer‟s constitutional rights and thus it is contended that s 91 is 
constitutionally valid.39 
 Section 14(1) of the Interim Constitution provided every person with 
the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion. 
The Katz Commission expressed the view that the preferential treatment 
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contained in s 10(1)(f) of the Income Tax Act exempting religious 
organisations from income tax might fall foul of s 14 of the Interim 
Constitution.40 The Commission also stated that the tax deduction granted 
for donations made to the Bible Society of South Africa under s 18A of the 
Income Tax Act would violate s 14 of the Interim Constitution. This 
concession was removed from 1 October 1996.41  
 As a consequence of the right contained in s 23 of the Interim 
Constitution to access to information held by the State taxpayers may call 
for the release of any relevant information held by the Commissioner 
relating to themselves.42 If the Commissioner fails to release the 
information the taxpayer may approach a court for proper relief. I analyse 
the consequences of the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 
2000 on taxpayers‟ rights in chapter 5.  
 The Katz Commission‟s interim report dealt with the administrative 
practices adopted by the Commissioner. It also considered the impact of 
the taxpayer‟s right to just administrative action, addressed below, under 
s 24 of the Interim Constitution.43  
 Before 1994 it was the general practice of the Commissioner not to 
supply taxpayers with reasons for decisions made in the exercise of 
discretionary powers, or in issuing assessments. Section 24 of the Interim 
Constitution gave taxpayers the right to this information for the first time. 
The Katz Commission‟s Interim Report expressed the view that s 24(c) 
granted taxpayers the right to reasons, in writing, for administrative action 
affecting any of their rights.44 The Commission specifically referred to the 
cryptic approach adopted by the Commissioner in dealing with objections 
and appeals, and stated that the prevailing practice would have to end.45 
Not long after the publication of the Katz Commission‟s report the 
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Commissioner indicated that, in future, taxpayers would have access to 
the reasons for decisions. 
 For many years, the Commissioner‟s internal Revenue Assessing 
Handbook and internal circular minutes were unavailable to the public.46 
This caused difficulties for taxpayers who did not know why the 
Commissioner was taking a particular view on certain items of 
expenditure or income. The Katz Commission was of the opinion that 
such internal documentation should be available to taxpayers, ensuring 
that the Commissioner and his officers complied with their constitutional 
obligations.47 Shortly after publication of the Commission‟s report the 
Revenue Assessing Handbook was published as the SARS Income Tax 
Practice Manual, which is now available to all taxpayers.48 The 
Commissioner started releasing practice notes, interpretation notes, 
media releases and other documents to assist and educate taxpayers 
about the interpretation of their fiscal obligations.49 
 The Katz Commission also considered the constitutionality of s 82 of 
the Income Tax Act, whereby the onus of proof lies on the taxpayer.50 The 
debate about whether s 82 as presently drafted is constitutionally valid is 
not over and lies beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 Referring to taxpayers‟ entitlement to due legal process under s 22 
of the Interim Constitution, the Katz Commission expressed the view that 
certain fiscal statutes, which ousted the right to challenge certain actions 
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V THE CONSTITUTION 
 In 1996 the Constitutional Court certified the Final Constitution, 
which replaced the Interim Constitution.52 Chapter 2 of the Constitution 
contains a Bill of Rights similar to that contained in ch 3 of the Interim 
Constitution. 
 Section 213 of the Constitution provides for the creation of a 
National Revenue Fund for the collection of all money paid to the national 
government. The Constitution does not specifically confer on the State the 
power to impose tax but its provisions imply this. The legislature enacted 
the Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 to regulate those matters 
previously dealt with in the Exchequer Act. Section 1 of the Public 
Finance Management Act contains a definition of „revenue fund‟. This 
creates the National Revenue Fund as envisaged in s 213 of the 
Constitution and deals with the Provincial Revenue Fund as mentioned in 
s 226 of the Constitution. 
 As was the case in the Interim Constitution, a provincial legislature 
may impose the following taxes, as envisaged in s 228 of the Constitution: 
 taxes, levies and duties other than income tax, value-added tax, 
general sales tax, rates on property or customs duties; 
 flat-rate surcharges on the tax bases of any tax, levy or duty 
imposed by national legislation, other than the tax bases of 
corporate income tax, value-added tax, rates on property or 
customs duties.  
 For a province to exercise the power conferred on it under s 228 of 
the Constitution it must comply with the statute regulating that process.53 
Thus far, no province in South Africa has exercised the right to impose a 
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provincial tax, though the Western Cape Province has mooted the 
possibility of a fuel levy.  
 Section 229 of the Constitution limits the powers of municipal 
authorities to impose rates on property and surcharges on fees for 
services provided by the municipality. A municipality may only impose 
other types of taxes if these are sanctioned by national legislation. Such 
taxing measure must not seek to impose any tax similar to that imposed 
by the national government. 
 The fundamental rights contained in ch 2 of the Constitution are not 
absolute and may be limited by s 36. Many taxpayers have the mistaken 
impression that because the Constitution enshrines rights they may not 
be restricted or violated. In deciding whether a breach of the Bill of Rights 
has occurred it is necessary to refer to the specific rights contained in 
ch 2 of the Constitution. Section 36, which determines the validity of any 
limitation of rights, provides as follows: 
„(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms 
of law of general application to the extent that the limitation 
is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, 
taking into account all relevant factors, including: 
(a) the nature of the right; 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any provision of 
the Constitution, no law may limit any right entrenched in the 
Bill of Rights.‟ 
 Thus, a taxpayer must weigh up the impact, if any, of the limitation of 
rights on the Commissioner‟s powers to collect tax. 
 A statute of general application may limit the rights contained in the 
Constitution.54 Such rights are therefore not absolute and it is necessary 
to ascertain whether the infringement of the right by the organ of state in 
question is valid. If the legislature wishes to limit any right contained in the 
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Constitution the limitation must apply equally to all persons. It is not 
lawful, for example, to introduce taxing regulations that only apply to a 
section of the community. Any law limiting a person‟s rights must 
therefore apply generally and would have to be reasonable and justifiable, 
because of the ethos of the new South Africa. De Waal et al deal with the 
reasonableness and justifiability test in the following terms: 
„to satisfy the limitation test then, it must be shown that the law in 
question serves a constitutionally acceptable purpose and that 
there is sufficient proportionality between the harm done by the 
law (the infringement of fundamental rights) and the benefits it is 
designed to achieve (the purpose of the law).‟55  
 As stated above, the government of the day needs funds to ensure 
that it can finance its administration and meet certain specified social 
objectives imposed on it by the Constitution. It is thus essential that 
proper administration of tax collection ensures that taxpayers comply with 
the law and meet their obligations. At the same time, the revenue 
authority should not exceed its powers.  
 Inland Revenue was previously a directorate within the Ministry of 
Finance and was an integral part of the civil service. Historically, it 
comprised two branches. The first fell under the Commissioner for Inland 
Revenue, who was responsible for overseeing all fiscal legislation other 
than the Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964. The second branch, 
managed by the Controller of Customs and Excise, was responsible for 
collection of customs and excise duties and the supervision of the 
Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964. The South African Revenue Service 
Act 34 of 1997 (SARS Act), section 2 of which established the South 
African Revenue Service as an organ of the state within the public 
administration but as an institution outside the public service, came into 
force on 1 October 1997. South Africa now has one office, the 
Commissioner: South African Revenue Service, responsible for the 
administration of all fiscal statutes in the country. Section 4 of the Act 
prescribes that it is the Commissioner‟s objective to ensure the efficient 
and effective collection of revenue and to enforce the fiscal statutes 
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administered by the Commissioner.56 Under its regulatory statute the 
Commissioner must uphold the values and principles contained in s 195 
of the Constitution.  
 The fiscal statutes of the country confer certain powers on the 
Commissioner, many of which are necessary to ensure the proper and 
efficient collection of taxes. Certain of the powers may be unconstitutional 
under ch 2 of the Constitution. I will weigh up the various powers 
conferred on the Commissioner in the fiscal statutes to ascertain if they 
can withstand constitutional scrutiny. I will also consider the extent of a 
taxpayer‟s right to:  
 property 
 privacy 
 access to information 
 administrative justice; and 
 access to courts.  
 The provisions of the Constitution would be meaningless if taxpayers 
could not redress breaches of the Bill of Rights in some manner. 
Section 38 provides that should anyone violate a taxpayer‟s rights the 
taxpayer may approach a competent court for relief, including a 
declaration of rights. The section provides that the following persons may 
approach a court for relief: 
„a) anyone acting in their own interest; 
b) anyone acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in their 
own name; 
c) anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or 
class of persons; 
d) anyone acting in the public interest; and 
e) an association acting in the interest of its members.‟ 
 Schedule 6 of the Constitution confirms that the Constitutional Court, 
established by the Interim Constitution, becomes the Constitutional Court 
under the Constitution. Section 167(3) provides that the Constitutional 
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Court is the highest court in all constitutional matters. The court has the 
responsibility to decide whether or not an Act of Parliament is 
constitutional. The Supreme Court of Appeal or a High Court may rule 
that an Act of Parliament appears unconstitutional.57 An order made by 
such court on the constitutionality of an Act may only obtain force once 
the Constitutional Court has confirmed that order.58 
 Paragraph 20 of Schedule 6 of the Constitution provides that various 
institutions created under the Interim Constitution continue to exist. 
Section 181 confirms the establishment of various State institutions to 
support democracy in South Africa. These bodies, which comprise, inter 
alia, the Public Protector and the Human Rights Commission, may also be 
available to taxpayers seeking redress against the Commissioner where 
they believe their rights, as enshrined in chapter 2 of the Constitution, 
have been violated. 59 Section 182 of the Constitution restates the 
functions of the office of Public Protector as, inter alia, investigating 
alleged or suspected improper conduct in State affairs or in public 
administration at any level of government. The duties and responsibilities 
of the Public Protector are more fully dealt with in the Public Protector Act 
23 of 1994. A taxpayer may, in certain circumstances, be able to lodge a 
formal complaint with the Public Protector where the Commissioner has, 
in the taxpayer‟s view, violated the taxpayer‟s constitutional rights.60 
 The Constitution sets out the duties of the Human Rights 
Commission under s 184. These include observing, investigating and 
reporting on human rights, as well as taking the necessary steps to 
secure appropriate redress where human rights have been violated. 
Taxpayers may, in certain cases, be able to use the office of the Human 
Rights Commission to investigate alleged violations of human rights, 
including their rights as taxpayers vis-à-vis the Commissioner. 
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VI THE TAX PROCESS 
(1) The Tax System 
 Taxation in South Africa comprises two distinct parts, namely, direct 
taxation and an array of indirect taxes regulated by various statutes 
managed by the Commissioner.61  
 John Stuart Mill defines direct and indirect tax in the following terms: 
„A direct tax is one which is demanded from the very person who it 
is intended or desired should pay it. Indirect taxes are those which 
are demanded from one person in the expectation and intention 
that he shall indemnify himself at the expense of another.‟62 
 Direct taxation thus denotes taxation imposed on individuals, 
companies and other taxpayers. Indirect taxation is that form of taxation 
levied on transactions. It includes VAT payable on the purchase of goods 
or services, transfer duty payable on the purchase of property, stamp 
duties and similar levies payable on the purchase of shares. 
 
(2) Direct Taxation 
 The Commissioner requires all persons liable for taxation to register 
for tax purposes.63 Section 66 of the Income Tax Act prescribes which 
specific persons must submit an annual tax return.64 Section 1 of the 
Income Tax Act defines the term „person‟ widely and includes companies, 
close corporations and natural persons, as well as the categories of 
persons specifically mentioned. The provisions of the Income Tax Act 
compel taxpayers to render an annual return to the Commissioner. The 
Commissioner may query items disclosed in that return. In addition, he 
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may conduct an on-site audit or a detailed investigation into the 
taxpayer‟s affairs.  
 Once the Commissioner has processed the tax return he will issue 
an assessment reflecting the tax payable, or refundable, as the case may 
be. If the taxpayer disagrees with the Commissioner‟s assessment, he 
has a right to object. If the Commissioner disallows the objection the 
taxpayer may prosecute an appeal to either the Tax Board65 or the Tax 
Court66 under the rules promulgated in terms of s 107A of the Income 
Tax Act.67  
 When the taxpayer lodges his notice of appeal he may proceed to 
alternative dispute resolution („ADR‟).68 The Commissioner does not have 
to agree to the taxpayer‟s election of ADR. He is, however, obliged, 
within 20 days of receipt of the notice of appeal, to inform the taxpayer of 
the outcome of his or her request to refer to the matter to ADR.69  
 It is anticipated that ADR will promote the settlement of tax disputes 
without the need for the Commissioner and taxpayers to resort to the Tax 
Court and incur the related costs of litigation. From recent practical 
experience it appears to me that certain of the Commissioner‟s officials 
are frustrating the ADR route, advising that certain matters are 
inappropriate for ADR. The reason given is that the Commissioner is 
seeking judicial pronouncement on the issue.  
 In cases where the appeal proceeds to the Tax Board and the 
taxpayer or the Commissioner does not accept the board‟s decision 
either party may note an appeal to have the matter heard by the Tax 
Court. Where the parties are unhappy with a decision of the Tax Court 
they may advance either to the High Court or directly to the Supreme 
Court of Appeal.70 
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 The Commissioner will seek to recover income tax under the 
provisions contained in the Income Tax Act and in terms of practices 
published in the SARS Income Tax Practice Manual.71 The 
Commissioner will also publish media releases, interpretation notes, 
general notes and rulings to suggest how his officers should apply the 
law in certain circumstances. 
The Commissioner may conduct audits of taxpayers to ensure the 
timeous and accurate payment of direct tax. He may also seek warrants 
to conduct search and seizure operations to ensure compliance with the 
applicable governing fiscal statute. 
 
(3) Indirect Taxation 
 The method of collecting indirect tax differs from that of gathering 
direct tax. A purchaser or person who is obliged to pay indirect tax does 
not always need to submit a tax return. However, in certain instances, the 
purchaser must pay the requisite tax over on declaration to the 
Commissioner. The VAT system calls for the submission of VAT returns 
under the VAT Act. Under other statutes the question of payment of 
indirect tax arises on the purchase of property or shares in the form of 
transfer duty, customs and excise duty and stamp duty.72  
 The administrative procedures and information-gathering powers 
found in the various statutes regulating indirect taxes are, in many 
respects, similar to those found in the Income Tax Act. 
 
(4) The Commissioner’s Powers 
 The Commissioner, through his various officers, exercises powers 
contained in the fiscal statutes dealing with taxpayers. The right to 
establish whether the application of these powers is appropriate lies with 
the taxpayer. He further has the right to approach a court to determine 
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whether those powers will withstand scrutiny vis-à-vis the Bill of Rights 
contained in ch 2 of the Constitution. 
 
VII THE RELEVANCE OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS TO THE TAX ARENA 
 At first blush there may appear to be little connection between the 
Bill of Rights and taxpayers‟ fiscal obligations. This is misleading. 
Taxpayers Rights and Obligations: A Survey of the Legal Situation in 
OECD [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development] 
Countries73 sets out the interaction of fundamental rights and tax 
obligations as follows: 
„2.1 Tax administrations are given wide powers to determine the 
tax base, to verify information provided by taxpayers and third 
parties and to collect the tax due. There may be a potential 
conflict between the use of these powers to minimise tax 
evasion and avoidance and to ensure that all taxpayers are 
fairly treated, with the need to respect the rights of individual 
taxpayers. The rights to privacy, to confidentiality, of access 
to information, and to appeal against decisions of the 
administration, for example, are fundamental rights in 
democratic societies. A high degree of co-operation from 
taxpayers is required if complex tax systems are to operate 
efficiently. Co-operation is more likely to be forthcoming if 
taxpayers perceive the system as being fair and if their basic 
rights are clearly set out and respected. In practice, all OECD 
governments take great care to ensure that these rights are 
respected.‟74  
 It is therefore fitting to consider whether the powers granted to the 
Commissioner in the various fiscal statutes conform with the 
requirements set out in the Constitution. Taxpayers are invariably in an 
unequal relationship with the fisc in that it compels them by statute to 
contribute to the State‟s coffers. They are therefore not willing 
participants in the tax system. Bentley submits that the perception by 
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taxpayers that they receive fair treatment and there is no violation of their 
rights enhances their degree of compliance with the tax system.75  
 Certain of the powers conferred on the Commissioner may not, in 
themselves, violate the fundamental rights of taxpayers. However, the 
execution of such powers may constitute a violation of the taxpayer‟s 
right to administrative justice and this requires to be investigated. The 
Commissioner must exercise his powers reasonably. South African 
taxpayers have the right to question whether the powers granted to the 
State in collecting tax are valid when weighed up against the Bill of 
Rights. If the powers conferred on the Commissioner violate the 
taxpayer‟s fundamental rights as set out in the Constitution, the limitation 
of rights in s 36 will establish whether this infringement is sustainable. I 
contend that taxpayers‟ rights are a species of human rights that 
taxpayers should consider in their relationship with the fiscal authority. 
 
VIII INTERPRETATION OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 
 Section 39 of the Constitution regulates the interpretation of the Bill 
of Rights. A court must promote the values that underlie an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. 
Further, it must consider international law and may consider foreign law. 
International law includes, for example, the United Nations Declaration on 
Human Rights and other international agreements dealing with human 
rights, whether South Africa has adopted such agreements or not.76 
Foreign law, on the other hand, comprises the statutes of other countries. 
In its decisions the Constitutional Court, empowered by s 39(1)( c) of the 
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Constitution, draws on foreign cases and foreign law for guidance on how 
to deal with such matters in South Africa.77  
 
IX INTRODUCTION OF A TAXPAYERS‟ CHARTER IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 Many countries have published a taxpayers‟ charter setting out the 
rights and obligations of taxpayers in their dealings with the revenue 
authority.78 In 1995 the Katz Commission recommended the introduction 
in South Africa of a statement of taxpayers‟ rights.79 
 The Commission concluded that the fiscal statutes should not 
contain such a statement. Rather, taxpayers‟ rights should constitute a 
contract between the revenue authority and taxpayers which taxpayers 
may utilise as a means of evaluating service levels and administrative 
action encountered in their dealings with the Commissioner.80 
 The Minister of Finance published the SARS Client Charter in the 
1997 Budget Review.81 The Charter is merely a statement of intent by the 
Commissioner, it does not alter the law in any way and it confers no 
greater rights.82  If a taxpayer believes his or her constitutional rights 
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have been breached he or she must approach a competent court for 
relief.83  
 The current Commissioner has indicated in discussions that he is 
investigating the possibility of introducing an ombudsman to assist 
taxpayers who face administrative difficulties in their dealings with the 
Commissioner.84 Such an ombudsman would seek to address violations 
of taxpayers‟ rights. However, it would not seek to resolve objections and 
appeals, as the Tax Court, High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal 
must, by law, deal with such matters.85  
 Having briefly outlined the background to the tax system and the 
developments in our constitutional dispensation it is necessary to 
consider the taxpayer‟s right to property.86 In the next chapter I will do so 
in the context of the fiscal statutes. This examination will determine 
whether those statutes can withstand constitutional scrutiny in light of the 
right to property. 
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THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY 
‘As long as he does not rob the great majority of their property or their 
honour, they remain content.’1 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 In this chapter I will evaluate certain fiscal provisions in the light of 
the right to property contained in the Constitution. I will determine 
whether these provisions conform to the taxpayer‟s right to property. 
Taxation constitutes a deprivation of property by the State. I analyse in 
what circumstances taxation may constitute an unlawful deprivation of 
property which contravenes s 25 of the Constitution and would not be 
saved by the limitation of rights contained in s 36 of the Constitution. 
Section 25 of the Constitution confers a right to property on taxpayers in 
the following terms:  „(1) No one may be deprived of property except in 
terms of law of general application, and no law may permit arbitrary 
deprivation of property.‟2  
 Section 25(4)(b) specifically provides, inter alia, that for s 25 the term 
„property‟ is not limited to land. De Waal examines the term „property‟ and 
expresses the view that it has at least three possible meanings: 
„First the clause could refer to physical property itself … second 
the term could refer to, a set of legal rules governing the 
relationship between individuals and physical property – what the 
common law terms property rights … third the term could refer to 
any relationship or interest having an exchange value.‟3 
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 Devenish comments on the concept of property as being not only a 
relationship between an owner and a „thing‟, but „rather as a spectrum of 
legally enforced claims upon resources‟.4  
 In First National Bank of S.A. Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for 
South African Revenue Services and Another („FNB‟) Ackermann J dealt 
with the meaning of „property‟ as follows:  
„At this stage of our constitutional jurisprudence it is, for the 
reasons given above, practically impossible to furnish – and 
judicially unwise to attempt – a comprehensive definition of 
property for purposes of s 25. Such difficulties do not, however, 
arise in the present case. Here it is sufficient to hold that 
ownership of a corporeal movable must – as must ownership of 
land – lie at the heart of our constitutional concept of property, 
both as regards the nature of the right involved as well as the 
object of the right and must therefore, in principle, enjoy the 
protection of s 25.‟5 
 It appears from the above that the term „property‟ has a wide 
meaning in terms of establishing the scope of the right to property 
contained in the Constitution. It is clear that the term „property‟ refers not 
only to land but also to several different rights held by a taxpayer. Thus, if 
the authorities sought to introduce legislation to remove a taxpayer‟s 
entitlement to certain benefits or rights, those rights would constitute 
„property‟ as envisaged in s 25 of the Constitution.  
With regard to what comprises the deprivation of property envisaged 
in s 25(1) Ackermann J, in FNB, held: 
„The term “deprived” or “deprivation” is, as Van Der Walt (1997) 
points out, somewhat misleading or confusing because it can 
create the wrong impression that it invariably refers to the taking 
away of property, whereas in fact  
“the term „deprivation‟ is distinguished very clearly from the 
narrow term „expropriation‟ in constitutional jurisprudence 
worldwide.”  
In a certain sense any interference with the use, enjoyment or 
exploitation of private property involves some deprivation in 
respect of the person having title or right to or in the property 
concerned. If section 25 is applied to this wide genus of 
interference, “deprivation” would encompass all species thereof 
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and “expropriation” would apply only to a narrower species of 
interference. Chaskalson and Lewis, using a slightly different idiom 
in dealing with both the interim and 1996 Constitutions, put it 
equally correctly thus: 
“Expropriations are treated as a subset of deprivation. There 
are certain requirements for the validity of all deprivations.” 
… 
If the deprivation infringes (limits) section 25(1) and cannot be 
justified under section 36 that is the end of the matter. The 
provision is unconstitutional.‟6 
 Based on FNB there must be a determination of whether there has 
been any infringement of the taxpayer‟s right to property.7 This includes 
the arbitrary deprivation of a taxpayer‟s property, as well as a restriction 
on the taxpayer‟s rights over the property concerned. 
 Does the right to property apply to both natural and juristic persons? 
The Constitutional Court considered this issue in FNB8, in which 
Ackermann J stated: 
„A preliminary question is whether FNB, as a juristic person, is 
entitled to the property rights protected by s 25 of the Constitution. 
In this regard, s 8(4) of the Constitution provides as follows: 
“a juristic person is entitled to the rights in the Bill of Rights to 
the extent required by the nature of the rights and the nature of 
that juristic person.”‟9  
 Ackermann J stated further: 
„Even more so than in relation to the right to privacy, denying 
companies entitlement to property rights would “… lead to grave 
disruptions and would undermine the very fabric of our democratic 
State.77 [77 –Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences 
v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd 2000 (10) BCLR 1097 (CC); 
2001(1) (SA) 545(CC)].” It would have a disastrous impact on the 
business world generally, and creditors of companies and, more 
specifically on shareholders in companies. The property rights of 
natural persons can only be fully and properly realised if such 
rights are afforded to companies as well as to natural persons. I 
therefore conclude that FNB is entitled to the property rights under 
s 25 of the Constitution, … .‟10 
Thus, the right to property applies to both natural and juristic 
persons.  
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 I will now analyse the following issues in the light of the right to 
property found in s 25(1) and the limitation of rights contained in s 36 of 
the Constitution:  
 When will the imposition of tax constitute an unlawful deprivation of 
property? 
 Does the set-off of tax debts and refunds violate the right to 
property? 
 Does a delay in receiving a tax refund constitute a deprivation of 
property? 
 May the taxpayer recover from the Commissioner wasted costs 
incurred through unreasonable conduct by his officials? 
 Where the Commissioner seeks to hold directors of companies 
personally liable for the tax debts of a company does this breach 
their right to property? 
 Does the imposition by the Commissioner of additional tax and 
interest violate the right to property? 
 Does the prohibition on payment of interest on delayed VAT 
refunds breach the right to property? 
 Does the enactment of fiscal amendments with retrospective effect 
breach the right to property?11 
 
II WHEN WILL THE IMPOSITION OF TAX CONSTITUTE AN UNLAWFUL 
DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY? 
 Is the power of the State to impose tax a violation of the right to 
property in that tax amounts to an unlawful deprivation of property?  
 Paying tax is involuntary in that the force of law requires taxpayers to 
pay amounts of money to the fisc under the various fiscal statutes in 
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force. The payment of tax, therefore, constitutes the deprivation of, for 
example, a part of the taxpayer‟s salary received for services rendered or 
a portion of the profit derived by an entrepreneur from the carrying on of 
business. 
 The various statutes under which taxes are payable constitute laws 
of general application applicable to all taxpayers in South Africa. These 
statutes do not discriminate unfairly on one or more of the grounds found 
in s 9 of the Constitution.12  
 I am not aware of any reported court case in South Africa in which a 
taxpayer has attempted to refuse to pay tax contending that taxation 
constitutes property deprivation in contravention of s 25 of the 
Constitution. Metcash Trading Ltd v C: SARS and Another13 indirectly 
touched on this issue. In this case, the Commissioner procured an expert 
legal opinion from Professor Dr P Sellmer, who commented on German 
tax laws and the right to property as follows: 
„Art. 14 GG thus, only by way of exception, grants protection 
against the duty to pay in cases which has a so-called strangling 
(punitive) effect. For the rest, the collection of taxes and revenues 
does not constitute an infringement of the right to property. If the 
imposition of a duty to pay does not constitute an infringement of 
Art. 14 GG, then the immediate execution of the duty to pay can a 
fortiori not do so.‟14 
 Thus, the German Constitution does not regard tax imposition as an 
infringement of the taxpayer‟s right to property. 
 In FNB15 Conradie J in the court a quo considered whether taxation 
constitutes property deprivation. He stated the following at page 449: 
„Taxation does not amount to a deprivation of property. Nor is 
there anything which is expropriated. No one would think of 
claiming compensation for having been taxed. Freedom from 
taxation is not a fundamental right. Nothing protects the subject 
against taxation. Not even death. I consequently do not consider 
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that the taking of the property of an affected owner (i.e. one who is 
not by definition an importer) is, in principle, a violation of s 28 of 
the Interim Constitution or s 34 of the Constitution. It may be 
different where the impugned tax is oppressive or partial and 
unequal in its operations; but customs duty is a form of taxation 
acknowledged worldwide. If its reach seems broader than it need 
be, that is no ground for a constitutional challenge.‟16 
 In the Constitutional Court Ackermann J, drawing on the court a 
quo‟s decision, stated that: „Taxation could not amount to deprivation or 
expropriation‟.17 
 In this case the Constitutional Court referred to the court a quo‟s 
decision and did not seek to contradict the views expressed by Conradie 
J, which were obiter.18  
 In interpreting the Bill of Rights our courts have an obligation to 
promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society. They 
must consider international law and may consider foreign law.19 Imposing 
taxes and securing payment will, in principle, be acceptable in a 
democratic society, subject to the safeguards contained in the Bill of 
Rights. 
 A survey of the approach taken in other jurisdictions will assist in 
reaching a conclusion. Article 1 of Protocol No 1 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights supports this approach as follows: 
„Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment 
of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions 
except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided 
for by law and by the general principles of international law. 
The preceding provision shall not, however, in any way impair the 
right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to 
control the use of property in accordance with the general interest 
or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or 
penalties.‟20 
 The Convention makes it clear that payment of taxes is not a breach 
of a person‟s right to the peaceful enjoyment of his or her possessions. 
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European democracies may impose taxing measures and may introduce 
measures to secure payment of taxes.  
 Van Dijk deals with the imposition of tax and securing the payment in 
Europe in the following terms: 
„Thus, the power of the national authorities to levy taxes, to 
impose penalties (with due observance of Article 7), to make 
social security contributions compulsory and to impose other 
levies is left intact as long as there exists a legal basis for them, no 
discrimination is involved, and the power is not used for a purpose 
other than that for which it has been conferred.‟21 
 The European Commission of Human Rights has decided that it is 
entitled to assess a legislature‟s objective in imposing a taxing measure 
and may determine whether it is reasonably necessary and 
proportionate.22 In Gudmundsson v Iceland23 the European Commission 
of Human Rights decided that even though the property tax was high it 
constituted a tax in the public interest and was legitimate.24 
 Although Australia considers taxation to be a deprivation of property 
it falls outside s 5125 of that country‟s provision governing and protecting 
rights to property.26 
Commenting on the position in Switzerland Van der Walt writes: 
„The institutional property guarantee (Institutsgarantie) means that 
only those state interferences (including taxation) which leave the 
essence of private property as a fundamental institution of the 
Swiss legal system intact are acceptable in view of the 
constitutional property guarantee. The institutional guarantee 
implies that the state is prohibited from steadily depriving 
individual taxpayers of their wealth or parts of that wealth (for 
example, immovable property) through disproportionately high 
taxation. … In this regard the court referred to similar German 
decisions, in which it was said that taxes which strangle 
(erdrosselin) the taxpayer would be confiscatory and thus 
unconstitutional.‟27  
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 Thus, the level of taxes imposed must be reasonable and must not 
disturb the essence of a taxpayer‟s right to property.28  
 In Trinidad and Tobago the courts have evaluated the validity of a 
tax and whether a particular levy unlawfully violates the taxpayer‟s right to 
property.29 The courts have held that the State has an inherent power to 
collect taxes; however, to be valid, such taxation must serve the public 
purpose and apply equally to all citizens of the country.30 
 The Indian Supreme Court has considered whether imposing 
taxation constitutes the deprivation of property in contravention of the 
property clause contained in the Indian Constitution. Dearling with this 
issue Seervai writes: 
„However, the Supreme Court held in Ramjilal v I.T.O 
Mohindargarh that the deprivation of property referred to in 
Art.31(1) did not include taxation in view of Art.265 which provides 
that “no tax shall be levied or collected save by authority of law” as 
otherwise Art.265 would be rendered redundant. However, Art.265 
required that the law (i) should be within the legislative 
competence of the legislature, (ii) should not be prohibited by any 
particular provision of the Constitution e.g. Art.276(2), 286, etc and 
(iii) should not be invalid in whole or in part under Art.13. A tax law 
need not satisfy the test of Art.31(2), but it did not follow that every 
other Article of the chapter on Fundamental Rights was 
inapplicable.‟31 
 Commenting on the position under the American Constitution Henkin 
& Rosenthal write: 
„In a literal sense, taxation is, of course, a confiscation of property; 
equally clearly no organised society can function without taxation. 
This has not prevented some extreme libertarians from arguing 
against taxation on the basis of natural rights: “taxation of earnings 
from labour is on a par with forced labour,” argues Robert Nozick. 
… In a notable paper, Epstein proceeds from a similar starting 
point (taxation is a taking) but notes the absurdity to which the 
constitutional argument would lead – the money raised must be 
returned to the individuals from whom it was collected as 
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“compensation”. His search is for an intermediate position that 
allows limited constitutional supervision of the powers to tax.  
… 
There may be other constitutional grounds for challenging 
taxation, but the taking of property without compensation is not 
one of them. Not surprisingly, other legal systems follow a similar 
course.‟32 
 The Irish High Court in Daly v the Revenue Commissioners33 
considered the obligation to pay tax and the taxpayer‟s right to property. 
Costello J stated that where a taxpayer claims there is an infringement of 
his right to private property he or she must show that those rights have 
been subject to „an unjust attack‟.34 A taxpayer will succeed where the 
State fails to pass the proportionality test.35  
 Daly referred to a decision of the Canadian Supreme Court, namely, 
Chaulk v R,36 which formulated the proportionality test as follows: 
„The objective of the impugned provision must be of sufficient 
importance to warrant over-riding a constitutionally protected right. 
It must relate to concerns pressing and substantial in a free and 
democratic society. The means chosen must pass a 
proportionality test. They must:- 
(a) be rationally connected to the objective and not be arbitrary, 
unfair or based on irrational considerations; 
(b) impair the right as little as possible, and 
(c) be such that their effects on rights are proportional to the 
objective.‟37 
 In Daly38 Costello J decided that the particular fiscal provision failed 
the proportionality test because it produced results that were unfair to 
taxpayers in that they caused them hardship.39 Where a fiscal provision 
which is out of proportion to the objective it must achieve is challenged a 
court should strike the provision down for violating a taxpayer‟s right to 
property.40   
Kelly, writing on the Irish Constitution, expresses the following view: 
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„The courts are particularly reluctant to hold that tax laws amount 
to an unjust attack on property rights. Such laws enjoy the benefit 
of a very strong presumption of constitutionality and will only fall 
foul of the constitutional guarantee of property rights if they are 
discriminatory or arbitrary in their operation.‟41  
 From the review of the right to property found in other countries it 
appears that the imposition of tax constitutes the taking of property. 
However, such deprivation of property is generally lawful and does not 
violate the particular country‟s constitutional right to property.  
 It is contended based on Daly,42 that if South Africa introduced a 
taxing measure that caused undue hardship to taxpayers it would not 
pass muster under s 25 of the Constitution. Taxation constitutes a 
deprivation of property but is generally lawful because the State requires 
funding from its citizens to meet its obligations. Where the tax „… affect[s] 
property rights in a manner out of proportion to the objective which the 
measure is designed to achieve‟43 the court should set it aside.  
 Where the legislature introduces a taxing measure that applies 
equally to all citizens of South Africa I contend that a taxpayer will fail to 
persuade a court to strike down the statute merely because it constitutes 
a violation of the right to property.44 A taxpayer may succeed in having a 
taxing measure struck down on other grounds. For example, introducing 
unfairly discriminatory taxing measures is likely to violate the right to 
equality contained in s 9 of the Constitution.45 This aspect lies beyond the 
scope of this thesis.  
 If the imposition of taxation constituted an unlawful deprivation of 
property in violation of s 25 of the Constitution the taxpayer would seek to 
recover compensation from the State. The State‟s only means of 
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financing such compensation would be from taxes themselves. Thus, a 
taxpayer will fail in challenging the constitutionality of taxing provisions on 
the grounds that they constitute an unreasonable and unjustifiable 
deprivation of property.  
 I therefore conclude that, in principle, the imposition of tax is a 
justifiable deprivation of a taxpayer‟s property. If, however, the State 
introduces an unreasonable taxing measure or a tax with an ulterior 
purpose or not for a public purpose, a court should strike such measure 
down as unreasonable in an open and democratic society.46  
 
III DOES THE SET-OFF OF TAX DEBTS AND REFUNDS VIOLATE THE 
RIGHT TO PROPERTY? 
 Generally in South African law set-off applies where person A owes 
a debt to person B, and B is in turn indebted to A.47 Because of set-off 
such persons do not have to pay their debts to each other. Historically, 
the Commissioner might not appropriate a refund due to a taxpayer 
under one taxing statute to liquidate a debt due to the State under 
another statute.48 The Commissioner, for example, paid refunds of VAT 
even though the taxpayer owed the Commissioner income tax.  
 Amendments to the various statutes administered by the 
Commissioner specifically allow him to appropriate a refund due under 
one statute against a debt due under another.49 The question arises 
whether these provisions violate the taxpayer‟s right to property 
contained in s 25 of the Constitution. 
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For example, s 102(3) of the Income Tax Act provides as follows: 
„Where any refund contemplated in sub-section (1) is due to any 
person who has failed to pay any amount of tax, additional tax, 
duty, levy, charge, interest or penalty levied or imposed under this 
Act or any other Act administered by the Commissioner, within the 
period prescribed for payment of the amount, the Commissioner 
may set off against the amount which the person has failed to pay, 
any amount which has become refundable to the person under 
this section.‟ 
 If a taxpayer, for example, owes the Commissioner value added tax 
(„VAT‟), transfer duty or stamp duty and has overpaid his income tax, 
entitling him to a refund, the Commissioner may appropriate that refund.50  
 When reference is made to the extensive meaning of the term 
„property‟ a refund due to a taxpayer constitutes property under the 
Constitution.51  The appropriation of a refund due to a taxpayer by the 
Commissioner in settlement of tax debts properly due under another fiscal 
statute means deprivation of property will take place under a law of 
general application. Various fiscal statutes apply equally to all South 
African taxpayers and are valid under s 36 of the Constitution. Thus, 
appropriating a refund due under one fiscal statute to settle taxes due 
under another does not constitute a violation of s 25 of the Constitution.  
 Unfair treatment of a taxpayer occurs when a refund is properly due 
under, say, the VAT Act and an incorrect tax assessment reflects an 
amount as owing to the Commissioner for income tax. Unfortunately, the 
Commissioner‟s staff and systems are not infallible. Payments made by a 
taxpayer may be credited to the incorrect taxpayer. Alternatively, an 
income tax return may be incorrectly captured and reflect an incorrect 
amount of income tax payable. It is unfair for the Commissioner to 
appropriate a VAT refund and apply that against an amount of income tax 
reflected as owing by a taxpayer because of administrative errors made 
by the Commissioner. The application of the VAT refund to settle an 
income tax liability incorrectly reflected should not be upheld in an open 
and democratic society because such conduct is unreasonable and 

















unjustifiable. The Commissioner should only be authorised to apply set-off 
after establishing that the income tax reflected as payable is, in fact, due. 
 Let us imagine that a business rendered services to the 
Commissioner and encountered difficulties in obtaining payment. At the 
same time the business owed the Commissioner income tax and VAT. 
The business could not effect payment of the taxes due because its cash 
flows were under pressure because of the non-payment of fees by the 
Commissioner. The question that arises is whether the business can seek 
to apply set-off of the VAT and other taxes due to the Commissioner 
against the debt due by the Commissioner for services rendered. 
Unfortunately, the fiscal statutes do not allow a taxpayer in such 
circumstances to apply set-off and South African Railways v Kemp52 
supports this.  
 In this case the court decided that the defendant could not reduce 
the amount due to the South African Railways by an amount due to him 
by the Department of Defence. The court ruled that the funds 
administered by the South African Railways were placed in the Railways 
and Harbour Fund and the amount due by the Department of Defence 
would come from the Consolidated Revenue Fund.53 The court decided 
the defendant had to pay the amount claimed by the Railways and then 
claim the amount due from the Department of Defence.  
 The difficulty Kemp faced was that the amount due to him was 
payable by one State department and the amount payable by him was 
due to another.54 Today a court hearing a similar matter would need to 
comply with s 39(2) of the Constitution under which the courts must 
promote the spirit and objects of the Bill of Rights.55 A court faced with a 
taxpayer applying set-off of amounts due by the Commissioner for 
services rendered against tax due by the taxpayer may reach a different 
conclusion from that in Kemp56 because the taxpayer is dealing with an 
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organ of state and the provisions of s 39(2) of the Constitution. A court 
may agree to set-off on the basis that it is fair to the taxpayer and 
promotes the Bill of Rights. 
 The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development 
(„OECD‟), which considered the question of whether a taxpayer may 
offset his tax liability against debts owed by the government, stated in its 
1990 report: „Offsetting a tax liability against a government debt is 
generally not permitted, though Greece and Turkey do so and a few 
countries allow it under certain conditions.‟57 In those countries that permit 
set-off it may only apply if the liability relates to taxes due and payable to 
the same level of government.58  
 A South African taxpayer would have to institute recovery 
proceedings against the Commissioner for the outstanding debt for 
services rendered. Unfortunately, the cost of proceeding to court is 
significant and the taxpayer could become insolvent before recovering the 
amount due. The fiscal statutes should provide for a taxpayer to apply 
set-off where he or she has not received timeous payment from the 
Commissioner for services rendered and, as a result, cannot pay the 
taxes due. Alternatively, the Commissioner should defer payment for 
taxes due until he settles the amounts due to the taxpayer for services 
rendered.  
 
IV DOES A DELAY IN RECEIVING A TAX REFUND CONSTITUTE A 
DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY? 
 If a taxpayer overpays income tax he or she may seek a refund 
under s 102 of the Income Tax Act. In certain circumstances the taxpayer 
may receive interest on the overpaid tax under s 89quat of the Act.  
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 Section 89quat (4) currently provides that interest shall be payable 
only to provisional taxpayers where the refund exceeds R10 000 or the 
taxpayer‟s taxable income exceeds certain specific amounts. 
 Section 89quat of the Income Tax Act provides that provisional 
taxpayers with a February year-end pay interest to the Commissioner and 
receive interest from the Commissioner after seven months from the end 
of the year of assessment. For provisional taxpayers with a year-end 
other than February interest is payable to and by SARS after six months 
from the end of the taxpayer‟s year of assessment. In these cases 
taxpayers receive interest on the refund payable to them. If a provisional 
taxpayer properly manages his or her tax affairs he or she should not 
become liable to pay tax to the Commissioner on assessment nor should 
he or she become entitled to a refund.  
 However, it may happen that a taxpayer overpays provisional tax 
because the taxable income reflected on the previous assessment is 
greater than the taxable income derived in the later year of assessment. 
Section 89quat of the Income Tax Act provides that interest is payable in 
cases where the provisional taxpayer overpays income tax. 
 Those persons who are not provisional taxpayers do not pay interest 
to the Commissioner until the due date of the assessment issued to them 
has passed. I submit that it is thus equitable for non-provisional taxpayers 
not to receive interest from the end of the tax year until the due date of 
the assessment.  
 My concern is the unreasonable delay of refunds to non-provisional 
taxpayers. If a taxpayer files his or her tax return on time he or she 
should receive the refund within a reasonable time. The failure to pay 
interest on a refund unreasonably delayed constitutes a violation of the 
taxpayer‟s right to property contained in s 25 of the Constitution. The 
Income Tax Act should provide for the payment of interest when the issue 
of the assessment is unjustifiably delayed. The statute should also 














 A taxpayer may challenge the interest receivable if the prescribed 
rate is lower than the rate of interest earned on an investment with a 
financial institution.59 A question that arises is whether the rate of interest 
payable to a taxpayer is reasonable. If the taxpayer is an entrepreneur, 
his or her business would typically generate returns greater than the rate 
of interest payable by the Commissioner under the Income Tax Act. Is the 
shortfall between the rate of return the entrepreneur generates compared 
to the rate of interest payable by the Commissioner on the delayed refund 
an unlawful deprivation of the taxpayer‟s property? The rules regulating 
the payment of interest on refunds apply to taxpayers generally and do 
not distinguish between taxpayers other than between those who are 
provisional taxpayers and those who are not. The section thus constitutes 
a law of general application and I contend that such a provision is 
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society. A revenue 
authority should pay a market-related rate of interest to a taxpayer who 
has overpaid tax, failing which the taxpayer may argue that the rate of 
interest is too low and thus constitutes an unjustifiable deprivation of 
property.   
 It would be more equitable if the rate of interest due to the 
Commissioner equated with that paid by the Commissioner for income 
tax purposes. In the case of VAT the rate of interest due to the 
Commissioner is the same as that paid by the Commissioner on a VAT 
refund. Further, where a taxpayer who succeeds in an income tax appeal 
has paid the tax in dispute the Commissioner refunds the tax plus interest 
at the same rate as is due to him.60 The Income Tax Act should remove 
the disparity.  
 The interest received by a provisional taxpayer from the 
Commissioner is liable to income tax. However, the interest levied by the 
Commissioner is not deductible for tax purposes, which increases the 
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cost of the interest paid to the Commissioner.61 A taxpayer would find it 
difficult to show that, on constitutional grounds, the interest received from 
the Commissioner is not taxable. A taxpayer must declare all interest 
received for tax purposes. It would be equitable if interest paid to the 
Commissioner were deductible for tax purposes but it will be difficult to 
challenge this provision, which applies to all taxpayers. The only 
taxpayers who have a case for claiming interest are those who are not 
provisional taxpayers, where the Commissioner delays their refund 
unreasonably. Such taxpayers should place the Commissioner in mora 
and seek mora interest on the delayed refund. It would be preferable, 
however, if the legislature introduced amendments to cater for the 
payment of interest on refunds that the Commissioner has unreasonably 
delayed. 
 
V MAY THE TAXPAYER RECOVER FROM THE COMMISSIONER 
WASTED COSTS INCURRED THROUGH UNREASONABLE 
CONDUCT BY TAX OFFICIALS?  
 The Commissioner may audit a taxpayer and issue a revised 
assessment. If the taxpayer has incurred professional fees because of 
consultations with attorneys or accountants to deal with the matter, the 
taxpayer cannot feel aggrieved if the revised assessment is valid. 
However, where the Commissioner issues additional assessments 
without proper foundation, is the taxpayer entitled to recover his costs 
from the Commissioner?  
 The Commissioner frequently institutes audits and investigations 
because of anonymous tip-offs received from estranged spouses or 
disgruntled employees. Where the complainant has made vexatious 
allegations against the taxpayer and the taxpayer has incurred 
accounting and other professional fees in answering the Commissioner‟s 
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queries, the taxpayer suffers a decline in his or her patrimony. This 
constitutes a deprivation of the taxpayer‟s property. 
 The decision to engage professional advisors rests solely with a 
taxpayer. However, because of the complexities of South African fiscal 
legislation the taxpayer should not, in my submission, deal with the 
Commissioner without professional assistance. Is the taxpayer not 
entitled to recover his or her costs where the Commissioner acts 
unreasonably? There is currently no authoritative statement of the 
position in South Africa. A review of how other countries deal with this 
issue is instructive. 
 Bentley comments that: 
„In a successful appeal, taxpayers should have the right to 
compensation for legal costs and expenses that they have 
incurred. They should also have the right to compensation for 
personal or economic loss resulting from any actions taken by the 
tax authorities without lawful authority or cause. This would include 
where an employee of the tax authority disregards the 
requirements of the tax law and regulations to the detriment of the 
taxpayer, for example, by releasing without authorisation, 
commercially sensitive information on a taxpayer‟s file, either 
generally, or to another taxpayer. Compensation should be 
available for inadvertent as well as intentional or reckless actions. 
The protection for the government would be that the taxpayer 
would have to show loss.  
It might be reasonable for the government to place a cap on the 
compensation, to limit its exposure to massive claims. It is 
detrimental to the proper administration of the tax system if the tax 
authority is restrained in its proper pursuit of tax evasion and fraud 
for fear of facing large damages claims in the event that it cannot 
prove its case.‟62 
 Sweden allows taxpayers to recover costs in limited cases. Hultqvist 
summarises the position in Sweden in the following terms: 
„Finally, the taxpayer may recover costs if there are very special 
reasons for reimbursement. For example, they may be reimbursed 
if the tax authority has been negligent, or nearly so, when auditing 
a company and has forced the taxpayer to pay a lawyer or 
accountant to defend itself against unreasonable tax charges. This 
provision is rarely applied. 
The taxpayer never has to pay the tax authorities their litigation 
costs. On the other hand, taxpayers are not reimbursed for their 
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own work or other internal costs in an action. This applies equally 
to the cost of using in-house lawyers.‟63 
 In the United Kingdom Newth has stated the following: 
„It has to be said that, nowadays, satisfaction is often reached at 
this point and restitution may be made by an official apology, with 
or without compensation to reimburse the fees of the professional 
advisor and/or a consolatory payment to the client. I have taken 
this route myself and reached an entirely satisfactory settlement 
with a Revenue department.‟64  
 The Australian authorities have released draft guidelines explaining 
how taxpayers may claim compensation from the Australian Tax Office 
where that office‟s conduct has caused loss.65 
 Writing about the position in the USA Scott comments: 
„Congress has enacted some express rights to recover damages 
from the IRS. Because the action for improper disclosure of 
information is available for negligence and the damages are the 
greater of $1 000 or the actual damages for each disclosure, 
people have a reasonable opportunity to recover compensation for 
their injuries. 
Other rights are limited to the point that few people can recover. A 
proposal to include assessment in the malpractice statute was 
rejected, and the collection malpractice requirements are very 
difficult to satisfy. Because it is available only to the taxpayer, 
Congress intentionally excluded cases where collection is 
attempted from another person. Grounds are difficult to prove 
because there must be a reckless or intentional disregard of the 
Code or regulations, and damages are limited to the lesser of 
$100 000 or the “actual, economic damages”. Because a proposal 
to authorise recovery of actual damages for negligent collection 
was rejected, Congress wanted to restrict recoveries. … 
Because they have a substantial track record of lawless conduct, 
remedies in addition to damages are needed to regulate the 
activities of the IRS and its employees. Possibilities include 
injunctions to prohibit future misconduct, class actions to make 
remedies available to groups of people, and publicity of all 
damages judgements against the IRS or its employees.‟66  
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 In the light of experience abroad, where a taxpayer has suffered 
financial prejudice because of unreasonable conduct by the 
Commissioner I would argue that he or she may recover damages from 
the Commissioner. A taxpayer may institute an action for damages on 
delictual grounds but it remains unclear how a court will decide on such 
an action in the tax arena. A taxpayer may, based on the decision of the 
court in Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another67 
succeed with a claim, based in delict against the Commissioner, where 
his officials have acted wrongfully.68 
 Where the taxpayer shows that he or she has suffered loss as a 
result of the negligent acts of the Commissioner‟s officials, a court should 
award damages.69 
 The legislature should introduce measures prescribing the 
circumstances in which a taxpayer can recover damages from the 
Commissioner. Such legislation would act as a counter balance to the 
Commissioner‟s draconian powers, which are unfortunately occasionally 
abused by the Commissioner‟s officials. However, the proposed 
legislation should not constrain the Commissioner in effectively exercising 
his mandate under the SARS Act. The proposed measures would 
enhance the fair and proper administration of the tax system in South 
Africa.  
 
VI WHERE THE COMMISSIONER SEEKS TO HOLD DIRECTORS OF 
COMPANIES PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR THE TAX DEBTS OF A 
COMPANY DOES THIS BREACH THEIR RIGHT TO PROPERTY? 
 In starting a business undertaking a choice must be made of which 
entity to use in conducting the business. If an entrepreneur conducts 
business as a sole proprietor or in partnership with other persons he or 
she exposes his or her personal assets to his or her creditors if the 
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business fails. Alternatively, the choice is to conduct the business as a 
close corporation governed by the Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984, or 
as a company governed by the Companies Act 61 of 1973 or as a 
business trust regulated by the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988. A 
principle of company law limits the directors‟ and shareholders‟ liability for 
the debts of a company. Where, however, any officers of the company, 
including its directors, trade recklessly and defraud creditors they are 
personally liable for the debts of the company.70 A court may also pierce 
the corporate veil in appropriate cases.71 A close corporation limits the 
liability of members unless it trades in insolvent circumstances, cannot 
meet its debts when they fall due, or if the court rules that there is an 
abuse of the juristic personality.72  In addition, s 63(a)-(h) of the Close 
Corporations Act prescribe various circumstances where the members 
are jointly and severally liable for certain debts of the corporation.  
 Various fiscal statutes contain provisions allowing the Commissioner 
to disregard the principle of limited liability conferred on shareholders and 
directors of companies and members of close corporations. 
Paragraph 16(2C) of the Fourth Schedule of the Income Tax Act provides 
as follows:  
„Where an employer is a company, every shareholder and director 
who controls or is regularly involved in the management of the 
company‟s overall financial affairs shall be personally liable for the 
employees‟ tax, additional tax, penalty or interest for which the 
company is liable.‟73  
 If a company fails to withhold and/or pay over employees‟ tax, 
comprising Pay As You Earn („PAYE‟) and Standard Income Tax on 
Employees („SITE‟) from employees‟ remuneration, the Commissioner 
may recover the tax from either the directors or the shareholders of the 
company. The above provision does not take account of the negligence 
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or state of mind of the shareholder or director of the company. It only 
requires the director of the company to control or be regularly involved in 
managing the company‟s financial affairs. Paragraph 16(2C) of the Fourth 
Schedule of the Income Tax Act is thus harsh where there is no direct 
involvement by a director in the daily business of the company.  
 The rationale for this provision is that the amounts of employees‟ tax 
due by an employer to the Commissioner constitute „trustee funds‟.74 An 
employer must withhold and deduct employees‟ tax under the Fourth 
Schedule of the Income Tax Act from remuneration paid to its employees 
and pay those amounts to the Commissioner on behalf of its 
employees.75 Similarly, VAT collected by vendors from members of the 
public also constitutes „trustee money‟ due to the Commissioner.76  
 Where a company fails to pay assessed income tax the 
Commissioner is unable to recover such tax from the directors or 
shareholders of the company under the Income Tax Act.77 The Act does 
not override the general principle limiting the liability of a company‟s 
shareholders. 
 I question whether the provisions of para 16(2C) of the Fourth 
Schedule of the Income Tax Act and s 48(9) of the VAT Act comply with 
the principles contained in the Constitution. Where the shareholders or 
directors conduct a business negligently, or with the intention to defraud 
the Commissioner, such persons should lose the protection available to 
them under s 424 of the Companies Act. Where the directors administer 
the business according to sound financial principles and the business 
fails it is questionable why the Commissioner should be able to recover 
unpaid employees‟ tax, additional tax, penalties and interest from the 
directors personally. I suggest the affected persons could argue that para 
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16(2C) of the Fourth Schedule of the Income Tax Act constitutes a 
violation of the taxpayers‟ right to property in s 25 of the Constitution.  
 A director of a company has a fiduciary duty to the company and 
must act with care and skill.78 The failure by a director to pay over 
employees‟ tax and/or VAT could constitute a breach of the director‟s 
statutory duty to the company. 
 I accept that public interest demands that the Commissioner should 
rank preferentially vis-à-vis the taxpayer‟s other creditors. However, the 
legislature could have introduced less punitive measures to protect the 
Commissioner. Currently the Commissioner enjoys preference over other 
creditors in relation to the payment of debts due by liquidated or 
sequestrated taxpayers.79 The recovery provisions under consideration 
should require negligence, recklessness, or an intention by the taxpayer 
not to pay SARS. The measures are thus too broad and require to be 
reviewed and narrowed down in the manner suggested. 
 Interest, additional tax and penalties levied by the Commissioner do 
not constitute funds held in trust by a taxpayer. The right to recover such 
amounts from a member of a close corporation or director or shareholder 
of a company may be invalid. Unfortunately, no cases have been decided 
that deal with this principle. The requirement to pay the interest, 
additional tax and penalties on employees‟ tax and VAT could constitute 
an arbitrary deprivation of the director‟s property where that director has 
acted reasonably.  
 
VII DOES THE IMPOSITION BY THE COMMISSIONER OF ADDITIONAL 
TAX AND INTEREST VIOLATE THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY?  
 The Income Tax and VAT Acts both contain provisions whereby 
additional tax, if imposed, may amount to up to twice the tax that would 
otherwise have been payable by a taxpayer.80 The other fiscal statutes 
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administered by the Commissioner also contain provisions allowing for 
the imposition of additional tax.81 In addition, a taxpayer faces the 
imposition of certain penalties and fines provided for in the various fiscal 
statutes.82   
 The Commissioner has the power to levy a penalty equal to 10 per 
cent of PAYE paid late.83 The Commissioner may levy a late payment 
penalty under various fiscal statutes in those cases where the taxpayer 
fails to pay tax timeously.84  
 Section 75 of the Income Tax Act specifies those actions which will 
constitute an offence under the Income Tax Act. A taxpayer who violates 
s 75 faces criminal prosecution and, if convicted, exposure to a fine or 
imprisonment for any of the offences listed in s 75 of the Income Tax 
Act.85  
 Further, the Commissioner may levy interest at the prescribed rate in 
those cases where tax is overdue or where there is late payment of 
provisional tax.86 In countries abroad, the opinion is that the imposition of 
interest by the Commissioner is a form of penalty imposed on the 
taxpayer.87 The conclusion is that taxpayers should be subject to interest 
or penalties but not both, as this amounts to them facing a similar impost 
for the same offence. 
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 The tax due, as well as any penalties and additional tax levied by the 
Commissioner, is subject to interest, thus increasing the interest finally 
payable. 
 Under s 89 of the Income Tax Act South African taxpayers may be 
subject to interest on the late payment of assessed tax and additional tax. 
The imposition of the penalties, additional tax and fines provided for in 
the various fiscal statutes may have dire financial consequences for 
taxpayers and directly affects their right to property. 
 Arnold deals with penalties imposed in South Africa as follows: 
„B.3.9.1 Comparison of the Canadian and South African 
provisions 
… 
The basic approach of the Canadian Income Tax Act to penalties 
is considerably different from the approach in s 75 of the South 
African Income Tax Act. Under the provisions of the Canadian 
Income Tax Act, different penalties are provided for different 
offences. In this way, serious fines and imprisonment are 
restricted to serious offences such as tax evasion. Minor offences 
such as the late filing of a tax return are punishable by minor 
financial penalties.  
… 
B.3.9.2 Reasonableness 
In my opinion, it is inappropriate, even if not unconstitutional, for 
major and minor offences to be subject to the same penalty and 
then to rely on the authorities not to impose penalties on what they 
perceive to be minor offences. 
… 
B.3.9.5 Suggested reforms 
In light of the foregoing discussion, it seems appropriate for the 
penalty provisions of the South African Income Tax Act to be 
reviewed and restructured. There should be civil penalties that 
apply automatically where the taxpayer or another person fails to 
provide the necessary information or provides incorrect or false 
information. The amount of the penalty should be appropriate to 
the nature of the offence. … In some situations it may be 
appropriate for the amount of the penalty to be based on the 
amount of the understatement of the taxpayer‟s tax liability. 
Criminal penalties should be restricted to serious offences such as 
tax evasion.‟88  
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 The position in other countries will assist in determining whether the 
imposition of additional tax and other penalties violates the taxpayer‟s 
constitutional right to property.  
 Bentley writes of penalties imposed in other countries: 
„Penalties are normally set out in statutes or regulations. It should 
be clear when they apply and in what circumstances. There should 
also be guidelines setting out how the tax authorities will exercise 
any discretion that they have in imposing penalties.‟89  
 The penalties imposed by the Inland Revenue Department, New 
Zealand, take account of shortfalls identified in the taxpayer‟s income, 
and whether such identification takes place, for example, before or after 
notification of an audit.90 In New Zealand, writes Alston, 
„[t]he civil penalties include “shortfall penalties” for which standard 
rates are set but which may be either reduced, if the taxpayer 
makes a voluntary disclosure or if the shortfall is temporary in 
nature, or increased if the taxpayer obstructs the Commissioner in 
determining the correct tax position.‟91 
 New Zealand allows for an increase in penalties if the taxpayer 
seeks to obstruct the New Zealand Revenue. The revenue authorities 
reduce the penalties where the taxpayer co-operates and assists, or 
advises the revenue department of the shortfall before an audit starts.92  
 Sommerhalder & Pechler summarise the position in the Netherlands 
as follows: 
„In certain circumstances the tax inspector can increase the 
assessment. An administrative penalty of 100% is given if an 
additional assessment is necessary due to the intent or gross 
negligence of the taxpayer (AWR Art 18). The inspector, however, 
may remit all or any part of this penalty at her or his discretion 
(VAB para 18). Unless severe fraud is involved, the actual fine is 
usually reduced to 50% or lower. 
The taxpayer may be punished by criminal sanctions for filing a 
return irregularly, too late or not at all, for furnishing the tax 
                                                 
89
 Bentley (note 62 above) 54. 
90
 A Alston „Taxpayers‟ Rights in New Zealand‟ in Bentley (note 33 above) 280. The standard rate of 
penalties may be reduced by 75 per cent if disclosure is made before notification of an audit. If it is 
made after notification of an audit, the reduction is 40 per cent. Where the disclosure is made at the 
time of filing the return the penalty is reduced by 75 per cent. However, if the taxpayer obstructs the 
authorities the penalty is increased by 25 per cent. 
91















administration with incorrect or incomplete information, for 
providing the tax administration with incorrect or incomplete 
information, for providing the tax administration with false or 
falsified books and other records, for not keeping proper books 
and other records while obliged to do so, or for failing to preserve 
these books and records for a period of 10 years (ADW Art 
68 (1)).‟93  
 At 100 per cent the penalties in the Netherlands are thus half the 
200 per cent the Commissioner may levy in South Africa.94 However, 
according to the OECD survey, penalties in countries abroad range from 
40 per cent in Sweden and Japan to as much as 300 per cent in Turkey 
and 400 per cent in Switzerland.95  
 Unfortunately South African fiscal legislation, unlike that of other 
countries, does not contain a graduated system of penalties depending 
on the particular nature of the offence. Under the Income Tax Act the 
Commissioner may impose additional tax up to twice the normal tax 
otherwise payable, regardless of the offence committed. In practice, the 
question of additional tax may be subject to agreement and negotiation 
between the taxpayer and the Commissioner. In the 2006 Budget Speech 
the Minister of Finance said that, in future, guidelines would specify the 
circumstances under which the Commissioner may impose additional 
tax.96  Unfortunately, these guidelines remain outstanding. 
 The penalties, additional tax and fines leviable under the various 
fiscal statutes constitute a deprivation of the taxpayer‟s property. Given 
that the provisions levying these amounts constitute laws that are not 
arbitrary and are generally applicable to all taxpayers they are lawful 
under s 25(1) of the Constitution. Fiscal statutes around the world contain 
provisions whereby the revenue authority of the country concerned may 
levy, inter alia, fines and penalties on defaulting taxpayers to improve 
taxpayer compliance. It is contended that the penalty and related 
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provisions are reasonable, necessary and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society to ensure that the State timeously collects the taxes 
due to it. It is thus unlikely that a taxpayer would succeed in showing that 
the imposition of penalties, additional tax and fines constitutes an 
unlawful violation of his or her right to property.  
 
VIII DOES THE PROHIBITION ON PAYMENT OF INTEREST ON 
DELAYED VAT REFUNDS BREACH THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY?  
 Normally a vendor may receive interest under the VAT Act if the VAT 
refund due remains unpaid within 21 business days after submitting a 
VAT return to the Commissioner.97 Where a VAT return is defective 
interest is only payable from the date on which the information not 
previously supplied becomes available to the Commissioner.98 Similarly, 
if the Commissioner conducts an audit of the taxpayer‟s affairs, interest 
is due only on completion of the audit.99 If a VAT vendor reflects VAT 
refundable and has failed to supply VAT returns to the Commissioner, 
interest is not normally payable until that vendor submits the outstanding 
VAT returns.  
 Section 45(1)(iA) of the VAT Act prevents the Commissioner from 
paying interest on any VAT refund due if he identifies a vendor as not 
having submitted a return due under any other fiscal statute.  
The section provides as follows: 
„Where the vendor is in default in respect of any of his obligations 
under this Act or any other Act administered by the Commissioner, 
to furnish a return as required by such Act, the said period of 21 
business days shall be reckoned from the date on which any such 
outstanding return or returns furnished by the vendor as required 
by such Act are received by an officer of the South African 
Revenue Service.‟ [my emphasis].100 
 Thus, if the vendor neglects to submit PAYE or Unemployment 
Insurance Fund contributions or other returns to the Commissioner 
                                                 
97
 The VAT Act s 45(1). 
98
 Ibid s 45(1)(i). 
99
 Ibid s 45(1)(ii). 
100













interest is not payable on the VAT refund due to the vendor. This is 
regardless of the amount due under the other statute or the nature of 
the return not submitted to the Commissioner.  
 The Income Tax Act 27 of 1997 inserted s 45(1)(iA) into the VAT Act 
89 of 1991, further amending it by Acts 30 of 1998 and 60 of 2001. The 
Explanatory Memorandum on Act 60 of 2001 referred to the amendment 
to s 45(1)(iA) of the VAT Act  „as textual in nature‟. However, in practice, 
the Commissioner sometimes delays paying significant amounts of VAT 
refunds due to vendors. He also refuses to pay interest either because 
the vendor owes a small amount under another fiscal statute or because 
the Commissioner has not received a return required under another 
fiscal statute. The difficulty a vendor faces is where the vendor has 
submitted to the Commissioner the returns required under another fiscal 
statute and the Commissioner is unable to locate those returns in his 
office. In practice the Commissioner has, in such cases, relied on 
s 45(1)(iA) as a reason for not paying interest on the delayed refund of 
VAT legally due to the taxpayer. 
 Section 45(1)(iA) of the VAT Act constitutes a law of general 
application as envisaged in s 25(1) of the Constitution. I submit that it 
violates the taxpayer‟s constitutional right to property contained in s 25 
on the basis that the provision constitutes an unlawful deprivation of the 
taxpayer‟s property. To require that a taxpayer forfeit interest on an 
overpayment of VAT regardless of the taxpayer‟s circumstances or the 
nature of the offence allegedly committed is arbitrary. Interest should 
only be suspended under s 45(1)(iA) where the offence committed 
under another fiscal statute is serious. For example, the failure to submit 
a nil provisional tax return should not result in a suspension of interest 
as the Commissioner may achieve his objective by less draconian 
means. It is more reasonable if, in such cases, there is a suspension of 
interest due on the income tax until the taxpayer becomes entitled to 
interest on the VAT overpaid. 
 I contend that the provisions of s 36 of the Constitution do not assist 













offence committed under another fiscal statute. The provisions 
contained in s 45(1)(iA) of the VAT Act are unreasonable and 
unjustifiable in an open and democratic society.  
 Amendments to s 45(1)(iA) should provide the Commissioner with 
the discretion to pay interest to vendors where the violation of the other 
fiscal statute is inconsequential. The legislature should introduce less 
restrictive means to achieve the Commissioner‟s purpose of ensuring 
compliance with other fiscal statutes. 
 
IX DOES THE ENACTMENT OF FISCAL AMENDMENTS WITH 
RETROSPECTIVE EFFECT BREACH THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY? 
 May a taxpayer challenge the effective date of an amendment to the 
Income Tax Act on the basis that it breaches the right to property if it is 
introduced with retrospective effect?  
 Amendments to fiscal legislation normally take effect from a date 
after enactment. However, on occasion the National Treasury proposes 
tax legislation that takes effect retrospectively. I contend that the 
introduction of fiscal legislation with retrospective effect constitutes a 
deprivation of property as envisaged in s 25 of the Constitution.101 Ideally, 
a change in taxing measures should relate to future events because if it 
relates to past events it constitutes confiscation of property held by the 
taxpayer before the measure‟s enactment.102  
 The Constitution contains no specific prohibition against the 
introduction of tax amendments with retrospective effect. I refer to 
commentators on the experience of other countries. Bentley writes: 
„A problem fundamental to taxation is retroactive legislation. One 
of the tenets of most legal systems is that legislation should not 
have retrospective effect. Citizens have a right to be required to 
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act only in accordance with laws enacted by the legislature and 
not simply in accordance with statements of legislative intention. 
Tax laws stretch this rule to its limit. However, even tax legislation 
is seldom passed so that the law applies from a date earlier than 
the date that the legislation was first announced. That would be to 
require taxpayers to obey a law which was yet to be 
foreshadowed. However, tax legislation is notorious for giving 
effect to vague forms of earlier announcements or indications that 
a law would be passed in that area.‟103  
 According to Bentley there are different forms of retrospective 
legislation.104 The legislature often introduces amendments giving effect 
to earlier, administrative interpretations of the law. Retrospective 
legislation also includes announcing the enactment of amendments, 
ultimately broader in nature and effect than originally indicated, to achieve 
the desired result. However, the legislation as enacted takes effect from 
the date of the earlier announcement. Bentley states that in those 
countries adopting self-assessment with onerous penalties for non-
compliance, the taxpayer should have a legitimate expectation of certainty 
in the tax laws – for instance, legislation should not be introduced via 
media release.105 He concludes that such procedure is „offensive‟ and 
„unfair‟ in a democratic society.106  
 Bentley indicates that the introduction of retrospective legislation is 
justifiable in those cases to correct wrongs done to taxpayers, to confer 
benefits that do not prejudice taxpayers and to rectify errors in 
legislation.107 He expresses the view that, in order to close identified 
loopholes, it is occasionally necessary for government to introduce 
measures that take effect from the date of the announcement.108  
 Li points out that in Canada tax legislation often takes effect on the 
date it is announced in the Budget Speech. 109 This is despite the fact that 
it might be a considerable time before the legislation is enacted. She 
points out that this creates uncertainty from the date of the announcement 
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until the proposed measure is enacted and that a lengthy waiting period 
may undermine the rule of law. Li states that the Canadian courts have 
refused to upset the budgetary process.  
 She indicates that under the Canadian Constitution Parliament and 
the provincial legislatures have an unfettered discretion in deciding the 
effective dates of new tax laws and points out that the Canadian Charter 
of Rights requires that the intended retrospective effect must be clear and 
unequivocal. Based on Li‟s commentary it appears that the Canadian 
courts have ruled that retrospective tax legislation does not undermine the 
rule of law or violate the provisions of the Charter. 
 Considering the position in Germany Daiber comments that 
taxpayers‟ rights include the right to certainty and the prohibition of laws 
which apply retrospectively.110 She correctly expresses the view that 
retroactivity takes two forms: „[u]nder one form, future legal consequences 
are established but are based on past facts. Under the other form the 
legal consequences based on past facts are retroactive.‟111  . The second 
form is unconstitutional under German law.112  
Dealing with the question of retrospective tax legislation generally 
Baker states: 
„There is no clear consensus that retrospective tax legislation 
breaches the rights of taxpayers. This view is taken in certain 
countries (see, for example, Article 3 of the Italian Law 212 of 27th 
July 2000), and tax legislation in these countries may not be 
retrospective. In keeping with the principle of the rule of law and its 
corollary – certainty with respect to taxation – there is much to be 
said, however, for recognising this principle.‟113  
 Several countries thus prohibit the introduction of fiscal amendments 
with retrospective effect.  
 At the time the Constitution was being drafted I proposed to the 
Constitutional Assembly that a specific provision be included prohibiting 
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fiscal amendments from being introduced with retrospective effect.114 
Unfortunately, the Constitutional Assembly decided not to include such a 
provision. The introduction of such retrospective amendments must 
therefore be weighed against the existing provisions of the Constitution. 
 The budget speech of South Africa‟s Minister of Finance, made in 
Parliament in February each year, includes the announcement of changes 
to tax rates. Shortly thereafter, the National Treasury releases for 
comment the legislation effecting those amendments. Parliament then 
passes the legislation, which the President enacts by proclamation in the 
Government Gazette in June or July. This approach is the most practical 
way to give legal effect to the tax announcements made in the Budget 
Speech. What causes concern is the enactment on one date of fiscal 
amendments which take effect on another date, sometimes even earlier 
than the date on which the Minister of Finance first announced them.  
I agree that retrospective amendments should apply to those cases where 
the loss of revenue to the State would be significant.115 It is also important 
that amendments enacted should not extend beyond the ambit of the 
State‟s prior announcements.116 
 Is it possible to challenge an amendment on the grounds that it is 
retrospective and should be set aside in that it violates the taxpayer‟s 
constitutional right to property? The statute enacting an amendment is a 
law of general application and it would be difficult to set the amendment 
aside because of the limitation provisions contained in s 36 of the 
Constitution. Fiscal amendments apply generally, and not to particular 
taxpayers because of their specific characteristics or other features and 
thus should be lawful. 
 The limitation of rights provision in s 36 of the Constitution 
specifically refers to „less restrictive means to achieve the purpose‟. 
Clearly, it is preferable and more equitable for an amendment to take 
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effect prospectively so that it applies to years of assessment commencing 
on or after a specified date.  
 It is appropriate to consider the effect, if any, of section 1 of the 
Constitution, which contains the foundational values of the Constitution. 
That section refers, inter alia, to the „supremacy of the Constitution and 
the rule of law‟. It is necessary to consider whether this provision may 
assist in arguing successfully that retrospective amendments to fiscal 
statutes are unlawful. 
 In Minister of Home Affairs v National Institute for Crime Prevention 
and the Re-Integration of Offenders117 the Court stated: 
„The values enunciated in section 1 of the Constitution are of 
fundamental importance. They inform and give substance to all the 
provisions of the Constitution. They do not, however, give rise to 
discrete and enforceable rights in themselves. This is clear not 
only from the language of section 1 itself, but also from the way 
the Constitution is structured and in particular the provisions of 
chapter 2 which contains the Bill of Rights.‟118 
 The rule of law set out in s1 requires that the State act lawfully and 
that nobody is arbitrarily deprived of rights.119  
 Devenish comments on the rule of law and statutes introduced with 
retrospective effect as follows:  
„The rule of law provides for a weak form of constitutionalism, 
since as Jowell explains, no English court would strike down 
legislation that introduced punishment without trial, or statute with 
retrospective effect. Nonetheless, he argues that respect for the 
rule of law might inhibit the legislature from passing such laws.‟120 
 The courts in South Africa have not struck down legislation 
introduced with retrospective effect on the basis that it violates the rule 
of law. In President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo121 Mokgoro J 
stated that „[t]he need for accessibility, precision and general application 
flow from the concept of the rule of law. A person should be able to 
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know of the law, and be able to conform his or her conduct to the 
law.‟122  
 In National Director of Public Prosecutions v Carolus and Others123 
Farlam AJA decided that ch 6 of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act124 
was not intended to be retrospective because of the wording used to 
introduce the chapter. He also referred to the „cumulative effect of the 
unfairness, the legal culture leaning against retrospectivity where there is 
unfairness‟.125 
 In introducing ch 6 of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 
Parliament did not refer to offences committed „before or after the 
commencement of this Act‟.126 The effect of the rules of statutory 
interpretation is that amendments are introduced with prospective effect 
unless the legislature unequivocally provides that the legislation shall 
have retrospective effect.127  
 In Anglo Platinum Management Services (Pty) Ltd and Others v 
Minister of Safety and Security and Others128 Van Oosten J was required 
to consider the validity of regulations introduced with retrospective effect 
under the Private Security Industry Regulation Act.129 He commented as 
follows: 
„To revert to the question relating to retrospectivity. The rule 
against retrospectivity has become firmly entrenched in 
administrative law. It is founded upon the principle of legal 
certainty which in turn is derived from the rule of law. Where the 
exercise of powers affects rights and/or legitimate expectations 
retrospectivity clearly undermines the constitutional principle of the 
rule of law. This aspect received the attention of the Constitutional 
Court in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA and 
Another: In re Ex parte President of the Republic of South Africa 
2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) paragraph [39] where the following extract 
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from De Smith, Woolf and Jowell Judicial Review of Administrative 
Action 5 ed at 14-14 was quoted with approval:  
“…In addition, the rule of law embraces some internal 
qualities of all public law: that it should be certain, that is 
ascertainable in advance so as to be predictable and not 
retrospective in its operation; and that it be applied equally, 
without unjustifiable differentiation.”‟130 
 Regulation 10(3) of the regulations promulgated under the Private 
Security Regulation Act was declared null and void and of no force and 
effect because it purported to take effect retrospectively. This was 
because the public official who had made the decision was functus officio 
and could not alter his decision unless the empowering statute specifically 
authorised him to do so. Thus, the exemptions granted by the Minister of 
Safety and Security to Anglo Platinum Management Services (Pty) Ltd 
could not be amended by the introduction of regulations containing a time 
limit relating to the duration of those exemptions. The regulations were 
therefore held to be invalid because they did not conform to the provisions 
of the Act and also did not follow the process required under the 
Constitution and s 3 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act.131 
 In Anglo Platinum132 the court was required to consider the validity of 
regulations introduced with retrospective effect. Unfortunately, no case 
could be identified in which a court considered an amendment to a statute 
introduced with retrospective effect and it remains to be seen what a court 
will decide if the Minister of Finance introduces amendments to the 
Income Tax Act with retrospective effect and a taxpayer challenges the 
introduction on the basis that it violates the rule of law contained in the 
foundational principles of the Constitution. The principle may soon be 
tested on the ground that amendments contained in the Pension Funds 
Secondment Act133 are retrospective and thus invalid under the 
Constitution.134 
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 Thus it appears that the introduction of fiscal amendments with 
retrospective effect constitutes a deprivation of property, but it is difficult 
to show that such amendments are arbitrary and thus unlawful where they 
apply to taxpayers generally. It remains to be seen what impact the 
proposed Interpretation of Legislation Bill may have on the position.135 
 
X CONCLUSION 
 From the above analysis of a taxpayer‟s right to property weighed 
against certain provisions of the fiscal statutes it seems that taxpayers will 
find it difficult to satisfy a court that the Commissioner has violated their 
right to property. Many of the provisions of the South African fiscal 
legislation exist in the fiscal legislation of other open and democratic 
societies. This complicates matters for taxpayers in challenging the 
constitutional validity of the violation of the right to property contained in 
s 25 of the Constitution. 
 It is appropriate to summarise the above analysis by distinguishing 
those powers of the Commissioner which do not appear to constitute an 
unlawful deprivation of a taxpayer‟s property from those which would 
appear to do so. 
 The State needs funds to fulfil its constitutional mandate and thus it 
is unlikely that a taxpayer will satisfy a court that taxation is an unjustified 
deprivation of property violating the constitutional right to property 
enshrined in s 25. Furthermore, a taxpayer is unlikely to successfully 
challenge the Commissioner‟s power to impose additional tax, penalties 
and interest as constituting an unlawful deprivation of property. It is 
unfortunate that the fiscal statutes do not contain rules setting out what 
level of additional tax should be imposed for different types of offences. It 
would be far preferable if a system of graduated additional tax were 
introduced in South Africa, as is the case in a number of other open and 
democratic societies.  
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 Some democracies outlaw fiscal amendments which have 
retrospective effect. It is most unfortunate that the South African 
Constitution does not contain such a prohibition. A case may be pursued 
on the basis that retrospective amendments are repugnant to the rule of 
law but it remains to be seen whether a court will strike down 
retrospective legislation on this ground. Fiscal amendments should only 
be introduced with retrospective effect where the integrity of the tax 
system is at stake. 
 Should the State introduce a taxing measure targeting only a 
selected section of the population or which is disproportionate to the 
State‟s objectives a court should strike such provision down as being 
unreasonable in an open and democratic society and as constituting a 
deprivation of property in breach of s 25 of the Constitution. 
 It is unfortunate that South African taxpayers cannot apply set-off for 
tax debts due to the Commissioner where the State, especially the 
Commissioner, is indebted to that taxpayer for services rendered. It is 
inequitable that a business that has rendered services to the State should 
be allowed to fail because it is unable to meet debts due to the 
Commissioner because the Commissioner has itself not paid a debt due 
to the business. 
 The tax laws should be amended to relax the strict rules applicable 
to withholding refunds from taxpayers where the Commissioner has 
issued an incorrect assessment or where the taxpayer prosecutes an 
appeal to the Tax Court or a higher court. Failure to effect timeously a 
refund to the taxpayer constitutes an undue violation of the taxpayer‟s 
right to property enshrined in s 25(1). In addition, where a refund due to a 
taxpayer is unduly delayed the Income Tax Act should compel the 
Commissioner to pay interest to a non-provisional taxpayer as the delay 
may amount to unlawful deprivation. Furthermore, the legislation should 
prescribe the period within which the refund should be paid.  
 I contend that in certain well-defined cases the exposure of the 













would improve the administration of the tax system in South Africa. It 
would also prevent the deprivation of property that arises where the 
taxpayer incurs costs in meeting unreasonable demands for information 
from the Commissioner. Examples of this conduct are where the 
Commissioner investigates the taxpayer to obtain proprietary information 
for purposes other than for administering the fiscal statues or where his 
officials harass the taxpayer, causing the taxpayer to incur costs. Other 
countries permit the payment of compensation to taxpayers where they 
incur costs because of inappropriate conduct of the revenue authority‟s 
officials. A well-defined set of rules governing the payment of 
compensation should be introduced. 
 In addition, the statutory prohibition on the Commissioner paying 
interest on a VAT refund due to a taxpayer, where a taxpayer has failed to 
comply with his/her other fiscal obligations, is disproportionately harsh 
and constitutes an undue deprivation of the taxpayer‟s property, 
breaching s 25(1) of the Constitution. The VAT Act should be amended to 
allow the Commissioner to take the nature of the offence into account in 
deciding whether or not to pay interest on the delayed VAT refund. 
 The taxpayer‟s recourse in dealing with the Commissioner may, 
based on the above analysis, lie elsewhere. Taxpayers may be able to 
rely on other rights contained in the Constitution, particularly the right to 
just administrative action contained in s 33 and considered in chapter 5.  
 In the following chapter I analyse the taxpayer‟s right to privacy and 
its impact on certain powers conferred on the Commissioner under South 














THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
‘Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.’1 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 This chapter examines certain powers conferred on the 
Commissioner in the light of the right to privacy contained in the 
Constitution. Under the fiscal statutes administered by the Commissioner 
his officials have certain powers, such as the power to call for information 
from taxpayers and to conduct audits on taxpayers‟ affairs. If the 
Commissioner‟s powers violate the taxpayer‟s right to privacy it is 
necessary to ascertain whether that infringement is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society. 
 Section 14 of the Constitution confers a right to privacy, as follows: 
„Everyone has a right to privacy, which includes a right not to 
have – 
(a) their person or home searched; 
(b) their property searched; 
(c) their possessions seized; or 
(d) the privacy of their communications infringed.‟ 
 The use of the word „includes‟ in s 14 indicates that the list is not 
exhaustive.2  
 Before the introduction of the Interim Constitution South African 
citizens had a common law right to privacy aimed at protecting their 
dignity and integrity, and s 14 expands on this right.3  
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 It is appropriate to consider first what the term „privacy‟ means. The 
Concise Oxford Dictionary defines privacy as: 
„n 1. (a) The state of being private and undisturbed. 
  (b) A person‟s right to this. 
2. Freedom from intrusion or public attention. 
3. Avoidance of publicity.‟4 
 The Bill of Rights Handbook considers the common law right to 
privacy as follows:  
„The common law recognises the right to privacy as an 
independent personality right which the courts considered to be 
part of the concept of a person‟s “dignitas”. At common law, the 
breach of a person‟s privacy constitutes an iniuria. It occurs when 
there is an unlawful intrusion on someone‟s personal privacy or an 
unlawful disclosure of private facts about a person.‟5 
 Under the common law it was necessary to assess whether the 
invasion of the citizen‟s privacy was unlawful or not.6  
 In Constitutional Law of South Africa the authors comment on the 
meaning of „privacy‟ as follows: 
„Privacy has been variously defined. It has been described as “an 
amorphous and elusive” concept. The scope of privacy has been 
said to be closely related to the concept of identity. At the very 
least, the right to privacy includes the right to be free from intrusion 
and interference by the State and others in one‟s personal life. 
This second connotation of privacy implies that individuals have 
control not only over who communicates with them but also who 
has access to the flow of information about them.‟ [footnotes 
omitted].7 
In Bernstein and Others v Bester N.O. and Others8 Ackermann J 
explained the meaning of the term „privacy‟.  
„”Privacy is an individual condition of life characterised by seclusion 
from the public and publicity. This implies an absence of 
acquaintance with the individual or his personal affairs in this 
state.” … The unlawfulness of a (factual) infringement of privacy is 
adjudged “in the light of contemporary boni mores and the general 
sense of justice of the community as perceived by the Court”. 
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Examples of wrongful intrusion and disclosure which have been 
acknowledged at common law are entry into a private residence, 
the reading of private documents, listening into private 
conversations, the shadowing of a person, the disclosure of private 
facts which have been acquired by a wrongful act of intrusion, and 
the disclosure of private facts contrary to the existence of a 
confidential relationship. These examples are all clearly related to 
either the private sphere, or relations of legal privilege and 
confidentiality. There is no indication that it may be extended to 
include the carrying on of business activities.‟ [footnotes omitted].9 
Ackermann J commented further on the right to privacy by referring to 
a resolution of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, which 
stated: 
„”The right to privacy consists essentially in the right to live one‟s 
own life with a minimum of interference. It concerns private, family 
and home life, physical and moral integrity, honour and reputation, 
avoidance of being placed in a false light, non-revelation of 
irrelevant and embarrassing facts, unauthorised publication of 
private photographs, protection from disclosure of information 
given or received by the individual confidentially.” 
And in the final conclusions of the Nordic Conference on the Right 
to Respect for Privacy of 1967 the following additional elements of 
the right to privacy are listed: 
“The prohibition to use a person‟s name, identity or photograph 
without his/her consent, the prohibition to spy on a person, respect 
for correspondence and the prohibition to disclose official 
information”.‟10 
The right to privacy contained in the Constitution aims to protect the 
dignity of citizens and ensure that they may enjoy their space and their mode 
of living without undue invasion by the State or others. 
However, it is necessary to establish whether the infringement of 
that right is justifiable under the limitation clause contained in s 36 of the 
Constitution.11  
In Bernstein12 Ackermann J held that the scope of the right to privacy 
must be considered in light of the rights of others and the interests of the 
community:  
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„The truism that no right is to be considered absolute, implies that 
from the outset of interpretation each right is always already 
limited by every other right accruing to another citizen. In the 
context of privacy this would mean that it is only the inner sanctum 
of a person, such as his/her family life, sexual preference and 
home environment, which is shielded from erosion by conflicting 
rights of the community. This implies that community rights and 
the rights of fellow members place a corresponding obligation on a 
citizen, thereby shaping the abstract notion of individualism 
towards identifying a concrete member of civil society. Privacy is 
acknowledged in the truly personal realm, but as a person moves 
into communal relations and activities such as business and social 
interaction, the scope of personal space shrinks accordingly.‟13 
In principle, what a person chooses to do in his or her home should 
be regarded and protected as being private. However, the right to privacy 
does not protect the conduct of a citizen if his or her enjoyment of life violates 
the laws of the country or disturbs fellow citizens.14 Further, once the citizen 
chooses to enter the business arena or conduct a profession that is subject 
to regulation, such activities will limit the citizen‟s right to privacy because the 
person has voluntarily chosen to descend into the public arena.15 In such a 
case the person‟s right to privacy is not as extensive as that of a person who 
does not interact with members of the public. 
Section 8(2) of the Constitution entitles juristic persons to the rights 
contained in the Bill of Rights to the extent that the nature of the right 
permits.16 White comments as follows: „While it is correct to say that juristic 
persons will be protected by s 13 it is likely that this protection will not be as 
vigorously protected as will the individual‟s right to personal privacy.‟17  
Devenish expresses the following views on the matter: 
„It was previously thought, as far as our common law is concerned 
that privacy was a characteristic that could only inhere in human 
                                                 
13
 Ibid para 67 p 484. See also M H Cheadle et al South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of 
Rights, (2002) where, on p 18 the following is stated: „In Bernstein and Others v Bester and Others 
1996 (4) BCLR 449 (CC), Ackermann J characterised the right to privacy as lying along a continuum 
where the more a person interrelates with the world, the more the right to privacy becomes 
attenuated.‟ 
14
 Ibid para 9.3 p 190. 
15
 Ibid 270. See further Bernstein (note 8 above) 485. 
16
 Section 8(2) provides that „A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, 
and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of any 
duty imposed by the right.‟ 
17
 J White „Constitutional Litigation And Interpretation, And Fundamental Rights‟ Annual Survey of 













beings and that an action for the intrusion of privacy in relation to 
juristic persons would not be possible. However, in the recent 
controversial case of Financial Mail (Pty) Ltd v Sage Holdings 
Limited, it was held that a corporation had the right to sue for the 
invasion of privacy where a newspaper had obtained information 
from a private memorandum and unlawful tape recordings.‟18 
Because of technological advances the transfer of information from 
third parties to the Commissioner is becoming easier. In the 2006 Budget 
Speech the Minister of Finance indicated the intention to amend fiscal 
legislation to promote improved data matching and enable the Commissioner 
to check information more effectively than was previously possible.19 
Commenting on the changes in technology and transfer of information 
Slemrod writes: 
„The transmission and processing of information is at the core of 
taxation, and one of the great ongoing technological revolutions 
has been in information technology. Looking forward, 10, 20 or 30 
years, what are the implications of technological advancements for 
tax policy? How will, and should, a tax policy be different 20 years 
from now from how it is today? 
I will argue that, although the new technology greatly facilitates the 
use of taxpayer information to create a personalised consumption 
tax system there are forces pushing the tax system in the opposite 
direction, towards a radically depersonalised tax system, partly out 
of concern about the infringement of privacy of the information.‟20  
It is important to monitor technological advances in the transfer of 
information for tax purposes to ensure compliance with a taxpayer‟s 
constitutional right to privacy.  
In analysing the right to privacy the following questions are asked 
about the information-gathering powers conferred on the Commissioner:21  
                                                 
18
 G E Devenish A Commentary on the South African Bill of Rights (1999) 156 and 157. See 
further Chaskalson (note 3 above) para 18.4 p 8-18. 
19
 Budget Review National Treasury (15 February 2006) 199. 
20
 J Slemrod „Taxation and Big Brother: Information, Personalisation and Privacy in 21
st
 Century Tax 
Policy‟ 27 Institute For Fiscal Studies 1 p 2. 
21
 Additional issues bearing on the taxpayer‟s right to privacy are: 
 the disclosure of information to persons other than the taxpayer under s 4 of the Income Tax 
Act; 
 the exchange of information under double taxation agreements; 
 the reporting of professional misconduct under the fiscal statutes;  
 the publication of tax offender‟s personal details in the Government Gazette and the press.  













 Do the powers of the Commissioner to call for information from 
taxpayers, banks and other parties violate the taxpayer‟s right 
to privacy? 
 May the Commissioner justifiably conduct an audit of a 
taxpayer‟s affairs without breaching the taxpayer‟s right to 
privacy? 
 Do search and seizure operations conducted by the 
Commissioner unlawfully breach the taxpayer‟s right to privacy? 
 May the Commissioner conduct an inquiry into a taxpayer‟s 
affairs, without violating the taxpayer‟s right to privacy? 
 May the Commissioner lawfully call for information about a 
taxpayer that is subject to legal professional privilege? 
 
II DO THE POWERS OF THE COMMISSIONER TO CALL FOR 
INFORMATION FROM TAXPAYERS, BANKS AND OTHER PARTIES 
VIOLATE THE TAXPAYER‟S RIGHT TO PRIVACY? 
 Under the Income Tax Act a taxpayer must submit an annual tax 
return to the Commissioner.22 The tax return calls for personal details 
about the taxpayer, his or her income, expenses and other items of 
information. 
 Does the Commissioner‟s power to call for a tax return unjustifiably 
violate the taxpayer‟s right to privacy?  
 The State has an obligation to supply the citizens of the country with 
certain services and may only finance its expenditure by levying income 
tax and other taxes on persons and goods.23 Calling for personal 
information from taxpayers constitutes an infringement of the taxpayer‟s 
right to privacy, but such infringement seems reasonable and justifiable in 
an open and democratic society. There is no less intrusive means 
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whereby the State may secure the payment of tax. Thus, a taxpayer will 
not succeed in showing that the obligation to submit an annual tax return 
unlawfully violates his or her right to privacy.  
 The Commissioner receives tax returns under the Income Tax Act 
and must issue an assessment of the taxpayer.24 One way in which the 
Commissioner may verify information contained in a tax return is to call 
for further information or documentation from the taxpayer or from any 
other person about the taxpayer.25 Another method used by the 
Commissioner to obtain information about a taxpayer is to require banks, 
employers and other persons to submit returns to the Commissioner 
reflecting income derived by the taxpayer.26 Do these information-
gathering powers conferred on the Commissioner violate the taxpayer‟s 
right to privacy?27  
 Section 74A of the Income Tax Act authorises the Commissioner‟s 
officers to call for information from a taxpayer and any other person for 
the purpose of administering the Income Tax Act. 
„74A The Commissioner or any officer may, for the purposes of 
the administration of this Act in relation to any taxpayer, 
require such taxpayer or any other person to furnish such 
information (whether orally or in writing) documents or 
things as the Commissioner or such officer may require.‟28 
 Thus, under s 74A the Commissioner may only call for information 
required for the administration of the Income Tax Act. In terms of 
section 74(1) the „administration of this Act‟: 
„means the – 
(a) obtaining of full information in relation to any – 
(i) amount received by or accrued to any person;  
(ii) property disposed of under a donation by any person; 
and 
(iii) dividend declared by any company; 
(b) ascertaining of the correctness of any return, financial 
statement, document, declaration of facts or valuation; 
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(c) determination of the liability of any person for any tax, duty or 
levy and any interest or penalty in relation thereto leviable 
under this Act;‟ 
 The Commissioner cannot use the provisions of s 74A for other 
purposes, for example, to obtain trade secrets or other commercial 
information from the taxpayer.  
 One of the methods used to corroborate the information contained in 
tax returns is to require persons to submit a special return, namely form 
IT3 under s 69 of the Act. These returns set out details of, for example, 
interest, rent, royalties and other payments made to a taxpayer and must 
be submitted to the Commissioner annually. The submission of the IT3 
return enables the Commissioner to cross-check information with the tax 
returns submitted.  
 Section 70 of the Income Tax Act requires companies to complete 
and submit returns setting out details of interest paid to taxpayers on 
debentures and dividends paid on shares. Under s 70A of the Act the 
Commissioner requires collective investment schemes to submit returns 
setting out the income and other amounts awarded to taxpayers. These 
returns also facilitate the cross-checking of information supplied. 
 The Commissioner occasionally requests that taxpayers complete 
the so-called Lifestyle Questionnaire, which requires them to disclose full 
details of their assets, liabilities and annual expenditure on holidays, food, 
school fees, and so on. Many taxpayers have enquired whether such a 
request is constitutionally valid.29 In practice the Commissioner calls on a 
taxpayer to complete the Lifestyle Questionnaire where the taxpayer‟s 
income does not appear to support his or her standard of living or where 
the increase in the taxpayer‟s net assets is disproportionately high in 
relation to his or her income disclosed for tax purposes.  
 The Commissioner only uses the Lifestyle Questionnaire in cases 
where a natural person is subject to an audit for sound reasons.  
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 Taxpayers believe the Lifestyle Questionnaire constitutes an undue 
violation of their right to privacy. However, the Commissioner uses the 
questionnaire circumspectly. Under s 74A the Commissioner has the 
power to call for information about the taxpayer‟s personal affairs. Acting 
under s 74B he may also conduct an audit at the taxpayer‟s premises to 
confirm that information,. Taxpayers overlook the fact that the rights 
contained in the Constitution may be limited and that the Commissioner 
calls for the information under a law of general application.  
 It is contended that it is reasonable and necessary in an open and 
democratic society for the Commissioner to insist on the completion of the 
Lifestyle Questionnaire and that this does not constitute an unlawful 
violation of the taxpayer‟s right to privacy.  
 In 2006 The South African Institute of Chartered Accountants 
(„SAICA‟) received reports from its members that the Commissioner‟s 
officials had arrived at business premises demanding that taxpayers 
complete a document entitled „SARS Inspection Survey‟.30 The survey, 
which is still in use, requires taxpayers to answer numerous questions 
about their business. The purpose of the survey is to broaden the tax 
base of the country, which is notoriously low.31 The Commissioner‟s 
officers arrive at the business premises without prior notice and usually 
demand that the taxpayer answer the questions immediately, sometimes 
in front of clients and customers. Further, certain officials deny the 
taxpayer‟s requests to consult with his or her tax accountants or attorneys 
before responding to the questionnaire.32  Such conduct is unreasonable 
and does not conform to the standard required in an open and democratic 
society. The Commissioner could achieve the objectives of broadening 
the tax base by less intrusive means. 
 Under s 4 of the Income Tax Act the Commissioner‟s officials may 
not discuss the taxpayer‟s affairs with any person other than the taxpayer. 
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To demand answers to detailed questions about the taxpayer‟s business 
in front of third parties constitutes an infringement of the taxpayer‟s right 
to privacy. The Commissioner is charged with ensuring that taxpayers 
comply with the fiscal statutes he administers. However, it should not be 
necessary to violate a taxpayer‟s right to privacy in order to extend the tax 
base and the Commissioner‟s conduct is unlikely to be justifiable in terms 
of s 36 of the Constitution. 
 It would be more acceptable for the Commissioner to require the 
business to provide details of its tax reference numbers before compelling 
the taxpayer to complete the SARS Inspection Survey. The 
Commissioner should then review information to which he has access to 
establish whether the business is registered for tax purposes or is in 
default. In the case of a defaulting taxpayer the Commissioner may 
reasonably demand answers to the questions contained in the survey.  
 In addition, the survey requires a taxpayer to disclose details of his 
or her business plan. I question whether this constitutes information 
necessary to the administration of the Income Tax Act, as required under 
s 74(1). The demand that the taxpayer complete the questionnaire 
immediately appears unreasonable, as the officials do not first establish 
whether or not the taxpayer‟s affairs with the Commissioner are in order.  
 In deciding whether the Commissioner‟s information-gathering 
powers are constitutionally valid, I refer to the position in other democratic 
jurisdictions.  
 Section 20 of the 1970 Taxes Management Act of the United 
Kingdom confers certain information-gathering powers on an inspector of 
the United Kingdom Inland Revenue: 
„(a) An Inspector can, by notice in writing, require a person: 
(i) to deliver to him such documents as are in the 
person‟s possession or power and (in the 
Inspector‟s reasonable opinion) contain, or may 
contain, information relevant to any tax liability to 
which that person may be subject or the amount 













(ii) to furnish to him such particulars as the Inspector 
may reasonably require as being relevant to, or to 
the amount of, any such liability, …‟33 
 As in South Africa under s 74A of the Income Tax Act, an Inland 
Revenue Inspector in the United Kingdom has the authority to call for 
information from third parties in the following terms: 
„(c) An Inspector can, by notice in writing, require a third 
party to deliver to him (or, if that person so elects, to 
make available for inspection by a named officer of the 
Board) such documents as are in his possession or 
power and as (in the Inspector‟s reasonable opinion) 
contain or may contain, information relevant to a tax 
liability of that person into whose tax affairs the Inspector 
is enquiring (or the amount of such a liability) [TMA 1970 
s20 (3)].‟34 
 According to Howarth & Maas the above provision authorises the 
revenue official to obtain documents held by a third party.35 The official 
may not insist that a list of transactions with another party is provided 
unless such list is already in existence.36 
 A survey, entitled Taxpayers’ Rights and Obligations – A survey of 
the legal situation in OECD countries researched the question of banks 
supplying information to the fiscal authority and found as follows: 
„2.30 However, in the majority of countries the tax administration 
has a statutory power to override confidentiality and to 
obtain specific information from the bank for tax purposes. 
This power is used with reserve and tax administrations are 
obliged not to divulge any information so obtained to third 
parties, although they can pass the information to foreign 
tax authorities with whom they have bilateral or multilateral 
instruments which provide for exchange of information for 
tax purposes. 
2.31 … It follows that in many countries general investigations 
into banks to obtain information about their clients are not 
permitted and that examinations of the business accounts 
of banks may not be used for that purpose.‟37 
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 In the OECD countries, besides the obligation facing taxpayers to 
supply information to the tax authorities, third parties, especially 
employers and banks, must supply information to the tax administration: 
„3.8 In all countries employers have to supply the tax 
authorities with information on the amounts of salaries and 
wages paid to employees. ... A few countries operate 
special systems for the construction industry, under which 
a firm has to inform the tax authorities of payments to sub-
contractors. 
3.9 In most countries, banks and other financial institutions 
are required to respond to requests for information on 
interest payments to identify taxpayers.‟38 
 The Japanese tax authority may call for information from taxpayers 
and this is not seen as a violation of the citizen‟s right to privacy. Ishimura 
describes the position in Japan as follows:  
„(6) Information gathering procedures accompanying audits 
In Japan, there are virtually no provisions under current 
law to regulate the collection of materials by the tax 
authorities, such as the taking possession and 
photocopying of books, records and other documents. 
… 
From the point of view of this modern type of privacy right, 
a taxpayer should be notified of any request for co-
operation and what information was provided. Then the 
taxpayer would be able to control his/her personal 
information.‟39 
 Commenting generally on the taxpayer‟s right to privacy Baker & 
Groenhagen write: 
„A distinction can be made between confidentiality and privacy. 
Confidentiality relates to the handling of information which has 
been supplied to the revenue authority and which should not be 
passed on to any other person in breach of that confidence: 
privacy relates to the right of an individual not to suffer any 
intrusion into his private or business life, his home or business 
premises unless that intrusion is necessary and is expressly 
authorised by law.  
… 
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It goes without saying that any interference with a taxpayer‟s right 
to privacy must be in accordance with law and should not be 
disproportionate to the context of the legislation.‟40 
 The above sources indicate that it is normal for a fiscal authority to 
request information from third parties about income paid to a taxpayer in 
the forms, for example, of wages, salaries and dividends.  
 The OECD survey shows that most tax administrations need not 
advise the taxpayer that they will call for information from a third party.41  
 The Commissioner‟s call for information may constitute an intrusion 
into the taxpayer‟s life and thus a breach of his or her right to privacy, 
however, the Commissioner has the responsibility of gathering taxes so 
that the government may finance its social and welfare programmes. An 
integral part of ensuring compliance with the fiscal laws of a country is the 
capacity of the Commissioner to call for information from taxpayers and 
other persons. In Bernstein42 Ackermann J stated that the scope of the 
right to privacy narrows if a citizen conducts business and thereby enters 
the public arena.43 A citizen who undertakes a business venture assumes 
certain obligations, one of which is to comply with the tax laws of the 
country.44 To allow the revenue authority to call for information from 
banks and third parties is therefore reasonable and justifiable taking 
account of the mandate held by the Commissioner under the SARS Act. It 
is not possible for a taxpayer to prevent a bank, or other third party, from 
releasing personal information to the Commissioner on the basis that 
such conduct violates the taxpayer‟s right to privacy. The practice in other 
countries seems to support this view. 
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III MAY THE COMMISSIONER JUSTIFIABLY CONDUCT AN AUDIT OF A 
TAXPAYER‟S AFFAIRS WITHOUT BREACHING THE TAXPAYER‟S 
RIGHT TO PRIVACY?  
 Section 74B of the Income Tax Act sets out the power to call for 
information at the taxpayer‟s premises and to inspect or audit such 
information as follows: 
„74B (1) The Commissioner, or an officer named in an 
authorisation letter, may, for the purposes of the 
administration of this Act in relation to any taxpayer, 
require such taxpayer or any other person, with 
reasonable prior notice, to furnish, produce or make 
available any such information, documents or things as 
the Commissioner or such officer may require to inspect, 
audit, examine or obtain. 
 (2) For the purposes of the inspection, audit, examination or 
obtaining of any such information, documents or things, 
the Commissioner or an officer contemplated in 
subsection 1, may call on any person – 
(a) at any premises; and 
(b) at any time during such person‟s normal 
business hours.‟ 
 Section 74(1) defines the „authorisation letter‟ referred to in s 74B(4) 
as: 
„… a written authorisation granted by the Commissioner, or by any 
other person designated by the Commissioner for this purpose or 
occupying a post designated by the Commissioner for this 
purpose, to an officer to inspect, audit, examine or obtain, as 
contemplated in s 74B, any information, documents or things;‟  
 A taxpayer may insist that a person claiming to be an official of the 
Commissioner present the authorisation letter issued by the 
Commissioner or any person designated by the Commissioner. The 
definition of „authorisation letter‟ implies that it is a general letter of 
authorisation granting the official the powers set out in s 74B. It is not a 
requirement of the Act that the letter specify the particular taxpayer 
subject to audit. The power to conduct audits of taxpayers‟ affairs is 
therefore a general power exercised by the Commissioner‟s officers 
without the intervention of the judiciary. To obtain information from a 













s 74(B) the Commissioner may not arrive at a taxpayer‟s business to 
inspect and audit the taxpayer‟s records without prior arrangement. 
 Having set out the powers contained in s 74B I refer to the 
experience in other open and democratic societies.  
 Canada‟s taxing statute allows its revenue authority to conduct 
audits of taxpayers‟ affairs and to call for information from taxpayers.45  
 Li sets out the position: 
„Sections 231 to 231.6 of the Act provide the Minister with the 
powers to: 
 
 audit and inspect books and records kept by a taxpayer 
(s231.1); 
 demand information from a taxpayer or third parties 
(s231.2); 
 search premises for evidence and seize the evidence 
(s231.3); 
 authorise an inquiry (s231.4); and 
 demand foreign-based information (s231.6). 
 
The right of taxpayers to privacy is guaranteed by s 8 of the 
Charter. It is protected by restricting the audit and investigative 
powers of Revenue, Canada. Sections 231 to 231.6 have 
undergone several major changes, each of which has resulted in 
more protection of the right to privacy. The most recent changes 
were in response to the enactment of the Charter.‟46  
 The power to conduct audits and to call for information from 
taxpayers does not constitute a violation of the right to privacy contained 
in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.47 
 Germany is also a constitutional State which allows its revenue 
authority to conduct audits of taxpayers‟ affairs.48 According to Daiber: 
„Taxpayers that derive business income or income from forestry 
and agriculture are subject to field audits at regular intervals to 
ensure lawful and equal taxation. The tax inspector examines all 
the taxpayer‟s factual and legal circumstances whether favourable 
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or not. As in the general procedure, the taxpayer has a duty to co-
operate.‟ [section references omitted]. 49 
 Commenting on the right to privacy in Germany Kommers writes: 
„The Basic Law does not explicitly create a general right of privacy. 
Three of its provisions, however, do protect privacy interests. The 
second, at issue in the Klass case […], is the provision of 
article 10 that guarantees “privacy of posts and 
telecommunications”; and the third is the guarantee of the home‟s 
inviolability under article 13. 
… 
NOTE: PRIVACY OF HOME AND COMMUNICATION 
Article 13(1) declares: “The home shall be inviolable.” Paragraph 2 
authorises judges to order searches as prescribed by law, and 
paragraph 3 permits “encroachments” (Eingriffe) and “restrictions” 
(Beschränkungen) of the home‟s inviolability only “to avert a 
common danger or a mortal danger to individuals or, pursuant to 
law, to prevent imminent danger to public safety and order.” … 
The state could thus permissibly inspect records that would 
disclose the exact nature of a business for tax purposes.‟50  
 Greenbaum sets out the position in the United States of America 
(„USA‟): 
„One of the cornerstones of the investigative powers of the tax 
administration is the audit. … Further, the taxpayer must be given, 
prior to the conduct of an audit or interview, an explanation of the 
process, and the statement of the rights which a taxpayer has in 
relation to the process.‟51 
 Commenting generally on a revenue authority‟s power to conduct 
audits and investigations, Bentley writes: 
„Fundamental to the successful operation of a self-assessment 
regime, and widely used in all tax systems, is the audit and 
investigation of taxpayers. … However, it is important that 
taxpayers are protected by a clear definition of the limits of audits 
and investigation. … However, the right to privacy should be used 
to provide protection for the taxpayer against unreasonable 
searches.‟52  
Regarding the taxpayer‟s right to privacy Baker & Groenhagen write: 
„[P]rivacy relates to the right of an individual not to suffer any 
intrusion into his private or business life, his home or business 
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premises unless that intrusion is necessary and is expressly 
authorised by law.  
…  
It goes without saying that any interference with the taxpayer‟s 
right to privacy must be in accordance with law and should not be 
disproportionate to the context of the investigation.‟53 
 Various constitutional democracies allow the revenue authority to 
conduct audits of taxpayers‟ affairs, treating such audits as reasonable 
and necessary violations of the taxpayer‟s right to privacy.  
 For the Commissioner‟s officials to obtain authorisation letters each 
time they call for information from a taxpayer unduly fetters them in 
exercising the mandate conferred on them to administer the tax laws. 
Section 74B(1) of the Income Tax Act should survive, if challenged on the 
grounds that it violates the taxpayer‟s constitutional right to privacy. A 
review of the position in, for example, Canada and the USA, supports 
this.54 
 It seems clear that the power conferred on the Commissioner by 
s 74B allowing him to audit and inspect taxpayers‟ records is an invasion 
of privacy. Is such invasion of privacy warranted? 
 Section 74B is part of a law that applies generally. To ensure and 
improve compliance with the tax system it is normal for the Commissioner 
to have the power to corroborate information received from taxpayers. 
Furthermore, the constitutional validity of the way in which the 
Commissioner conducts the audit and, in certain circumstances, requests 
specific information, must be considered.  
 The Commissioner‟s officials regularly visit luxury-car dealers on the 
pretext of auditing the VAT affairs of the business under s 57B of the VAT 
Act. This enables the Commissioner to establish the details of persons 
buying luxury vehicles from the registered vendor. The Commissioner 
then uses such information to corroborate whether the purchasers of the 
luxury cars have declared for tax purposes the income required to finance 
and maintain such expensive vehicles.  
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 It is difficult for a luxury car dealer to resist the Commissioner‟s 
request for information about the purchasers of luxury cars. However, it is 
important that the Commissioner does not target only one luxury-car 
dealer but treats all car dealers in that category similarly. Failing this, the 
targeted business may justly raise the ground that the Commissioner‟s 
conduct is discriminatory.55 However, the car dealer faces the difficulty of 
showing that the Commissioner‟s request for information as part of the 
VAT audit relating to purchasers of its goods, or indeed requesting such 
information, is constitutionally invalid.  
 Occasionally the Commissioner seeks remote access to the 
taxpayer‟s computer systems on a real-time basis, allowing him to secure 
information about the purchasers of goods or services supplied by the 
taxpayer. I contend that such a request is unreasonable in that it may 
hinder the business conducted by the taxpayer and that there are less 
restrictive means by which the Commissioner can obtain the required 
information. The Commissioner could, instead, seek specific information 
about transactions conducted with other taxpayers in a specified period. 
To allow the Commissioner ongoing access to live computer systems 
constitutes an undue violation of the taxpayer‟s right to privacy. The 
limitation of rights provision contained in s 36 of the Constitution would 
not legitimise the Commissioner‟s conduct.  
 In deciding whether the Commissioner‟s conduct in gathering 
information constitutes a violation of the taxpayer‟s right to privacy the 
taxpayer must consider his or her position dispassionately by interpreting 
the fiscal statutes and the Constitution.  
 The tax base in South Africa is narrow and the Commissioner has a 
duty to broaden that base, thereby spreading the tax burden among a 
greater number of people.56 In such circumstances it is difficult to 
maintain that calling for information constitutes an unlawful violation of the 
taxpayer‟s right to privacy. The call for the information under a law of 
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general application is both reasonable and necessary in an open and 
democratic society. 
 The Commissioner‟s decision to conduct an audit on a taxpayer or to 
request that the taxpayer supply information constitutes an „administrative 
action‟ as envisaged in s1 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 
of 2000. Thus, the Commissioner must comply with the requirements of 
procedural fairness contained in that statute. This aspect is considered in 
chapter 5. 
 
IV DO SEARCH AND SEIZURE OPERATIONS CONDUCTED BY THE 
COMMISSIONER UNLAWFULLY BREACH THE TAXPAYER‟S RIGHT 
TO PRIVACY? 
 Under s 74D of the Income Tax Act the Commissioner may search 
the taxpayer‟s premises without prior notice if he obtains a search and 
seizure warrant. Before analysing the current provisions of s 74D I review 
the changes the search and seizure provisions have undergone since the 
introduction of the Constitution.  
 Section 74(3) of the Income Tax Act, before its amendment by s 14 
of the Revenue Laws Amendment Act,57 provided that the Commissioner 
could authorise his staff to conduct a search and seizure operation. It was 
unnecessary to obtain a warrant from a judge authorising such an 
operation. 
 The Katz Commission in its Interim Report expressed the following 
views on the validity of the old s 74: 
„Furthermore in terms of Section 74(3) of the Act powers are 
conferred upon officers engaged in carrying out the provisions of 
the Act to search and seize a variety of items, subject to the 
authorisation of the Commissioner. This section prima facie 
violates Section 13 of the Constitution and would require to be 
justified in terms of the limitation clause. It should be noted that in 
terms of Hunter et al v Southam (1984) similar provisions were 
held to be unconstitutional by the Canadian Supreme Court.‟58  
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 The Katz Commission recommended that warrants required under 
s 74 must be authorised in advance of execution by persons acting 
judicially. The Commission concluded that the authorisation of warrants 
by the Commissioner was invalid under the Constitution.59 It pointed out 
that the person authorising the issue of the warrant must be satisfied, by 
information given under oath, that an offence has been committed under 
the fiscal statutes.60 In addition, the Commission stated that the execution 
of the warrant should lead to evidence corroborating the assertion that an 
offence has been committed.61 
 The decision of the court in Park-Ross and Another v The Director, 
Office for Serious Economic Offences62 supports the comments made by 
the Katz Commission. In Park-Ross63 the Court had to decide whether s 6 
of the Investigation of Serious Economic Offences Act 117 of 1991 
empowering the Director of the Office for Serious Economic Offences 
(OSEO) to authorise entry, search and seizure, was constitutionally valid. 
Section 6 of the Investigation of Serious Economic Offences Act 117 of 
1991 did not require the intervention of the judiciary in deciding whether to 
conduct a search and seizure operation. That provision was therefore 
similar to the provisions found in the old s 74(3) of the Income Tax Act.  
 Tebbutt J decided as follows: 
„It would, I feel, accord with the spirit and purport of the 
Constitution if it was provided that before any search or seizure 
pursuant to s 6 of the Act, prior authorisation be obtained from a 
magistrate or from a Judge of the Supreme Court in chambers for 
such search and seizure. Any application for such authorisation 
should set out, at the very least, under oath or affirmed 
declaration, information as to the nature of the enquiry in terms of 
s 5, the suspicion having given rise to that enquiry, and the need, 
in regard to that enquiry, for a search and seizure in terms of s 6. 
… 
I accordingly hold that s 6 as it presently reads is in conflict with 
the Constitution.‟64 

























 In Mistry v Interim Medical and Dental Council of South Africa65 the 
Constitutional Court endorsed the decision of the court in Park-Ross.66 In 
Mistry67 the Constitutional Court struck down the search and seizure 
provisions of the Medicines and Related Substances Control Act 101 of 
1965.  
 The recommendations of the Katz Commission, and probably the 
decision of the Court in Park-Ross, resulted in the repeal of s 74 of the 
Income Tax Act.68 The current information-gathering powers contained in 
ss 74, 74A to 74D replaced the old section. 
Section 74D provides, inter alia: 
„74D(1) For the purposes of the administration of this Act, a 
Judge may, on application by the Commissioner or any 
officer contemplated in s 74(4), issue a warrant, 
authorising the officer named therein to, without prior 
notice and at anytime – 
(a) (i) enter and search any premises; and 
 (ii) search any person present on the premises, 
provided that such search is conducted by 
an officer of the same gender of the person 
being searched, for any information, 
documents or things, that may afford 
evidence as to the non-compliance by any 
taxpayer with his obligations in terms of this 
Act; 
(b) seize any such information, documents or things; 
and 
(c) in carrying out any such search, open or caused 
to be opened or removed and opened, anything in 
which such officer suspects any information, 
documents or things to be contained. 
 (2) … 
 (3) a Judge may issue the warrant referred to in 
subsection (1) if he is satisfied that there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that – 
(a) (i) there has been non-compliance by any 
person with his obligations in terms of this 
Act; or 
 (ii) an offence in terms of this Act has been 
committed by any person; 
                                                 
65
 1998 (4) S.A 1127 (CC). 
66
 Note 62 above. 
67
 Note 65 above 1150. 
68
 Katz Commission Report para 6.3.28 p 75. Similar amendments were made to the information-













(b) information, documents or things are likely to be 
found which may afford evidence of - 
 (i) such non-compliance; or 
 (ii) the committing of such offence; and 
(c) the premises specified in the application are likely 
to contain such information, documents or things.‟ 
 The application for the warrant must, under s 74D (2), be supported 
by information supplied under oath containing facts substantiating the 
allegations of non-compliance with the fiscal statutes. Furthermore, under 
s 74D(4) the warrant must itself contain details of the alleged offences 
committed by the taxpayer and must specify the premises to be searched. 
In addition, the warrant must identify the taxpayer who has allegedly failed 
to comply with his or her fiscal obligations and must be reasonably 
specific about the information and documents to be seized.  
 In Bernstein69 the court considered the right to privacy contained in 
s 13 of the Interim Constitution. Bernstein, a registered accountant and 
auditor in public practice, sought an order from the court that the audit 
working papers of the liquidated company were confidential and that he 
should not hand over the information to the liquidator of the company. 
Ackermann J, handing  down judgment for the majority, stated: 
„In South Africa, the right not to be subjected to seizure of private 
possessions forms part of every person‟s right to personal privacy. 
The right against seizure must therefore be interpreted in the light 
of the general right to personal privacy. So much is also clear from 
the qualification of the right, i.e. the right against seizure of private 
possessions. I have repeatedly emphasised that privacy concerns 
are only remotely implicated through the use of the enquiry. The 
public‟s interest in ascertaining the truth surrounding the collapse 
of the company, … must be weighed against this, peripheral, 
infringement of the right not to be subject to seizure of private 
possessions. Seen in this light, I have no doubt that s 417(3) and 
418(2) constitute a legitimate limitation of the right to personal 
privacy in terms of s 33 of the Constitution.‟70 
 The court decided that the right to privacy extended only to private 
possessions and did not cover the documents and records affecting the 
business affairs of the liquidated company. This was because the public 
interest in establishing the reasons for the collapse of the liquidated 
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company was greater than the individual‟s right to privacy. Thus, calling 
for the audit working papers of the liquidated company did not violate the 
right to privacy contained in the Interim Constitution.  
 I contend that Bernstein71 makes it difficult for taxpayers to show that 
the search and seizure provisions contained in s 74D unlawfully violate 
their right to privacy. Thus, the failure by taxpayers to meet their 
obligations could result in the Commissioner requesting the issue of a 
search and seizure warrant under s 74D to secure records required for 
the administration of the Income Tax Act. The Commissioner cannot rely 
on s 74D to seize private possessions unrelated to the administration of 
the Act.  
 In Oberholzer and Others v The Commissioner For The South 
African Revenue Service72 the taxpayer challenged the validity of the 
warrant issued under s 74D because the Commissioner failed to disclose 
material information to the judge. The taxpayer contended that the 
Commissioner failed to disclose particulars about a prior investigation, 
which the Commissioner settled. The taxpayer indicated that as payment 
of outstanding tax, interest and penalties was material, the Commissioner 
should have advised the judge who granted the warrant to the 
Commissioner under s 74D.73  
 The Commissioner responded to the taxpayer‟s assertion by pointing 
out that different entities were now under investigation. Further, the 
previous investigation also dealt with different tax issues. An alleged 
breach of the duty placed on the Commissioner in an ex parte application 
to make a full disclosure to the court was the basis for the taxpayer‟s 
cause of action.74 The Commissioner‟s counsel argued that the 
application to a judge for a warrant under s 74D was an administrative 
authorisation issued by a court official and was not a court application. 
Blignault J decided there was no merit in this aspect of the 
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Commissioner‟s defence.75 He summarised the facts of the prior 
investigation conducted by the Commissioner on Oberholzer‟s affairs and 
decided as follows: 
„In the circumstances I do not think that Van der Westerhuizen 
was under any particular duty to disclose the facts relating to these 
previous investigations at the time when he applied for the 
warrant. It seems to me, indeed, that a disclosure of a fact that first 
applicant‟s business activities had previously been the subject 
matter of two special investigations which resulted in the payment 
by him of tax penalties and interest might, if anything, have 
bolstered respondent‟s case in the application for the warrant.‟76 
 As a result, the court dismissed the taxpayer‟s application for an 
order to set aside the warrant. The decision of Blignault J makes it clear 
that it is important that the Commissioner disclose material information to 
the court motivating the issue of a warrant under s 74D.  
 I contend that the power to search premises and seize documents is 
a necessary part of the Commissioner‟s armoury to ensure tax 
compliance. However, it is essential that a judge, as an independent 
party, oversees the powers granted and decides whether the 
Commissioner has just and reasonable cause to conduct such a search 
and seizure operation. 
 If a court grants the Commissioner a search and seizure warrant and 
the officer executing the warrant identifies further premises to search or 
documents to seize, he may do so under s 74D(5) and (6). The power 
conferred on the Commissioner‟s officer aims to prevent the destruction of 
records that may be necessary to enforce the provisions of the various 
fiscal statutes. The concern with these provisions is that the 
Commissioner‟s officers should not have the right to exercise this 
discretion. It would be preferable to obtain another warrant for such 
further premises and documents. This will prevent the Commissioner from 
abusing s 74D(5) and (6) by extending the ambit of the warrant on the 
pretext that the taxpayer will destroy documents. I submit that the failure 
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to secure another warrant constitutes an undue violation of the taxpayer‟s 
right to privacy.  
 A difficulty arises where, under s 74D, the Commissioner presents 
incorrect facts to a judge. It is also a problem when the Commissioner 
relies on vexatious accusations made by a member of the public against a 
particular taxpayer. Once a judge authorises the issue of a warrant it is 
difficult for a taxpayer to prevent the Commissioner‟s officers from 
executing that warrant. However, s 74D(9) allows the taxpayer to 
challenge the issue of the warrant. The taxpayer may seek relief from the 
court after its execution, or seek an order suspending the warrant pending 
a hearing by the court.  
 Such relief was sought in Ferela (Pty) Ltd and Others v 
Commissioner for Inland Revenue and Others,77 in which the 
Commissioner had secured warrants to search premises and seize 
records under s 74D of the Income Tax Act and s 57D of the VAT Act. 
The taxpayer approached the Commissioner for access to the court files 
containing the Commissioner‟s request for authorisation of the search and 
seizure warrants. The Commissioner refused this request because 
making the information available would violate the secrecy provisions 
contained in s 4 of the Income Tax Act.78 The court decided that s 4 
protects taxpayers against other parties obtaining information about the 
taxpayer‟s affairs and that taxpayers had a right of access to the file 
prepared in the case.79 This allowed taxpayers to exercise their rights in 
relation to the warrant. It also enabled them to determine whether the 
warrant was valid and, further, what steps they could take in seeking relief 
against the Commissioner, if justified.80 Botha J decided: 
„That is in my view the purpose, inter alia of s 74D(9). It confers on 
the court, not judge, a wide discretion to order the return of any 
information, documents or things seized under a warrant. In effect 
it empowers the court to reverse the effect of a warrant in toto. It 
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also empowers the court on hearing such an application to make 
such an order as it deems fit. … 
It is not necessary for me to speculate on all the types of grounds 
on which s 74D(9) could be invoked. Grounds that spring to mind 
are: if a party concerned needs any documents that have been 
seized; if the documents seized do not have any bearing on the 
affairs of a taxpayer; if the documents seized are not covered by 
the warrant; and also if the warrant is deficient; or if it should not 
have been obtained.‟81 
 In Ferela82 the Court held that the warrants issued to the 
Commissioner were invalid and ruled that the Commissioner should 
return to the taxpayer all documents seized in terms of the warrant.  
 Various other cases dealing with search and seizure provisions 
found not only in the fiscal statutes, but also in other statutes are 
instructive here.  
 In Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others v Smit NO and 
Others83 the court had to decide whether the search and seizure warrants 
issued under the National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998 („the NPA 
Act‟) unlawfully violated Hyundai‟s right to privacy.  
 In that case, certain of the applicants had been under investigation 
by the Commissioner and the Commissioner passed on information to the 
Investigating Director as envisaged in the NPA Act. Southwood J held 
that the Commissioner and his officials had contravened the secrecy 
provisions contained in s 4 of the Income Tax Act.84 Southwood J granted 
an interdict against the Commissioner and his officials to prevent the 
continuing violation of the provisions of s 4.85  
 In considering the validity of the search and seizure warrants issued 
under the NPA Act the Court held that the judge called on to grant the 
warrant should only issue it if satisfied that there was reason to suspect 
the person had committed an offence specified in the NPA Act.86 The 
Court referred to the requirements of the Income Tax Act and the VAT Act 
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that there must be some satisfaction that there had been non-compliance 
with a fiscal statute. Further, the warrant issued must specifically state the 
information, documents or things subject to search and seizure.87  
 In Hyundai it was necessary for Southwood J to determine whether 
certain provisions of the NPA Act were consistent with the Constitution. 
The comments made by the court are useful: 
„The question as to whether provisions in a statute are in conflict 
with the Constitution and therefore invalid is determined by an 
objective enquiry and the subjective positions in which parties to a 
dispute may find themselves have no bearing on the status of the 
provisions under attack …‟88 
 One of the Commissioner‟s officials in Hyundai89 assisted in the 
search and seizure operation conducted by the Special Investigations 
Division of the NPA for non-tax offences. The official was, according to 
the court, present because of his knowledge and understanding of the 
affairs of the persons subjected to the search and seizure operation. 
Southwood J held that such conduct violated s 4 of the Income Tax Act 
and s 6 of the VAT Act.90  
 In Deutschmann NO and Others v Commissioner For the South 
African Revenue Service and Shelton v Commissioner For the South 
African Revenue Service91 the court was required to decide whether the 
search and seizure warrants issued under s 74D of the Income Tax Act 
were valid. Commenting on the taxpayer‟s right to privacy and the 
provisions contained in s 74D of the Income Tax Act92 Chetty J, 
Schoeman AJ and Brauns AJ said: 
„As alluded to hereinbefore it was submitted on behalf of Shelton 
that the application should be viewed against the background of 
the rights to privacy and property extended in ss 14 and 25(1) of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 as 
well as the common law rights to privacy and property.  
In the context of s 14 of the Bill of Rights, privacy has been 
defined as “an individual condition of life categorised by seclusion 
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from the public and publicity. This implies an absence of 
acquaintance with the individual or his personal affairs in this 
State.” It is apparent from the judgement that the concept of 
privacy does not extend to include the carrying on of business 
activities.‟ [footnotes omitted].93 
 The court also held that the issue of the warrant was proper in that it 
was „reasonably specific as to the information, documents or things to be 
searched for and seized‟.94 In Deutschmann95 the applicants argued that 
the Commissioner should inform a taxpayer of the application for a search 
and seizure warrant under s 74D of the Income Tax Act and s 57D of the 
VAT Act. The court held as follows: 
„Given the wide ambit of search contemplated by the provisions of 
the sections, it is inconceivable that the legislature could have 
contemplated that prior notice of an application to conduct such 
search could be required in every instance. To require such would 
render nugatory the words „without prior notice‟ in the respective 
sections. Furthermore, a requirement of prior notice of the 
application for a warrant would render redundant the provisions of 
s 74D(9) of the IT Act.‟96  
 The Commissioner has no obligation to advise the taxpayer of an 
application for the issue of a warrant under s 74D before executing the 
warrant.97  
 Another case dealing with search and seizure warrants issued under 
s 74D came before Locke J in Haynes v Commissioner For Inland 
Revenue.98 Haynes conducted business together with Deutschmann and 
Shelton.99 Initially, Haynes was more successful in having the search and 
seizure warrant set aside in that Locke J ruled that the warrant was 
invalid.100 The Court reviewed cases in other countries and concluded 
that the Commissioner should have informed the taxpayer of the 
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application for the search warrant before its approval and execution.101 
Locke J decided as follows: 
„Again with respect I do not concur that the express terms of 
s 74D(1) provide that no prior notice need to be given of the 
application for a warrant. What the section provides is that the 
officer named in the warrant may without prior notice enter and 
search any premises, and search any person present on the 
premises. This “without prior notice” provision does not apply to the 
bringing of the application.‟102 
 The court also ruled that when the Commissioner executes the 
search and seizure warrant he must supply the taxpayer with a copy of 
the court order and of his application for the warrant.103 This is the correct 
view – how else may a taxpayer challenge the issue of a search and 
seizure warrant? 
 In Haynes104  the court criticised the Commissioner for not having 
exhausted the provisions of ss 74A and 74B of the Income Tax Act. Locke 
J commented: 
„In my view, the Commissioner would have to show that the 
measures provided for in s 74A and 74B provided [sic proved] non-
compliance by the taxpayer with his obligations in terms of the Act 
and that the information, documents or things could not be 
obtained by way of the provisions of s 74B thereby necessitating 
the application brought in terms of s 74D.  
… 
In the present matter, there were certainly no facts established by 
the Commissioner for the judge to be satisfied that there were 
reasonable grounds to believe that there had been non-
compliance by the applicant with his obligations in terms of the Act 
and that information, documents or things were likely to be found 
which might afford evidence of such non-compliance in the 
absence of previous compliance with ss 74A and 74B of the 
Income Tax Act or 57A and 57B of the Value-Added Tax Act.‟105 
 Should the Commissioner not use less invasive means of obtaining 
information by requiring a taxpayer to submit information under ss 74A 
and 74B before resorting to a search and seizure operation under s 74D? 
There is, with respect, merit in the view expressed by Locke J in 
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Haynes.106 In the cases reviewed the Commissioner had no obligation to 
confirm when approaching a judge for a search and seizure warrant that 
he had exhausted ss 74A and 74B before resorting to s 74D.  
 Under s 46(1) of the Competition Act 89 of 1998 the Competition 
Commission is entitled to apply for the issue of a search and seizure 
warrant along the lines contained in s 74D of the Income Tax Act. In 
Pretoria Portland Cement Co. Ltd and Another v Competition Commission 
and Others107 the Court had to determine whether there was proper 
authorisation of the search and seizure warrant. In addition, the Court had 
to establish whether the Competition Commission‟s officials executed the 
warrant properly and whether it unlawfully violated the appellant‟s right to 
privacy. In this case, the Competition Commission invited the South 
African Broadcasting Corporation and eTV to accompany them when they 
executed the warrant. Commenting on this aspect of the search and 
seizure operation Schutz JA said:  
„The camera crew had not been invited to enter PPC‟s grounds, 
nor did any Court order permit them to do so. These facts, which 
are common cause, together with the further undisputed fact that 
there was no express identification of the camera crew when they 
entered the building, already constitute a grave invasion of PPC‟s 
right to privacy.‟108 
 The Court set aside the search and seizure warrant and ordered that 
the Commissioner return to the applicant all documents seized.109  
 The Competition Act provides that a warrant issued by a judge of the 
High Court is valid under s 46(3) of the Competition Act until: 
„(a) the warrant is executed; 
(b) the warrant is cancelled by the person who issued it or, in 
that person‟s absence, by a person with similar authority;  
(c) the purpose for issuing it has lapsed; or 
(d) the expiry of one month after the date it was issued.‟ 
 Unfortunately, s 74D contains no similar provision and I recommend 
that the legislature amend the Income Tax Act and other fiscal statutes to 
incorporate such provisions. The Commissioner will often call for a 
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warrant on one date and only execute it many months later. This is not 
ideal. It would be preferable if the warrant were valid for a restricted time 
only, as is the case under the Competition Act.110  
 Further, s 49(5) of the Competition Act deals with the matter of 
privileged information in the following terms: „During a search, a person 
may refuse to permit the inspection or removal of an article or document 
on the grounds that it contains privileged information.‟ 
 I recommend that the fiscal statutes dealing with the specific issue of 
privileged information be amended along the following lines: when the 
Commissioner‟s officers execute a warrant issued under s 74D a taxpayer 
may, in terms of the court‟s decision in Heiman, Maasdorp and Barker v 
Secretary for Inland Revenue,111 lawfully refuse to furnish privileged 
information to him.  
 The Constitutional Court reviewed the decision made by 
Southwood J in Hyundai112, where he ruled that certain provisions of the 
NPA Act were invalid.113 Commenting on the need to balance a person‟s 
right to privacy and the needs of the State Langa DP commented: 
„On the other hand, state officials are not entitled without good 
cause to invade the premises of persons for purposes of searching 
and seizing property; there would otherwise be little content left to 
the right to privacy. A balance must therefore be struck between 
the interests of the individual and that of the State, a task that lies 
at the heart of the enquiry into the limitation of rights. 
On the proper interpretation of the sections concerned, the 
Investigating Directorate is required to place before a judicial 
officer an adequate and objective basis to justify the infringement 
of the important right to privacy. … These provisions thus strike a 
balance between the need for search and seizure powers and the 
right to privacy of individuals. … It follows, in my view, that the 
limitation of the privacy right in these circumstances is reasonable 
and justifiable.‟114 
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 In Ferrucci and Others v Commissioner, South African Revenue 
Service and Another,115 the Cape Provincial Division considered the 
validity of the search and seizure warrants granted in terms of s 74D of 
the Income Tax Act. The Court held that it is important that the warrant 
issued under s 74D indicate the nexus between the documents subject to 
seizure from the taxpayer, and the offence or non-compliance for which 
the Commissioner seeks a warrant.116 In this case, the court held that the 
warrant did not specify clearly what documents were subject to seizure 
and this was not constitutionally justifiable.117  
 Oosthuizen A J commented as follows on the factors the Court 
should consider in deciding whether the issue of a warrant was valid 
under s 74D(9) of the Income Tax Act: 
„The court dealing with an application under s 74D(9) need do no 
more than satisfy itself, as does the Judge issuing the warrant, 
that there are reasonable grounds for believing that there has 
been a non-compliance by any person of his obligations or an 
offence committed under the Act, and that information, documents 
or things affording evidence of such non-compliance or offence 
are likely to be found at the premises specified in the warrant. If it 
is not so satisfied, that may constitute a ground for setting aside 
the warrant.‟118 
 The court stated that it is insufficient for the warrant to specify only 
the sections of the Income Tax Act or the VAT Act the taxpayer has 
allegedly violated.119 Oosthuizen A J stated that the warrant must specify 
in detail the alleged offence or non-compliance by the taxpayer, otherwise 
rendering s 74D(4)(a) meaningless.120  
 The Judge also considered whether the Commissioner must exhaust 
other means of gathering information before resorting to a search and 
seizure warrant under s 74D(9) of the Income Tax Act and stated:121 
„In my view, the contention that a search and seizure should not 
be permitted where the objective sought to be achieved thereby 
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could be attained by less drastic means is, generally speaking 
correct. The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Araujo 
and Others v the Queen 79 CRR (2d) 1 (SCC) is of some 
assistance on this issue. … Delivering judgment LeBel J said the 
following: 
 “Thus, the authorising Judge stands as the guardian of the law 
and of the constitutional principles protecting privacy interests. 
The Judge should not view himself or herself as a mere rubber 
stamp, but should take a close look at the material submitted by 
the applicant. … The Judge should remember that the citizens 
of his country must be protected against unwanted fishing 
expeditions by the State and its law enforcement agencies. 
There must be, practically speaking, no other reasonable 
alternative method of investigation, in the circumstances of the 
particular criminal enquiry.” 
… 
What is, in my view, clear is that the Judge issuing the warrant in 
terms of s 74D of the Income Tax Act or s 57D of the VAT Act 
should consider whether one of the less drastic mechanisms 
contained in those Acts could not be utilised in order to attain the 
objective sought. … In the instant case, this was not done at the 
time that the respondents applied for the warrant. For this further 
reason the warrant should, in my view, not have been issued.‟122 
 In Shelton v Commissioner for South African Revenue Service,123 
which proceeded on appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal, 
Streicher JA, considering the Appellant‟s contention that the 
Commissioner should give notice of the application for a search and 
seizure warrant, stated: 
„The appellant submitted that the respondent had to give notice to 
him of the application for a warrant unless a case could be made 
out that notice should be dispensed with; that the respondent 
failed to make out such a case; and that the respondent‟s 
application for a warrant should, therefore, have been refused. … 
… In these circumstances the giving of prior notice of the 
application for a warrant would have defeated the object and 
purpose of this section which is, among other, to enable the 
respondent to enter premises to search for information 
intentionally concealed from him. In the circumstances the section, 
by necessary implication, did not require the giving of notice.‟124 
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 Thus, the appeals lodged against the decisions of Locke J in Haynes 
v Commissioner For Inland Revenue 125 and Chetty J, Schoemann A J 
and Brauns A J in Deutschmann126 were dismissed by the Supreme Court 
of Appeal. Section 74D(9) does not require the Commissioner to advise 
the taxpayer that he has launched an application to secure a search and 
seizure warrant before the execution of the warrant. 
 More recently, the Supreme Court of Appeal struck down search and 
seizure warrants issued under the NPA Act because, inter alia, the 
warrants were too broad and thus unjustifiably violated the appellant‟s 
right to privacy.127 Cameron J A, commented: 
„The search warrants Van Der Merwe J signed were breath-taking 
in their scope. They authorised the investigating director or his 
delegees to examine “any object” and to seize “anything” at 
Powell‟s premises relevant or that could be relevant to “the 
preparatory investigation concerned”. No offence is mentioned. … 
It does not even refer to “alleged irregularities”. Its recipient is not 
informed of the nature and ambit of the “the preparatory 
investigation concerned”.  
… 
Instead, those carrying out the search were then given virtually 
untrammelled power to carry out what Mr Slomowitz in his 
argument justly called „a general ransacking‟ of Powell‟s premises. 
That has not been the law in this country since at least 1891, and 
is not the law under our Constitution, which preserved and 
enhanced what was best in our legal traditions. … The warrants 
must be set aside as unlawful.‟128  
 In his decision Cameron J A reviewed various cases dealing with 
search and seizure operations and summarised the most important points 
as follows: 
„These cases establish this: 
(a) Because of the great danger of misuse in the exercise of 
authority under search warrants, the courts examine their 
validity with a jealous regard for the liberty of the subject and 
his and/or her rights to privacy and property. 
(b) This applies to both the authority under which a warrant is 
issued, and the ambit of its terms. 
(c) The terms of a search warrant must be construed with 
reasonable strictness. Ordinarily there is no reason why it 
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should be read otherwise than in the terms in which it is 
expressed. 
(d) A warrant must convey intelligently to both searcher and 
searched the ambit of the search it authorises. 
(e) If a warrant is too general, or if its terms go beyond those the 
authorising statute permits, the courts will refuse to recognise 
it as valid, and it will be set aside. 
(f) It is no cure for an over-broad warrant to say that the subject 
of the search knew or ought to have known what was being 
looked for: The warrant must itself specify the object, and 
must do so intelligibly and narrowly within the bounds of the 
empowering statute.‟129 
 Thus, a warrant sought by the Commissioner must clearly identify 
the person and premises subject thereto, as well as precise details of the 
offence allegedly committed under the fiscal statutes. It should set out in 
some detail the nature of the records and documents subject to seizure.  
 Having completed a review of cases in South Africa dealing with 
search and seizure warrants, I now consider how other open and 
democratic societies regard search and seizure operations.  
 Baker & Groenhagen write about search and seizure operations as 
follows: 
„The most extreme form of interference with the taxpayer‟s right to 
privacy will occur in the course of a tax investigation where 
premises are searched and evidence is seized. Not surprisingly, in 
those circumstances heightened protections should apply. The 
European Court of Human Rights has held that a power of search 
by revenue authorities should be subject to judicial safeguards. … 
Only a prior warrant from an independent judge can ensure that 
any search is in accordance with law and is not disproportionate.‟ 
[footnotes omitted].130 
 The position of the OECD member states on search and seizure 
operations is the following: 
„Tax authorities also have extensive powers to enter business 
premises and personal dwellings, … Many countries require a 
warrant to enter private dwellings though most do not for entering 
business premises (e.g. Canada, Norway, Portugal). A few 
countries have no requirement for a warrant at all (e.g. Ireland, 
New Zealand). Columns 8 and 9 of Table 9 (A) show that the 
power to seize documents usually requires some kind of warrant. 
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The seizure of documents, however, is limited to either serious 
fraud cases or to certain penal procedures.‟131 
 Bentley comments generally: 
„Search and seizure powers are usually used in the context of tax 
audits, should be subject to strict limits, and should be used as a 
last resort. Most recent interpretations of the scope of these 
powers, in jurisdictions where they are reviewed under bills of 
rights, require court or independent third party approval in the form 
of a warrant or similar document. … It is part of the requirement for 
due process that search and seizure should be prevented before 
they take place, if they are unwarranted, rather than allowing them 
to proceed and giving the taxpayer a right of action once the harm 
has already occurred. 
Unless the tax authority can show reasonable cause why it should 
hinder the purpose of the search, the taxpayer should be informed 
prior to the search taking place.  
… 
The taxpayer should also be able to insist that the tax authority 
copy the information, rather than taking an original, unless the 
original is crucial to the investigation. If it is, the taxpayer should 
be able to make a copy before the information was taken.‟132 
 Bentley‟s suggestion that the tax authority should take copies of 
documents is a good one but unfortunately is not practical where the 
search and seizure operation involves thousands of documents, as is 
often the case.  
 The United Kingdom Inland Revenue may, under the provisions of 
its governing statute, conduct search and seizure operations. According 
to Howarth the position in the United Kingdom („UK‟) is that: 
„In very serious cases the Revenue has the power to obtain and 
execute search warrants. The legislation permits the Revenue to 
apply for a warrant only if there are reasonable grounds of 
suspecting that serious fraud is involved. The officer applying for 
the warrant has to give evidence on oath that there are reasonable 
grounds and that evidence is likely to be found on the premises 
specified. He also has to swear on oath that he is acting with the 
approval of the Board of Inland Revenue in that particular case.‟ 
[footnotes omitted].133 
 Thus, the United Kingdom judiciary also controls the issue of search 
and seizure warrants. In addition, the exercise of the warrant must take 
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place within 14 days of its authorisation.134 The person conducting the 
search and seizure operation must supply a copy of the warrant to the 
occupier of the premises before commencing the operation.135 The Inland 
Revenue must supply a record of documents taken under the search 
warrant. If a photocopy of the document will suffice, Inland Revenue must 
not keep original documents for longer than necessary.136 The powers 
conferred on the UK Inland Revenue to conduct search and seizure 
operations appear similar to those conferred on the Commissioner.  
 In R v IRC, ex parte Rossminster Ltd and Others137 the UK‟s Court 
of Appeal considered whether the warrant issued and executed by the 
Inland Revenue Commissioners was valid. Commenting on the way the 
Inland Revenue executed the warrant, Lord Denning MR said: 
„As far as my knowledge of history goes, there has been no search 
like it, and no seizure like it, in England since that Saturday, 30th 
April 1763, when the Secretary of State issued a general warrant 
by which he authorised the King‟s messengers to arrest John 
Wilkes and seize all his books and papers. … Pratt C J struck 
down the general warrant. You will find it all set out in R V Wilkes, 
Huckle v Money and Entick v Carrington. Pratt C J said: 
 “To enter a man‟s house by virtue of a nameless warrant, 
in order to procure evidence, is worse than the Spanish 
inquisition; a law under which no Englishman would wish 
to live an hour; it was the most daring public attack made 
upon the liberty of a subject.” 
Now we have to see in this case whether this warrant was valid or 
not. It all depends of course on the statute.‟138 
 Denning MR commented further on the Inland Revenue‟s conduct: 
„When the officers of the Inland Revenue come armed with a 
warrant to search a man‟s home or his office, it seems to me that 
he is entitled to say, “Of what offence do you suspect me?” … 
Unless he knows the particular offence charged, he cannot take 
steps to secure himself or his property. So it seems to me, as a 
matter of construction of the statute and therefore of the warrant, 
in pursuance of our traditional role to protect the liberty of the 
individual, it is our duty to say that the warrant must particularise 
the specific offence which is charged as being fraud on the tax.  
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… It should have specified the particular offence of which the man 
is suspected. On this ground I would hold that certiorari should go 
to quash the warrant.‟139 
Thus, in the UK, a valid search and seizure warrant must specify the 
precise offence the taxpayer has allegedly committed. Further, a judicial 
officer must issue the warrant. 
 A leading case in Canada dealing with issuing a search and seizure 
warrant is Hunter et al. v Southam Inc.,140 which weighed up the validity of 
a search and seizure warrant under the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms. Dickson J dealt with the question of who should authorise the 
search and seizure warrant: 
„The purpose of a requirement of prior authorisation is to provide 
an opportunity, before the event, for the conflicting interests of the 
state and the individual to be assessed, so that the individual‟s 
right to privacy will be breached only where the appropriate 
standard has been met, and the interests of the state are thus 
demonstrably superior. For such an authorisation procedure to be 
meaningful it is necessary for the person authorising the search to 
be able to assess the evidence as to whether that standard has 
been met, in an entirely neutral and impartial manner.‟141  
 It is clear that other democracies allow their revenue authorities to 
conduct search and seizure operations, but often require a judge to 
authorise the issue of the warrant. 
 In South Africa a taxpayer would find it difficult to satisfy a court that 
it should strike down the Commissioner‟s powers in s 74D on the basis 
that they unduly violate the right to privacy. The position of other open 
and democratic societies on the conduct of search and seizure operations 
supports this conclusion.  
 Clearly the execution of a search and seizure warrant constitutes a 
grave violation of the taxpayer‟s right to privacy. It is therefore important 
that the Commissioner satisfies the judge approached for the search and 
seizure warrant that he has exhausted the other information-gathering 
powers contained in s 74A and 74B without success. The search and 
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seizure warrant granted by the Court should contain details of the alleged 
offence and must not merely refer to alleged non-compliance with certain 
specific sections of the fiscal statutes.  
 The search and seizure warrant must detail the information required 
and the premises subject to search. To expect the Commissioner to 
advise a taxpayer that he has applied to a judge for the issue of a search 
and seizure warrant undermines the provisions of s 74D and is 
unnecessary. Once the Commissioner secures the warrant the fiscal 
statutes should require the warrant to be executed within a specified 
period, as is the case with search and seizure warrants issued under the 
Competition Act. It would be desirable that amendments to s 74D deal 
with this aspect and preclude the seizure of privileged information.  
 If the Commissioner carries out a search and seizure operation the 
taxpayer retains the inherent right to approach a court for relief to quash 
the warrant and have it set aside. Unfortunately, this remedy is neither 
ideal nor effective, as the taxpayer has already suffered the violation of 
his privacy.  
 I contend that amendments made to the search and seizure 
provisions of the fiscal statutes now conform to the right to privacy 
contained in the Constitution because the Commissioner may no longer 
authorise his officials to conduct search and seizure operations.142 Such 
operations require judicial intervention, which is also the case in many 
open and democratic societies.  
 
V MAY THE COMMISSIONER CONDUCT AN INQUIRY INTO A 
TAXPAYER‟S AFFAIRS WITHOUT VIOLATING THE TAXPAYER‟S 
RIGHT TO PRIVACY? 
 If the Commissioner wishes to conduct an inquiry into a taxpayer‟s 
affairs he must invoke the powers contained in s 74C of the Income Tax 
Act. The Commissioner may utilise the section as another means of 
securing information from a defaulting taxpayer. 
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 In Ferrucci143 Oosthuizen A J summarised the provisions of s 74C: 
„Section 74C vests in the Commissioner even more 
comprehensive investigatory powers. Under that section the 
Commissioner or his authorised representative may apply to a 
Judge for an order designating a presiding officer before whom an 
inquiry is to be held. … The Judge is entitled to grant the order if 
satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe: 
(a) that there has been non-compliance by any person with his 
obligation in terms of the Income Tax Act … 
(b) that information, documents or things are likely to be revealed 
which may afford proof of such non-compliance or of the 
commission of such offence; 
(c) that the inquiry which is sought is likely to reveal such 
information, documents and things. 
The order issued by the Judge must name the presiding officer, 
refer to the alleged non-compliance or offence, identify the 
perpetrator thereof and be reasonably specific as to the ambit of 
the inquiry. The presiding officer thus appointed thereafter 
conducts the inquiry, utilising such procedure as he sees fit.‟144 
 In order to conduct an inquiry into the taxpayer‟s affairs under s 74C 
the Commissioner must secure the approval of a judge, a requirement 
that balances the violation of the taxpayer‟s right to privacy and the need 
for the inquiry. The comments above about the judiciary‟s involvement in 
the issue of search and seizure warrants under s 74D apply equally to an 
inquiry conducted under s 74C.  
 The press has reported regularly on the tax affairs of Dave King, a 
prominent businessman and his disputes with the Commissioner.145 It is 
clear from The Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v D 
King and Others146 that the Commissioner has obtained useful 
information about King under s 74C of the Income Tax Act. King is the 
only reported case identified that refers to an inquiry conducted under s 
74C. Thus it appears that the Commissioner seldom utilises s 74C and 
this raises the question whether the provision serves any purpose. 
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Comparing the Canadian and South African provisions Arnold 
commented on the old s 74(2) of the Income Tax Act, which was similar to 
s 74C: 
„Under subsection 74(2) of the South African Income Tax Act, the 
Commissioner may demand any person in receipt of income or 
with information to be examined on oath. … The Canadian 
provision does not authorise the examination of persons under 
oath. However, under s 231.4 of the Canadian Income Tax Act, 
the Minister may authorise an official to conduct an inquiry with 
respect to any matter relating to the administration or enforcement 
of the Income Tax Act. The official conducting the hearing has the 
power to call witnesses and examine them under oath. … The 
inquiry procedure is seldom used by the Minister.‟147 
 As to whether the conducting of an inquiry on oath is reasonable, 
Arnold writes: 
„I am uncertain about whether subsection 74(2) of the South 
African Income Tax Act is reasonable, and necessary, and 
justifiable in a democratic society. Given the wide array of powers 
conferred on the Commissioner to obtain information, I am 
uncertain whether the additional power under subsection 74(2) is 
necessary. Undoubtedly, persons who are required to provide 
information under the Income Tax Act are subject to penalties for 
providing incorrect or false information. If this is the case, it is 
unclear what additional benefits are to be gained by giving the 
Commissioner the authority to examine persons under oath.‟148 
Daiber comments on the position in Germany as follows: 
„The tax authorities have the discretion to ask a taxpayer to affirm 
any information provided or to ask a competent court to require a 
third party to provide any information under oath. A taxpayer 
affirming information provided must be advised of the meaning of 
the affirmation and that criminal charges may apply where there is 
a false affirmation. … If a third party provides information under 
oath, the taxpayer must be informed of the date of the process and 
is entitled to ask questions during the examination.‟ [Section 
references omitted].149  
 The Internal Revenue Service of the USA may issue an 
administrative summons directing that a taxpayer attend an inquiry.150  
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 A number of countries will conduct inquiries into a taxpayer‟s affairs 
and it is not always necessary that a judge approve such inquiry. It is 
right, taking account of the constitutional dispensation in South Africa, that 
a judge should authorise the Commissioner‟s request to conduct an 
inquiry as required by s 74C of the Act. Arnold questions why the 
Commissioner requires a power to conduct inquiries in light of the other 
information-gathering powers contained in the Income Tax Act.151 When 
applying for a judge‟s approval to conduct an inquiry the Commissioner 
should show that he has exhausted all other less invasive means of 
obtaining information. 
 On the basis of decisions such as that in Ferreira v Levin NO and 
Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others152 and Bernstein 
v Bester NO153 on inquiries conducted under s 417 of the Companies Act 
it seems the Commissioner may pose incriminating questions at the 
inquiry, which the taxpayer is compelled to answer. 
 Despite its infrequent use I contend that s 74C of the Income Tax 
Act is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society, as 
the Commissioner cannot commence an inquiry without a judge‟s 
authorisation. It is unlikely that a taxpayer will succeed in having the 
provision struck down on the ground that it unduly violates his or her right 
to privacy.  
 
VI MAY THE COMMISSIONER LAWFULLY CALL FOR INFORMATION 
THAT IS SUBJECT TO LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE? 
 The right to claim privilege is not a statutory right but flows from the 
common law.154   
 Hoffmann writes that privilege extends not only to the rules of 
evidence but is a „fundamental common-law right (of which, no doubt, the 
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evidentiary aspect is a manifestation) that entitles a person to seek legal 
advice in confidence‟.155  
 Hoffmann & Zeffert justify why legal professional privilege applies to 
communications between a legal advisor and a client as follows: 
„The learned judge of appeal [Botha JA in S v Safatsa and 
Others]156 went on to approve of what Dawson J had said about 
this „fundamental principle‟ in Baker v Campbell:  
“The law came to recognise that for its better functioning it was 
necessary that there should be freedom of communication 
between a lawyer and his client for the purpose of giving and 
receiving legal advice and for the purpose of litigation and that 
this entailed immunity from disclosure of such communications 
between them. …” 
Although the privilege had been originally confined to maintaining 
confidence “pursuant to a contractual duty” arising out of a 
professional relationship, … 
“The restriction of the privilege to the legal profession serves to 
emphasise that the relationship between a client and his legal 
advisor has a special significance because it is part of the law 
itself …” 
The public interest, it has been decided by the courts, is better 
served by confidentiality rather than disclosure, “because the 
operation of the adversary system”, if this were not so, would be 
impaired.‟157 
 Jones J in Jeeva and Others v Receiver of Revenue, Port Elizabeth, 
and Others,158 in considering an application by taxpayers for the release 
of information held by the Commissioner, evaluated the scope of privilege 
and commented as follows: 
„These cases lay down the principle that the right to keep 
professional communications between legal advisor and client 
confidential is a fundamental right. Gibbs C J comments that “(t)his 
is a new development, which goes beyond any decision in 
England or Australia” (Baker v Campbell (supra at 65 (CLR) ). It 
does not seem to me to matter whether this is really a new 
development, or whether the law has come to recognise that what 
it previously treated as a rule of evidence has always been 
something more and that the rule of evidence is only one way of 
giving expression to a more fundamental right. It is certainly a new 
way of looking at privilege.‟159 
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 He further referred to Baker v Campbell, 160 where Dawson J stated: 
„This is why the privilege does not extend to communications 
arising out of other confidential relationships such as those of 
doctor and patient, priest and penitent or accountant and client. 
The restriction of the privilege to the legal profession serves to 
emphasise that the relationship between a client and his legal 
advisor has a special significance because it is part of the 
functioning of the law itself which may ultimately result in 
disadvantage to the client. ….‟ [footnotes omitted].161 
 When the Commissioner requires information from taxpayers or their 
advisors, Jeeva162 would entitle taxpayers to refuse to disclose 
information protected by privilege. The first ground is that the taxpayer‟s 
right to privacy contained in the Constitution protects such information 
from disclosure. Secondly, the legal right to claim privilege on the 
requested information would make the refusal lawful. 
 Schwikkard succinctly sets out the requirements for the existence of 
privilege.  
„Before legal professional privilege can be claimed the 
communication in question must have been made to a legal 
advisor acting in a professional capacity, in confidence, for the 
purpose of pending litigation or for the purpose of obtaining 
professional advice. The client must claim the privilege. And the 
lawyer can claim the privilege on behalf of his client once the latter 
has made an informed decision.‟163 
 For privilege to apply it is not necessary that the advice sought 
relates directly to actual or impending litigation. Schwikkard comments 
that: 
„Communications made between a legal advisor and her client, 
provided they are made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, 
need not be connected to actual or pending litigation for privilege 
to attach to them. However, before statements taken from agents 
or independent third parties will be treated as privileged, they must 
have been made in connection with contemplated litigation. 
Legal professional privilege will not be upheld if legal advice is 
sought so as to further a criminal purpose.‟164 
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 In Heiman Maasdorp and Barker v Secretary for Inland Revenue and 
Another165 the taxpayer contended that privilege precluded the disclosure 
of the information required by the Commissioner. Commenting on the 
Commissioner‟s powers to call for information under old s 74(1) of the 
Income Tax Act Snyman J said:  
„The crisp issue raised before me by counsel for all three parties 
was whether or not the usual privilege which a person consulting 
an attorney had, namely that the latter could not without his 
consent be compelled to divulge any confidences communicated 
to him or documents handed to him in the course of an attorney-
client relationship, persisted in spite of the provisions of s 74(1) of 
the Income Tax Act … 
… 
The language of this section would be decisive unless it is subject 
to the rule generalia specialibus non-derogant. In order to resolve 
the issue my enquiry becomes: whether the provision in 
section 74(1) is of a general nature as against the special nature 
of the privilege.‟166 
 Snyman J decided that the old s 74(1) of the Income Tax Act did not 
override the taxpayer‟s right to claim privilege to legal advice procured 
from the taxpayer‟s legal advisor.167 The judge correctly pointed out that 
attorney-client privilege exists only within well-defined legal limits.168 
 Taxpayers cannot secure privilege merely by handing over internally 
generated correspondence and documents to their legal advisor, which 
documents are required under the fiscal statutes by the Commissioner.169 
Privilege can only apply to communications where the legal advisor 
supplies legal advice to a client or for the purposes of pending litigation.170 
In addition, privilege does not apply where the legal advisor assists the 
taxpayer to complete schedules for a tax return or drafts other schedules 
for the taxpayer‟s personal use. 
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 Large accounting firms employ tax advisors who are not lawyers and 
the question arises whether a client‟s right to claim legal professional 
privilege applies only to qualified lawyers or also to accountants in public 
practice. May the Commissioner call for information from taxpayers or 
their advisors which legal privilege would otherwise protect?  
 Based on the authorities, an accountant is unable to claim privilege 
on communications that have passed between him or her and a client.171 
Thus, where a client seeks tax advice from any person other than a 
lawyer, privilege does not protect that advice.172  
 It is appropriate to refer to the views expressed by tax commentators 
on legal professional privilege. 
 Bentley points out that legal professional privilege constitutes a right 
protected by statute or common law in various jurisdictions.173 According 
to Bentley, only lawyers may legally claim such privilege. However, the 
Australian Commissioner of Taxation has extended privilege to specified 
documents passing between registered accountants and their clients.174 
The privilege conferred on clients of accountants may be withdrawn by 
the Commissioner of Taxation at any time as such right to privilege arises 
out of a concession made by the Commissioner and is not based on 
law.175 
 Writing about other countries, Baker identifies a lack of consensus 
on the scope of a taxpayer‟s right to claim legal professional privilege, for 
advice supplied by lawyers and non-lawyers, thereby preventing the 
disclosure of information to a tax authority.176 He points out that the 
debate is unresolved over whether privilege should apply only to lawyers 
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or should be extended to other advisors assisting a taxpayer with queries 
from revenue.177 
 Baker observes: 
„Two points might be made in this context. First, there is no reason 
why tax should be a special case: if there are good arguments for 
protecting professional privilege in ordinary civil cases, those 
arguments are equally good where tax is at issue. Secondly, tax is 
an area where professionals other than lawyers are commonly 
involved. If a client would enjoy privilege for communications with 
a lawyer, it seems logical that that privilege should apply equally to 
communications with another professional whom the taxpayer 
chooses to utilise in place of a lawyer.‟178 
 The distinction between lawyers and accountants in the tax arena 
appears unjustifiably discriminatory. The taxpayer should be entitled to 
appoint an advisor who is treated equally by the law. 
 Reviewing the Australian Commissioner‟s information-gathering 
powers and legal professional privilege Wheelwright states that the 
privilege applies where the purpose of „a communication is to obtain 
advice or to use it in litigation‟.179 She points out that the privilege does 
not extend to a solicitor‟s trust account records nor does it apply to 
accountants dealing with their clients.180 Officials inspecting taxpayers‟ 
premises must afford taxpayers sufficient time to review their documents 
and claim legal professional privilege.181 
 According to Bloom the Australian courts have reviewed the issue of 
legal professional privilege in the tax arena. 182 He summarises the 
position as follows: 
„In FCT v Citibank Limited the Full Court of the Federal Court held 
that the common law principle of legal professional privilege 
restricts s 263 of Income Tax Assessment Act 1936. Bowen, CJ 
and Fisher J said: 
“… 
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The adequate protection according to the law of privacy and the 
liberty of the individual is an essential mark of a free society 
and unless abrogated or abridged by statute the common law 
privilege attaching to the relationship of solicitor and client is an 
important element in that protection.” 
It is not only a matter of protection for the client.  
The freedom to consult one‟s legal advisor in the knowledge that 
confidential communications will be safeguarded will often make 
its own contribution to the general level of respect for and 
observance of the law within the community.‟183 
 Bloom comments further that in Australia the Commissioner‟s 
powers to search premises and make copies of documents are subject to 
the right of a taxpayer to claim legal professional privilege.184 
 Analysing a case dealing with the Australian Commissioner‟s 
request for information from Deloitte, a firm of accountants, McLennan 
comments on Deloitte‟s request for judicial review: 185 
„Deloitte argued that there was a legitimate expectation created by 
the Commissioner‟s “Access and Information Gathering 
Guidelines” (the Access Guidelines) that the Commissioner would 
not seize confidential material. Goldberg J noted the evident 
purpose of chapter 8.7 of the Access Guidelines is to provide: 
“by analogy with legal professional privilege a measure of 
protection except in exceptional circumstances to clients of 
professional accounting advisors in respect of disclosure of 
confidential taxation advice given to them by their professional 
accounting advisors.”‟186  
 McLennan points out that the information sought by the 
Commissioner was not privileged and was thus not protected by the 
guidelines.187 It is unfortunate that South Africa does not have similar 
guidelines in place to confer privilege on communications between 
taxpayers and their non-lawyer advisors. 
 The Inland Revenue Department, New Zealand, has procedures in 
place to protect information supplied to taxpayers by accountants.188 
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 In Canada, according to Li, a lawyer may claim solicitor-client 
privilege when Revenue Canada wishes to seize documents relating to a 
taxpayer.189 The privilege does not extend to communications between an 
accountant and his or her client.190 Analysing this position she writes: 
„The rationale for the absence of such a privilege seems to be that, 
unlike the solicitor-client privilege, the accountant-client privilege 
“is not founded upon a need to ensure an effective system of the 
administration of justice”, which is a basis for the solicitor-client 
privilege. However, it has been held that where an accountant is 
engaged by solicitors to obtain facts from a client, communications 
between the accountant and the client will be considered as 
communications between the solicitor and the client, and would be 
privileged.‟191  
 Daiber points out that in Germany persons other than the taxpayer 
are not required to provide information to the tax authorities unless the 
taxpayer cannot provide the required information.192 Attorneys, tax 
advisors, tax accountants, auditors and certified accountants may not 
provide information to the revenue authority unless the taxpayer 
withdraws the secrecy obligation facing these professionals.193 The 
authorities need not inform the professionals of their right to remain 
silent.194 
 A leading case in the UK confirmed that a taxpayer need not supply 
documents covered by legal professional privilege to Inland Revenue.195 
Lord Hoffmann weighed the Inland Revenue‟s power to call for 
documents against the right to claim that documents were subject to 
privilege as follows: 
„… the courts will ordinarily construe general words in a statute, 
although literally capable of having some startling or unreasonable 
consequence, such as overriding human rights, as not having 
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been intended to do so. An intention to override such rights must 
be expressly stated or appear by necessary implication.‟196 
 He pointed out that a balance must be struck between the public 
interest of the Special Commissioner to assess the taxpayer correctly 
against the taxpayer‟s right to privacy and concluded that the right to 
claim legal professional privilege is absolute and not only forms part of the 
right to privacy but is based upon the taxpayer‟s right of access to 
justice.197  
 In Grenfell198 the House of Lords decided that the documents 
requested by the United Kingdom Inland Revenue were subject to legal 
professional privilege and the taxpayer should not make them available.  
 Levy expressed the following view on the decision handed down in 
the Grenfell case: „This [privilege] is well and good for lawyers but what 
about tax advisors? It is not only lawyers who provide skilled advice about 
the law, a fact which is recognised by parliament which has granted non-
lawyers statutory rights to privilege under certain circumstances…‟199 
 According to Howarth & Maas auditors who prepare documents as 
part of their function as auditor are not obliged to make those documents 
available to the UK Inland Revenue.200 They point out that 
communications between a tax advisor and his or her client are protected 
where the purpose of the communications relate to the giving of tax 
advice.201 
 In the USA s 3411 of Taxpayer Bill of Rights 3202 amended s 7525 of 
the Internal Revenue Code to extend legal professional privilege to „a 
communication between a taxpayer and any federally authorised tax 
practitioner to the extent the communication would be considered a 
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privileged communication if it were between a taxpayer and an 
attorney‟.203  
 Thus, qualifying communications between taxpayers and registered 
tax practitioners are protected by privilege. It remains to be seen whether 
South Africa will follow this course when it enacts legislation to regulate 
the conduct of practitioners in the country.204 
 SAICA has proposed, via various submissions and in discussions 
with the Commissioner on legislation regulating tax practitioners, the 
removal of the distinction between tax advice given by a lawyer and that 
given by an accountant.205 As is the case in many other jurisdictions in 
South Africa more accountants than lawyers give tax advice.206 
 The purpose of conferring legal professional privilege is to 
encourage full and frank disclosure to ensure the proper administration of 
justice. I contend that there is no justification for distinguishing between 
tax lawyers and tax accountants in an open and democratic constitutional 
society. The removal of the distinction would encourage full and proper 
disclosure by taxpayers to their advisors, whether those advisors are 
trained as accountants or as lawyers.  
 However, based on the decision of Hoffmann LJ in Grenfell207cited 
above a taxpayer may satisfy a court that advice obtained from an 
accountant should not be made available to the Commissioner. 
Furthermore, the decision of Botha JA in S v Safatsa208 that the right to 
legal professional privilege „is a fundamental principle upon which our 
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judicial system is based‟209 may assist a taxpayer in resisting the 
Commissioner‟s request for access to tax advice supplied by an 
accountant. 
 Taxpayers cannot secure legal professional privilege for 
documentation not subject to privilege by handing that documentation 
over to their attorney or advocate.210 To rely on privilege in refusing to 
supply information to the Commissioner a taxpayer must satisfy a court 
that documentation relates directly to obtaining legal advice or for 
purposes of litigation.211  
 
VII CONCLUSION 
 In terms of the provisions of s 74, 74A-D of the Income Tax Act the 
Commissioner may call for information from taxpayers in different ways. 
Those provisions lawfully and justifiably violate the taxpayer‟s right to 
privacy as enshrined in the Constitution. The need for the Commissioner 
to call for information is understandable and, based on international 
experience, constitutes a valid limitation of the taxpayer‟s right to privacy. 
What is important is the manner in which the Commissioner‟s officers 
conduct themselves in securing the information and that the information 
must be required for administration of the Act and not for ulterior 
purposes. Where a taxpayer believes the Commissioner is embarking on 
a fishing expedition it will be difficult to challenge the Commissioner‟s 
powers to call for the information on the ground that such a request 
violates the taxpayer‟s right to privacy. I contend that the taxpayer‟s 
remedy lies elsewhere and may arise out of the violation of the 
constitutional right to administrative justice (see later).  
 The search and seizure provisions contained in s 74D constitute a 
violation of the taxpayer‟s right to privacy. However, taking account of the 
experience in other open and democratic societies, the requirement that 
judicial authority must be sought for the issue of a search and seizure 
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warrant under s 74D ensures that the warrant will be issued appropriately. 
I contend that the violation of the taxpayer‟s right to privacy entailed in 
such action constitutes a valid limitation of that right if the Commissioner 
can show that he has exhausted all other means of obtaining the required 
information. 
 The Commissioner does not conduct many inquiries into taxpayers‟ 
affairs under s 74C of the Income Tax Act and I question whether the 
power set out in this section is, in fact, necessary. The power is not 
common in other open and democratic societies.  
 Where the Commissioner requires a taxpayer or his or her advisor to 
supply information or documents the taxpayer should consider whether 
legal professional privilege protects any of that information. If it is 
protected the taxpayer would be within his or her rights to refuse to deliver 
the information to the Commissioner.212 The right to refuse to disclose 
such information plays an important role in the administration of justice 
and is common in many other democratic societies, as, indeed, it is in 
South Africa.  
 Many countries confer legal professional privilege on tax advisors, 
be they accountants or lawyers. I contend that the South African 
legislature should review the position and should confer legal professional 
privilege on all tax advisors, thereby ensuring full and frank discussion of 
tax affairs between taxpayers and their advisors, which will enhance the 
level of tax compliance in the country. There is no justification for a 
distinction between tax accountants and tax lawyers in this country and 
other democratic countries which have extended legal professional 
privilege to all advisors, either statutorily or by agreement between the 
revenue authority and the governing accounting bodies.  South African 
taxpayers are entitled to a right to privacy and taxpayers may seek to rely 
on that right in refusing to disclose information received from a tax 
accountant. 















 In the following chapter I consider the impact on the taxpayer‟s rights 
of access to information, to administrative justice and access to the courts 
on the powers conferred on the Commissioner in the fiscal statutes. I also 
















‘Justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be 
seen to be done.’1 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 In earlier chapters I evaluated the taxpayer‟s right to property and 
privacy. I concluded that a taxpayer might encounter difficulty in 
successfully challenging fiscal legislation or the conduct of the 
Commissioner on the basis of one of these rights and that the remedy 
might lie elsewhere. This chapter considers whether the procedural rights 
found in the Constitution offer an effective method of challenging the fiscal 
legislation or the conduct of the Commissioner and his officers. The three 
procedural rights contained in the Bill of Rights are inextricably linked and 
should not be evaluated independently. 
 The Constitution confers the following procedural rights on taxpayers: 
 access to information;2 
 just administrative action;3 and 
 access to the courts.4  
 
II ACCESS TO INFORMATION 
(1) Background 
 Section 32 of the Constitution provides that: 
„(1) Everyone has the right of access to - 
 (a) any information held by the state; and 
 (b) any information that is held by another person and that 
is required for the exercise or protection of any rights. 
                                                 
1
 Chief Justice Lord Hewart in Rex v Sussex Justices 1924 KB 131. 
2
 Section 32. 
3
 Section 33. 
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(2) National legislation must be enacted to give effect to this 
right, and may provide for reasonable measures to alleviate 
the administrative and financial burden on the state.‟5 
 The legislature enacted the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 
of 2000 („PAIA‟) to comply with s 32(2). PAIA sets out the information a 
taxpayer may request from the Commissioner, as well as the procedures 
to follow in securing that information. The Act imposes no obligation on 
public bodies to make information available generally to the public apart 
from requiring all such bodies to produce a PAIA manual which is 
accessible by the public. 6 
 It is unusual for a constitution to contain a separate right of access to 
information. Such right is normally part of a right to freedom of 
expression.7 The rationale for a separate right of access to information is 
understandable in the light of South Africa‟s history, particularly during the 
apartheid era when many statutes contained provisions expressly 
prohibiting the publication of information held by the State.8 The Interim 
Constitution created the right of access to information to encourage open, 
transparent and democratic government in South Africa.9  
 Roberts describes succinctly the rationale for a right of access to 
information.  
„Die reg op toegang tot inligting is ook deurslaggewend in die 
voorkoming of vermindering van arbitrêre optrede en die 
bevordering van administratiewe geregtigheid. Dit behels onder 
meer dat ‟n individu vooraf ingelig sal word oor beleid en 
prosedures en dat alle feite en oorwegings waardeur „n party 
geraak mag word, beskikbaar gestel moet word sodat die persoon 
sy/haar kant van die saak kan stel … Een van die vernaamste 
uitvloeisels van die geredelike verskaffing van inligting in sake waar 
die regte, vryhede en belange van die publiek ter sprake kom, is 
                                                 
5
 For a summary of the history relating to the right of access to information from the Interim 
Constitution to the Constitution see, eg, S Woolman & T Roux et al Constitutional Law of South Africa 
(2006) 62-1 and I Currie and J Klaaren The Promotion of Access To Information Act Commentary 
(2002) 3. 
6
 Section 14 of PAIA requires public bodies to publish an information manual and s 51 places the same 
obligation on private bodies. 
7
 M H Cheadle, D M Davis & N R L Haysom South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights 
(2002) para 26.1 p 576. 
8
 Currie & Klaaren (note 5 above) para 1.2 p 3. 
9
 G E Devenish, Commentary On The South African Bill of Rights (1999) 439; Woolman & Roux 













dat dit vertroue in die administratiewe proses in die hand werk en 
negatiewe persepies oor die openbare sektor verminder.‟10  
 A question that arises is whether a taxpayer may seek information 
only under PAIA or whether he or she may call for information directly 
under s 32 of the Constitution.11 It has been argued that a taxpayer should 
seek primarily to rely on PAIA for required information but may, where 
appropriate, call for information by relying directly on s 32 of the 
Constitution on the basis that PAIA should not restrict a fundamental right 
contained in the Constitution.12  
 
(2) Meaning of ‘required’ 
 The right of access to information exists if the taxpayer requires that 
information to exercise or protect any rights protected under the Bill of 
Rights.  
 It is necessary to consider the significance of the term „required‟ in 
the context of the right to access to information in s 32 of the Constitution. 
The decision of Myburgh J in Khala v The Minister of Safety and 
Security13 is helpful. 
„The context in which the word “required” is used in section 23 is 
that that section provides for a fundamental right in a Bill of Rights. 
The purpose of section 23 is to enable a person to gain access to 
information held by the State in order to create, and thereafter to 
maintain, an open and democratic society. One of the tests to be 
applied in deciding whether any fundamental right in Chapter 3 
should be limited is that the limitation is justifiable in “an open and 
democratic society” in terms of section 33(1)(a)(ii) [my emphasis]. 
In that context, section 23, and in particular the word “required” 
therein should be given a generous and purposive interpretation. It 
should not be restrictively interpreted, as contended by the 
defendant. While it seems to me that “required” does not mean 
                                                 
10
 B V Roberts „Betekenis en grondslae van die reg op toegang tot inligting‟ (2002) 65 THRHR 352. 
„The right of access to information is crucial in preventing or reducing arbitrary conduct and in 
promoting administrative justice. It comprises, inter alia, that an individual will be informed in advance 
about policy and procedures and that all facts and issues affecting a party are made available so that the 
party may explain his or her point of view. … One of the most important consequences of providing 
information on the public‟s rights, freedoms and interests, is that it increases confidence in the 
administrative process and reduces negative perceptions of the public sector.‟ [my translation]. 
11
 Currie & Klaaren (note 5 above) para 2.12 p 25. 
12
 Ibid para 2.12 p 25 and Woolman & Roux (note 5 above) 62-4. 
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“dire necessity” or “desired”, it is not possible to give the word a 
precise meaning. The enquiry in each case should be a factual 
one: Is the information required for the protection or exercise of a 
person‟s rights?‟14  
 In Khala15 the plaintiff sought access to the police docket to establish 
whether it contained any information that would assist in the plaintiff‟s 
case for damages against the authorities for wrongful arrest. Myburgh J 
held that the plaintiff was entitled to the information requested to protect 
his rights.16  
 
(3) Meaning of ‘Records’ 
 PAIA creates the means whereby taxpayers may request documents 
from the Commissioner for the protection of their rights, which would 
include the right to property, privacy and administrative justice. The 
document requested should assist taxpayers in understanding decisions 
that affect them.17 The Act does not provide that taxpayers may call for 
information from the Commissioner. Instead, it prescribes that they may 
call for „records‟ from the Commissioner in certain circumstances and sets 
out the procedures they must follow to secure that information.  
 Section 1 of PAIA defines a „record‟ for the purposes of the Act as 
follows: 
„”record” of, or in relation to, a public or private body, means any 
recorded information –  
(a) regardless of form or medium;  
(b) in the possession of or under the control of that public body 
or  
(c) whether or not it was created by that public or private body 
respectively;‟ 
 The Act specifies who may request access to „records‟ as defined 
and introduces the concept of „requester‟ 
„in relation to –  
(a) a public body [a requester] means – 
                                                 




 Ibid 122. A similar decision was reached by Kroon J in Qozoleni v Minister of Law and Order and 
Another (1994) (1) BCLR 75 (E) 89. 
17













(i) any person other than a public body contemplated in 
paragraph (a) or (b)(i) of the definition of „public body‟, or 
an official thereof) making a request for access to a record 
of that public body; or  
(ii) a person acting on behalf of the person referred to in 
subparagraph (i);‟ 
 PAIA imposes no obligation on the Commissioner to create records at 
the request of taxpayers but obliges the Commissioner to make available 
records requested by taxpayers, other than records containing information 
that the Commissioner may justifiably refuse under ch 4 of part 2 of the 
Act. 
 
(4) Public and private bodies 
 The Act distinguishes between „public bodies‟ and „private bodies‟.18 
The procedure governing requests for information by both types of bodies 
are much the same, as are the grounds for refusal of requests for 
information.  
 In terms of s 1 a „public body‟: 
„means -  
(a) any department of state or administration in the national or 
provincial sphere of government or any municipality in the 
local sphere of government; or 
(b) any other functionary or institution when –  
(i) exercising a power or performing a duty in terms of the 
Constitution or a provincial constitution; or 
(ii) exercising a public power or performing a public function 
in terms of any legislation;‟ 
 In relation to paragraph (b) public bodies, and all private bodies, a 
requester may approach a court for relief if the body denies a request for 
information.19  
 Section 2(3) provides as follows: „For the purposes of this Act, the 
South African Revenue Service, established by section 2 of the South 
African Revenue Service Act, 1997 (Act No. 34 of 1997), and referred to in 
section 35(1) is a public body.‟  
                                                 
18
 See the definitions of these terms in s 1. A detailed examination of the rules governing private bodies 
lies beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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 The provisions governing public bodies thus apply to the South 
African Revenue Service. 
 
(5) Requests for information from the Commissioner  
 A taxpayer seeking information under PAIA must comply with s 11, 
which provides: 
„(1) A requester must be given access to a public record of a 
public body if - 
 (a) that requester complies with all the procedural 
requirements in this Act relating to a request for access 
to that record; and 
 (b) access to that record is not refused in terms of any 
ground for refusal contemplated in Chapter 4 of this 
Part. 
(2) A request contemplated in subsection (1) includes a request 
for access to a record containing personal information about 
the requester. 
(3) A requester‟s right to access contemplated in subsection (1) 
is, subject to this Act, not affected by - 
 (a) any reasons the requester gives for requesting access; 
or 
 (b) the information officer‟s belief as to what the requester‟s 
reasons are for requesting access.‟ 
 A taxpayer is thus entitled to request information held by the 
Commissioner about himself or herself. This includes information 
physically located in the taxpayer‟s file held by the Commissioner or held 
electronically on the Commissioner‟s sophisticated computer system. 
Where information requested falls into one of the grounds on which it may 
be refused under ch 4 of part 2 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice 
Act („PAJA‟),20 the Commissioner is legally entitled to refuse access. 
 A taxpayer may call for information from the Commissioner before the 
commencement of criminal or civil proceedings. However, once 
proceedings have started a taxpayer cannot call for information relating 
thereto as such information is subject to the rules of discovery.21 If a 
taxpayer obtains information in contravention of the section he or she may 
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not use it as evidence in the civil or criminal proceedings.22 However, the 
court concerned may decide that to exclude the evidence would be 
detrimental to the interests of justice.  
 PAIA provides that an official wishing to decline a request for 
information must justify that decision rather than the requester being 
required to justify the request.23 If the information may lawfully be made 
available to the taxpayer the Commissioner must accede to the request. 
 The Act lays down that each body must appoint an information officer 
who is responsible for ensuring that the body complies with the obligations 
imposed by PAIA. Section 17 of PAIA allows for the appointment of 
deputy information officers to assist the information officer. The 
information officer may delegate certain functions to the duly appointed 
deputy information officers.24  
 The Commissioner publishes many interpretation notes, practice 
notes and guides on customs, income tax, VAT and other taxes and 
levies. These documents are readily available, thus taxpayers do not need 
to follow the procedures contained in PAIA to secure copies.25  
 
(6) Commissioner’s PAIA Manual 
 Under s 14 of PAIA every public body must prepare a manual  which 
sets out, as a minimum, the following information:  
 a description of its structure and functions; 
 contact details of the body and especially of the information officer 
of the body and every deputy information officer of the body; 
 a description of the guide referred to in s 10 of the Act and how to 
obtain access thereto; 
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 PAIA s 7. 
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 Ibid ss 9(b) and 25(3). 
24
 Ibid s 17(3); Currie & Klaaren (note 5 above) para 6.1p 73. 
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 sufficient detail to facilitate a request for access to a record of the 
body, a description of the subjects on which the body holds records 
and the categories of records held on each subject; 
 the latest notice under s 15(2) of the Act specifying what records 
are readily available from the body without the necessity of a 
request; 
 a description of the services provided by the body to members of 
the public and how to access those services; 
 a description of all remedies available in the event of the body 
acting or failing to act . 
 The Commissioner published the first edition of the manual required 
under s 14 in February 2003 and regularly issues updated manuals.26 The 
Commissioner‟s manual is useful as it sets out which officials taxpayers 
should approach when requesting information. The Commissioner has 
decided that taxpayers must direct all requests to officials located at his 
office in Pretoria to ensure better control over requests and to expedite 
responses.27  
 The manual contains the information required under s 14 of PAIA and 
specifies that the Commissioner holds three main types of records, 
namely: 
„8.1 Taxpayer information 
These records include tax returns, bills of entry, declarations, 
assessments, financial statements, financial or other information 
about taxpayers collected from various sources, and evaluative 
records. 
8.2 Personnel information 
These records include information on employment policy, contracts 
of employment of all personnel in SARS, evaluative records, and 
salary information. 
8.3 Business records 
These records include SARS‟ financial records on own account 
and revenue administered account, contracts, minutes of various 
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 Manual on the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2000 published by the Commissioner in 
February 2003.This manual has been updated twice, most recently during April 2007. The latest 
version is available at http://www.sars.gov.za. 
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committee, operational records, operational instructions and 
manuals, tax statistics, tenders, and trade statistics.‟28   
 If a taxpayer requires a copy of his or her tax return, assessment, 
statement of account and related records, the Commissioner will make 
copies available on request. The taxpayer may have to pay for the cost of 
copies supplied, depending on the volume of copies called for.  
 The Commissioner‟s PAIA manual reminds taxpayers to establish 
whether his office holds the required records before requesting them. 
 A taxpayer who wishes to request information from the Commissioner 
under PAIA must complete a request form published by the 
Commissioner.29 The form calls for the information required under PAIA 
and provides for payment of the prescribed fee where a person other than 
the taxpayer requests the information. If the taxpayer is requesting 
information about his or her own affairs no fee is payable.30 If the request 
for information is successful the Commissioner is entitled to charge a fee 
for copies of documents. . 
 A taxpayer has a right to receive a decision about a request for 
information within 30 days.31 PAIA deems the Commissioner to have 
denied a taxpayer‟s request if he fails to reach a decision within the 
stipulated period.32 If the request is denied the taxpayer may utilise the 
internal appeal process set out in s 74 of PAIA. According to s 25 a 
decision denying a request for information must contain adequate 
reasons.33  
 Section 74 requires that a taxpayer lodge an appeal against a 
decision by a paragraph (a) public body to deny a request for information 
within 60 days of receipt of the decision. Because the Commissioner 
considers SARS a paragraph (a) public body as defined in s 1 of PAIA the 
appeal must be lodged by the completion of a form (form B) submitted to 
the Deputy Information Officer who originally dealt with the taxpayer‟s 
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 Manual (note 26 above) 10. 
29
 Form A contained in Annexure 1 to the Manual (note 26 above) 16. 
30
 PAIA s 22(1). 
31
 Ibid s 25(1). 
32
 Ibid s 27. 
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request.34 The Commissioner must decide on the appeal within 30 days 
and advise the taxpayer of the decision, with reasons.35 Because 
paragraph (hh) of the definition of „administrative action‟ in s 1 of PAJA 
specifically excludes decisions made under PAIA an aggrieved taxpayer 
may not rely on the procedures contained in PAJA to challenge the 
Commissioner‟s decision to deny access to a record. 36   
 The taxpayer may also appeal to a court for relief in a case where the 
Commissioner has refused to grant a request for access.37 The Court may 
make an order either confirming, amending or setting aside, the 
Commissioner‟s decision. In addition, the Court may grant an interdict, or 
specific relief, a declaratory order or compensation, or may award costs.38  
 
(7) Disclosure of records by the Commissioner 
 What information may a taxpayer request from the Commissioner, 
and may members of the public request information about other taxpayers 
without restriction?  
 The Commissioner has a legal obligation to treat information supplied 
under the fiscal statutes as confidential under the secrecy provisions 
contained in the various fiscal statues.39 The taxpayer‟s right to privacy 
contained in s 14 of the Constitution must be balanced with the right of 
access to information in s 32 of the Constitution.  
 Section 35 of PAIA recognises the Commissioner‟s obligation not to 
disclose information about a taxpayer to any person other than the 
taxpayer. The section provides as follows:  
„Mandatory protection of certain records of South African Revenue 
Service 
(1) Subject to subsection (2), the information officer of the South 
African Revenue Service, referred to in section 2(3) must 
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 Form B is contained in Annexure 3 to the Manual (note 26 above) 22. 
35
 PAIA s 77(3). 
36
 Currie & Klaaren (note 5 above) para 3.8 pp 35 and 36. 
37
 PAIA s 78. 
38
 Ibid s 82. 
39
 See, eg, s 4 of the Income Tax Act and s 6 of the VAT Act. Similar provisions are found in the other 













refuse a request for access to a record of that Service if it 
contains information which was obtained or is held by that 
Service for the purpose of enforcing legislation concerning 
the collection of revenue as defined in section 1 of the South 
African Revenue Service Act, 1997 (Act No. 34 of 1997). 
(2) A record may not be refused in terms of subsection (1) 
insofar as it consists of information about the requester or 
the person on whose behalf it is made.‟ 
 
(8) Grounds for refusing access to records 
 Insofar as it is relevant to this thesis, the Commissioner must, under 
PAIA, refuse access to the following classes of information:  
 protection of privacy of a third party who is a natural person;  
 protection of certain records of the Commissioner;  
 protection of commercial information of a third party; 
 protection of certain confidential information, and protection of 
certain other confidential information, of a third party;  
 protection of police dockets in bail proceedings, and protection 
of law enforcement proceedings; and  
 protection of records privileged in legal proceedings. 40 
 The Commissioner may refuse access to information relating to the 
operation of SARS and requests that are manifestly frivolous or vexatious, 
or a substantial and unreasonable diversion of resources.41  
 All but one of the above categories are self-explanatory and are not 
analysed any further. The one ground that warrants further discussion is 
the protection of information under s 37 of PAIA, which covers information 
provided confidentially by a third party to the Commissioner. For example, 
a third party supplies an affidavit to the Commissioner alleging that a 
taxpayer did not export goods in conformity with s 11 of the VAT Act. 
When the Commissioner raises an additional VAT assessment and 
informs the exporter that he is relying on the affidavit to do so, may the 
exporter successfully call for a copy of the affidavit under PAIA?  
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 The information officer of a public body must refuse access to 
information if disclosure constitutes a breach of a contractual 
confidentiality agreement, unless the information is publicly available or 
the affected third party consents to the disclosure of the information.42 
 The Commissioner frequently acts on information received voluntarily 
from one taxpayer about another. The informant may expect the 
Commissioner to treat such information as confidential. However, it may 
be possible for a person requesting information to show that it is not 
subject to a confidentiality agreement. If so, the Commissioner may 
disclose the information to the „requester‟. Where the information is 
subject to a confidentiality agreement the taxpayer seeking the information 
may only secure it from the source and not from the Commissioner.  
 The Commissioner may refuse to disclose information received from 
a third party if it falls under the provisions of s 37(1)(b) of PAIA. Currie & 
Klaaren analyse the section as follows: 
„Section 37(1)(b) permits refusal of disclosure (1) if the record 
consists of information supplied in confidence by a third party and 
(2) if disclosure could reasonably be expected to prejudice the 
future supply of similar information or information from the same 
source and (3) if it is in the public interest that similar information 
should continue to be supplied.‟43  
 If the deponent of the affidavit supplied the information in confidence, 
even if there was no contract to that effect, the Commissioner may refuse 
access to the affidavit. The Commissioner may rely on one of the other 
grounds in s 37(1)(b) to deny the request. Under s 37(2) the 
Commissioner may only release the information if the third party agrees 
under s 48 or in writing to the requester or if the information is publicly 
available.  
 It is contended that a taxpayer seeking the release of the affidavit will 
encounter difficulty doing so because of the provisions of s 37 of PAIA. 
However, the taxpayer may secure the desired information by relying on 
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s 5 of PAJA as the taxpayer may come to understand the basis on which 
the assessment was made. 
 PAIA contains procedures for advising a third party that a „requester‟ 
has called for information from a public body supplied with or in 
possession of information about the third party.44  
 If the public interest is greater than the ground for refusal to release 
the information a body other than SARS is, under s 46 of PAIA, entitled to 
release the information requested. Section 46 of PAIA provides: 
„Despite any other provision of this Chapter, the information officer 
of a public body must grant a request for access to a record of the 
body contemplated in sections 34(1), 36(1), 37(1)(a) or (b), 38(a) or 
(b), 39(1)(a) or (b), 40, 41(1)(a) or (b), 42(1) or (3), 43(1) or (2), 
44(1) or (2) or 45 if –  
(a) the disclosure of the record would reveal evidence of – 
(i) a substantial contravention of, or failure to comply with the 
law; or 
(ii) an imminent and serious public safety or environmental 
risk; and 
(b) the public interest in the disclosure if the record clearly 
outweighs the harm contemplated in the provision in question.‟ 
 Section 46 of PAIA does not refer to s 35 of the Act. Thus, given that 
the Commissioner receives information from taxpayers under a statutory 
duty of secrecy and taxpayers expect that information to remain 
confidential, the records held by the Commissioner are not subject to the 
public-interest override, as is the case with records held by other public 
bodies.45    
 Where a member of the public seeks information about another 
taxpayer under PAIA the Commissioner must refuse the request for such 
information.46 If the requester is the taxpayer or someone authorised to 
act on his or her behalf the Commissioner must release the information to 
the taxpayer or his or her representative where that information may be 
disclosed and will not violate ss 62 to 69 of PAIA.  
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 The purpose of the legislation is to facilitate the release of information 
to „requesters‟. Clearly, the Commissioner may deny requests for 
information in certain cases. However, PAIA allows for sections to be 
severed from records.  
„(1) If a request for access is made to a record of a public body 
containing information which may or must be refused in 
terms of any provision of Chapter 4 of this Part, every part of 
the record which-  
(a) does not contain; and 
(b) can reasonably be severed from any part that contains,  
any such information must, despite any other provision of 
this Act, be disclosed.  
(2) If a request for access to-  
(a) a part of a record is granted; and 
(b) the other part of the record is refused, as contemplated 
in subsection (1), the provisions of section 25(2), apply 
to paragraph (a) of this subsection and the provisions of 
section 25(3) apply to paragraph (b) of this 
subsection.‟47  
 It is evident that the legislature intends the Commissioner to receive 
and consider requests for information. If possible, the Commissioner must 
make the information available to taxpayers in an unedited form. Where 
the information contains a mixture of information the Commissioner may 
release and information he may not release, he must delete the 
information that may not be released. He may do this on one of the 
grounds set out in ch 4 part 2 of PAIA. This will achieve the principle 
described by Currie & Klaaren:  
„[T]hat limitations of the right of access to information should be 
reasonable and proportional to the aims pursued by the limitation, 
the Act requires holding bodies to sever (i.e., delete) from a record 
any information that is subject to refusal and to disclose the 
remainder of the information.‟48   
 Where the Commissioner severs a record, he must release the 
information in such a manner that it contains no clues about the identity of 
the person protected.49 Further, the way in which he edits the record must 
not render it misleading or meaningless.50 Where a taxpayer requests 
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information about him or herself from the Commissioner, and such 
information contains details of another person, the Commissioner must 
release the record after removing the name of the other person.  
 What records may a taxpayer request from the Commissioner? The 
Katz Commission expressed the view that taxpayers will, under PAIA, 
have the right of access to all information held by the Commissioner 
relevant to an objection and appeal.51 The Commission correctly pointed 
out that the Commissioner would fail to show that the limitation clause in 
s 36 of the Constitution would assist in a refusal to make the requested 
information available.52  
 Furthermore, according to Davis et al a taxpayer may seek 
information from the Commissioner comprising the Commissioner‟s official 
manual containing his tax policies, practices and procedures.53  
 In deciding what information a taxpayer may call for from the 
Commissioner I refer to the comments made by Kirk-Cohen J in Rèan 
International Supply Company (Pty) Ltd and Others v Mpumalanga 
Gaming Board:54  
„The word “information” is far wider than the concept of “facts” 
known to an administrative body. In terms of s 33, an aggrieved 
applicant is entitled to decide for himself whether administrative 
action was justifiable in relation to the reasons given for the refusal 
of a licence. In order so to decide, an aggrieved party is entitled to 
“all information” which led to the refusal of a licence and that 
includes the deliberations of the administrative body. To exclude 
such deliberations would render the provisions of s 33(1)(d) 
somewhat nugatory because the deliberations may demonstrate 
the reasons upon which the board acted were unjustifiable or 
wrong. To exclude them from the ambit of ss 32 and 33 would 
impose an unjustifiable limitation upon the provisions of the 
Constitution. This follows from the provisions of s 33 that every 
person has a right to administrative action which is justifiable in 
relation to the reasons given. One can only decide whether 
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administrative action is justifiable if one has access to the 
reasoning of the administrative body.‟55  
 The Court held that the Gaming Board had to make available the 
transcripts of the meeting held to adjudicate the applicant‟s application for 
a licence.56 Relying on this decision, taxpayers should succeed in 
obtaining information utilised by the Commissioner in reaching a decision 
on the taxpayer‟s assessment. 
 The Commissioner may levy interest, penalties and/or additional tax 
on a taxpayer. In deciding whether to impose tax and what amount of 
additional tax to impose, the Commissioner will call for reasons from the 
taxpayer justifying why he should not impose additional tax. The decision 
to impose additional tax and/or penalties is usually made by a Penalty and 
Interest Committee following the policy guidelines set by the 
Commissioner. Once that committee has met the Commissioner advises 
the taxpayer of his decision and issues an assessment. 
 The minutes of the committee may assist the taxpayer in 
understanding the Commissioner‟s decision to impose additional tax 
and/or interest. Based on the judgment in Rèan57 the taxpayer should 
succeed in obtaining copies of minutes of the Penalty and Interest 
Committee meeting held to discuss whether the Commissioner will impose 
interest or additional tax on that taxpayer. If the Commissioner records 
those proceedings a taxpayer is entitled to call for a copy of the recording 
under the right of access to information.  
 The Commissioner‟s policy manual guides the decisions made by his 
officials in dealing with matters such as extensions for submission of tax 
returns, deferred payment of assessed taxes and finalisation of taxpayers‟ 
objections to and appeals against disputed assessments. A taxpayer‟s 
request for a copy of this manual should succeed.  
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(9) Operation of public bodies as a ground of refusal of access  
 Section 44 of PAIA allows a public body to refuse a request for 
information if it relates to the operation of the public body. On this subject 
De Waal et al comment:  
„The purpose of this ground for refusal is to protect from disclosure 
the formulation of policy and the taking of decisions. In this sense, 
this ground for refusal draws on the state communications 
privilege.  
…  
Section 44 (1)(a) covers two categories of records: records 
containing an opinion, advice, report or recommendation 
(s 44(1)(a)(i)) and records containing an account of a consultation, 
discussion or deliberation that has occurred (s 44(1)(a)(ii)). An 
example of the second category would be a record containing 
minutes of a meeting. To qualify for this ground for refusal, 
however, the records in the first category must have been 
“obtained or prepared … for the purpose of assisting to formulate a 
policy or take a decision in the exercise of a power or performance 
of a duty conferred or imposed by law”. Likewise, to qualify for this 
ground of refusal, the consultation, discussion or deliberation 
underlying the account in the second category must also have 
been “for the purpose of assisting to formulate a policy or take a 
decision in the exercise or performance of a duty conferred or 
imposed by law”.‟58  
 Thus, a taxpayer will not succeed in securing the release of 
information about planned changes in tax rates or other matters of fiscal 
policy. Where, however, the information relates directly to a taxpayer the 
Commissioner must release the information.  
 I submit that the taxpayer has the right to secure a copy of the 
minutes of the meeting of the Penalty and Interest Committee to the extent 
that they refer to the taxpayer. Clearly, the taxpayer cannot request 
information about other taxpayers discussed at the same meeting. The 
minutes of such meetings constitute a „record‟ as envisaged in s 1 of PAIA.  
 Section 44 of PAIA should not prevent the taxpayer from securing the 
information requested in this case, as it relates to a decision already taken. 
Currie & Klaaren‟s views on this aspect are instructive:  
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„The disclosure of records after a decision has been taken cannot 
reasonably be expected to frustrate the deliberative process in a 
public body. Occurring after the deliberation, their disclosure would 
not inhibit candid communication of a pre-decision opinion, advice, 
report or recommendation. Likewise, the disclosure of a final and 
binding decision or policy and the information that it was based on 
cannot reasonably be expected to frustrate the deliberative 
process.‟59  
 I contend that if the Commissioner has prepared guidelines or policy 
manuals for internal use by his assessors taxpayers have a right under 
PAIA to request the release of copies of such documents.60  
 The Commissioner regularly issues practice or interpretation notes on 
fiscal provisions, for public use via the website. Thus there is no need for a 
taxpayer to use the procedures contained in PAIA to secure a copy as 
these documents are released to the public once finalised by the 
Commissioner.  
 A difficulty may arise if, for example, taxpayer A suspects that the 
Commissioner may have issued a ruling to taxpayer B dealing with 
circumstances similar to those of taxpayer A. The Commissioner must 
apply the fiscal laws equally to all taxpayers so as not to violate the right to 
equality in s 9 of the Constitution. Taxpayer A, however, is unable to rely 
on PAIA to compel the Commissioner to release the ruling issued to 
taxpayer B.  
 Employers must deduct tax on remuneration paid to their employees, 
as defined in para 1 of the Fourth Schedule to the Income Tax Act. The 
law is clear but is difficult to apply to the facts that arise in practice. When 
sub-contractors supply labour only to a principal contractor in the 
construction industry it is unclear whether employees‟ tax should be 
deducted and if so, at what rate.  
 The South African Institute of Chartered Accountants („SAICA‟) 
became aware that the Commissioner had issued a ruling on the matter to 
the Building Industry Federation of South Africa („BIFSA‟) and it wished to 
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obtain a copy of the ruling to circulate to its members. Legally, SAICA 
could not insist on procuring a copy of the ruling from the Commissioner 
under PAIA as the ruling related to another taxpayer or group of 
taxpayers.61 As a result of the new provisions allowing taxpayers to 
request rulings from the Commissioner on certain aspects of the fiscal 
laws the Commissioner will, in future, publish general rulings of this type to 
assist taxpayers to comply with their fiscal obligations.62 This will reduce 
fears that certain taxpayers may secure rulings from the Commissioner 
while others have no knowledge of such rulings.  
 
(10) Other Countries  
 Few democratic countries have introduced a constitutional right of 
access to information.63 However, other countries have introduced non-
constitutional legislation allowing their citizens to obtain information 
under a dedicated piece of legislation, often referred to as „freedom of 
information‟ legislation.64  
 Commenting on the international position, Baker & Groenhagen write:  
„In some countries a taxpayer is given the right to have access to 
certain information held about him by the revenue authorities, and 
to correct any misinformation. This is the case, for example, in 
Australia under the Freedom of Information Act of 1982. 
There seems in principle no reason why such a right should not be 
more generally recognised. Practice may then develop as to what 
are appropriate details to which a taxpayer should be given access 
and what are matters (such as information from third parties) to 
which access might be denied.‟65 
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 Australia introduced its Freedom of Information Act (Commonwealth) 
in 1982 and the Australian Tax Office („ATO‟) has issued a manual for 
taxpayers in that country regarding access to information from the 
Australian Tax Commissioner.66 Wheelwright expresses the view that the 
legislation „facilitates the scrutiny of ATO policy and practice, thereby 
providing an important check on the ATO‟s activities‟.67  
 Under Australian legislation taxpayers in that country have a right to 
the following:   
„[I]nformation about you contained in documents held by us, as well 
as other information or documents such as public rulings and Tax 
Office procedures and guidelines that we use in making decisions. 
The Act also gives you the right to ask us to correct information 
held about you that‟s incomplete, incorrect, out of date or 
misleading. 
… 
However, there is information that the law exempts us from 
disclosure.‟68  
 Unfortunately, South African legislation does not require the 
Commissioner to publish the guidelines used in making decisions, as is 
the case in Australia. The Commissioner does publish guidelines on 
certain topics for information purposes. However, those documents do not 
explain how the Commissioner‟s officers make decisions, or, for example, 
set out how his officials will conduct a tax audit and what he expects of 
the taxpayer during such an audit.  
 The grounds on which the Australian authorities may refuse requests 
for information are similar to those found in our legislation. Further, if the 
information will prejudice an investigation, the proper administration of the 
law, or the proper and efficient conduct of the Australian Tax Office‟s 
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operations, the Australian authorities may deny a request for 
information.69  
 Australian law contains provisions allowing a taxpayer to take action 
against the Australian Tax Office by using the appeal procedures 
applicable to refusals to grant access to information.70 A taxpayer who is 
dissatisfied with a decision about a request for information or about 
correcting a record may note an appeal that is heard internally. If the 
taxpayer remains unhappy with the decision after the internal appeal he 
or she may apply to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to review the 
decision.71 Alternatively, Australian taxpayers may lodge a complaint with 
the Taxation Ombudsman if they have complained to the manager of the 
tax officer dealing with their affairs and have not been satisfied with the 
outcome.72  
 Myers comments on the discovery of documents in disputes with the 
Australian Commissioner as follows:  
„It appears that the Commissioner being of the opinion that there 
had been an avoidance of taxation due to evasion assessed the 
taxpayer in L’Estrange’s case upon an assets betterment basis 
under ss. 167 and 170(2). The taxpayer, apparently having had his 
objections treated as an appeal and forwarded to the High Court, 
sought an order against the Commissioner. In a tantalizingly brief 
oral judgement Menzies J. made orders under Order 32, r. 18 of 
the High Court Rules: 
 “(1) for the discovery of all reports in writing by officers of the 
respondent upon which the betterment statements, the 
foundation of the assessments in question, were based 
and of any documents upon which such reports were 
themselves based; and 
 (2) for the discovery of all reports in writing by officers of the 
respondent upon which the respondent relied in forming 
the opinion that in relation to any year of income the 
appellant had avoided tax due to evasion and any 
document upon which such reports were themselves 
based.”‟73   
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 Myers wrote the article cited above before the enactment of the 
Australian Freedom of Information Act. However, the Australian High 
Court decided that the taxpayer could have access to detailed 
information.  
 Several reported Australian tax cases have dealt with the application 
of the Freedom of Information Act, and the Australian Administrative 
Appeals Tribunal has reviewed requests from taxpayers for the Australian 
Commissioner to supply documents.74 The Tribunal weighed up whether 
the documents were exempt from disclosure on one of the grounds 
contained in the Australian legislation. It held that it was preferable, where 
possible, to disclose part of a document by removing the exempt portion 
rather than to refuse access to the entire document.75  
 A particularly complex issue relating to access to information arises 
when taxpayers seek to establish details about persons suspected of 
having suggested to the Commissioner that their affairs be audited. 
 When such an issue came before Beddoe, Senior Member of the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal in Re Sobczuk and Deputy 
Commissioner of Taxation76 he decided as follows: 
„A separate issue arises as to the source of information provided to 
the respondent. The public interest is in the applicant having 
access to the personal information about him, not the informant‟s 
identity.  
… 
The informant‟s name will need to be deleted in 2 places.‟77  
[footnotes omitted]. 
 On the basis of the above I contend that there is little or no support 
from the Australian system for South African taxpayers attempting to use 
PAIA to secure the release of an informant‟s name from the 
Commissioner under PAIA.  
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 The South African Police Service receives information from 
informants to assist in detecting crime.78 The information supplied by 
informants is protected under the so-called informer‟s privilege and the 
public interest in fighting crime.79 Similarly, the Commissioner may seek 
to rely on the public interest in detecting tax evasion as the basis on 
which to refuse disclosure of details of an informant. 
 
(b) India  
 India enacted the Right to Information Act in 2005 „in order to 
promote transparency and accountability in the working of public 
authorities …‟.80 The Act empowers citizens to gain access to information 
held by public authorities. A taxpayer must formally request information 
and the authorities must render assistance to persons who cannot reduce 
their request for information to writing. Indians wishing to request 
information do not have to supply any reasons.81 The Indian authorities 
must supply the information within 30 days of receiving the request, failing 
which the official involved is liable to a penalty of up to Rs25 000 and may 
face disciplinary action.82  
 The threat of sanctions imposed on an official is an interesting 
innovation and should ensure that officials in India exercise caution when 
they make decisions about requests for information. Unfortunately, the 
South African Commissioner‟s officials are not subject to any similar 
sanction. Similar provisions in the South African legislation might enhance 
the quality and swiftness of decisions. India also prescribes appeal 
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(c) United Kingdom 
 The United Kingdom enacted the Freedom of Information Act in 2000, 
prescribing procedures for taxpayers wishing to request information from 
HM Revenue and Customs.83 Individuals may request information on their 
personal affairs held by public authorities.84 As expected, taxpayers may 
request information about their own affairs, but not about those of other 
taxpayers. The Act also requires public authorities to implement a 
publication scheme which specifies the information the authorities must 
publish, eliminating the need for members of the public to request such 
information.85 This is similar to the requirement in South African law that 
public bodies publish a PAIA manual.  
 Taxpayers unhappy with the manner in which HM Revenue and 
Customs has dealt with their request for information may lodge a 
complaint with the Adjudicator‟s Office,86 which has released guidelines 
on how taxpayers may request information and relevant publications.87 
The Adjudicator‟s Office publishes internal and external guidelines for the 
users of the Office‟s services. It is unfortunate that the Commissioner 
does not release similar guidelines for use by his staff and taxpayers, as 
is the case in the United Kingdom and other democracies.88  
 
(d) United States of America 
 In the United States of America („USA‟) taxpayers may request 
information, other than that protected from disclosure under the Freedom 
of Information Act from the Internal Revenue Service („IRS‟).89 According 
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to Kanakis & Osterberg, taxpayers may have access to the following 
information: 
„Specifically, each agency must make available for public 
inspection and copying final opinions and orders made in the 
adjudication of cases, statements of policy and interpretations 
which have been adopted by the agency and not otherwise 
published, and administrative staff manuals and instructions to staff 
that affect a member of the public, although to prevent a clearly 
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy the agency may delete 
identifying details. In addition, each agency is required to disclose 
to any person records upon request which reasonably describes 
such records and is made in accordance with the agency‟s 
published rules for making such requests.‟90 
 From the above it is clear that United States government agencies 
must publish more information than is the case with similar bodies in 
South Africa.  
 The IRS may authorise the release of tax return information to 
taxpayers, unless that disclosure will jeopardise federal tax 
administration.91 The Internal Revenue Code („IRC‟) defines the term „tax 
administration‟ widely, and the authorities have a discretion to refuse 
requests for tax return information.92  
 US legislation contains administrative and judicial remedies for 
persons whose requests for information are denied.93 In Tax Analysts v 
Internal Revenue Service94 Urbina J denied the request for information 
from the Pacific Association of Tax Administrators („PATA‟) about cross-
border tax avoidance and tax evasion, as the information was non-
disclosable.95 The Court also refused a request for IRS records relating to 
meetings of the „Group of Four‟ (the USA, UK, France and Germany).96 
Tax Analysts sought information about representatives at the meetings as 
well as about a foreign country‟s tax law. The IRS contended that the 
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non-disclosure provision in the United States Model Income Tax 
Convention prevents the disclosure of information about both the PATA 
and the Group of Four meetings.97 The Court held that various tax treaties 
protected the information even though it did not relate to specific 
taxpayers.98  
 In Department of Justice v Tax Analysts99 the US Supreme Court 
held that the district court decisions received by the Tax Division of the 
Department of Justice must be released to Tax Analysts.100  
 
(e) Canada  
 Taxpayers in Canada have a right of access to information held by 
the revenue authority under the Privacy Act101 and the Access to 
Information Act,102 legislation similar to PAIA.103 The right of access is 
subject to the right to confidentiality contained in the Canadian fiscal 
legislation and excludes information that is subject to attorney-client 
privilege.104 Li indicates that when taxpayers request information they will 
typically receive a copy of their file collated by Revenue Canada with 
inter-office memoranda and reports. This is similar to the position in South 
Africa.105 Where the authorities have deleted information they record this 
fact on the documents released to the taxpayer and the taxpayer may 
challenge the deletions by appealing to the Federal Court.106  
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(f) New Zealand 
 In 1982 New Zealand enacted the Official Information Act, which 
provides that taxpayers may request official information unless there are 
sound reasons to deny the request.107 Reasons to deny a request for 
information include the reason that the information is protected by legal 
professional privilege, or that the information was supplied confidentially 
to the authorities.108 Taxpayers in New Zealand are entitled to call for 
information relating to themselves from the Inland Revenue Department.  
 
(11) Conclusion 
 It would appear that South Africa is unique in providing taxpayers with 
a constitutional right of access to information (s 32). However, many other 
countries have introduced specific „freedom of information‟ legislation 
(similar to South Africa‟s PAIA), giving citizens the opportunity to secure 
the release of personal information held by the authorities.109  
 As in other open and democratic societies, for example, Canada, in 
South Africa the Commissioner must provide the taxpayer with a copy of 
his or her file when called on to do so.110 
 Should the Commissioner deny a taxpayer‟s request for information 
under PAIA, the taxpayer may follow the internal appeal procedure 
prescribed in s 74 of PAIA, or proceed to court under s 78 to secure the 
release of the required information.  
 An unresolved issue is whether the taxpayer may challenge the 
ground of refusal to access by relying directly on s 32 of the Constitution. 
I contend that a taxpayer could argue that the grounds of refusal in PAIA 
are too broad and undermine the fundamental right enshrined in s 32. 
Further, the taxpayer may attempt to satisfy a court that other open and 
democratic countries do not commonly deny access to records on the 
grounds contained in PAIA. The taxpayer could argue that the authorities 
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could achieve their objectives with less draconian methods than denying 
access to records. However, the taxpayer is unlikely to succeed with 
these arguments, particularly when referring to the grounds of refusal to 
access information in democratic countries such as those dealt with 
above and the limitation of rights contained in s 36 of the Constitution 
 I propose that the legislature should step in to amend PAIA to 
increase the amount of information such as, for example, internal policy 
manuals, that public bodies must publish.  
 The right to request information should not be viewed in isolation from 
the right to administrative justice contained in s 33 of the Constitution. 
Commenting on the interaction of the two rights, De Waal et al write: 
„The principal purpose of furnishing reasons is to justify the 
administrative action that has been taken. This is a different 
purpose to that of providing the information on which the 
administrative action is based.‟111  
 The information a taxpayer successfully obtains from the 
Commissioner under PAIA may assist an understanding of the 
Commissioner‟s reasons for decisions made. It is clear that taxpayers 
should consider the right of access to information in conjunction with the 
right to just administrative action. 
 
III ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE  
(1) Background  
 Historically, taxpayers had no legal basis on which to insist that the 
Commissioner‟s officials gave reasons for decisions reached.112 There 
appear to be no reported tax cases decided before the Interim 
Constitution where a taxpayer sought to argue that he or she had the 
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right to reasons for a decision or that the Commissioner had failed to 
comply with the principles of natural justice. 
 The introduction in the Interim Constitution of a right to administrative 
justice and its further inclusion in the Constitution has changed the 
manner in which the Commissioner administers the country‟s tax affairs.  
 
(2) The Constitutional right to just administrative action 
 Section 33 of the Constitution confers a right to just administrative 
action on taxpayers in the following terms:  
„(1) Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, 
reasonable and procedurally fair. 
(2) Everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by 
administrative action has the right to be given written 
reasons. 
(3) National legislation must be enacted to give effect to these 
rights and must - 
 (a) provide for the review of administrative action by a court 
or, where appropriate, an independent and impartial 
tribunal; 
 (b) impose a duty on the state to give effect to the rights in 
subsections (1) and (2); 
 (c) promote an efficient administration.‟113 
 Cachalia comments on the right to administrative justice as follows:  
„Provisions in a bill of rights dealing with administrative justice are 
extremely rare. For example, in Canada and the United States 
administrative law has evolved largely without constitutional 
guarantees. Section 24 [of the Interim Constitution] does not 
purport to be a codification of South African administrative law but 
rather to provide for minimum basic entitlements to administrative 
justice.‟114  
 Reviewing the effect on taxpayers of the Bill of Rights in the Interim 
Constitution the Katz Commission commented as follows:  
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„Section 24 of The Constitution is even more significant. Although 
the entire section is so drafted as to make it difficult to provide a 
definite view as to its exact ambit Section 24(c) appears to provide 
the taxpayer with the right to be furnished with written reasons for 
administrative action which affects any of his or her rights or 
interests unless the reasons for such action have been made 
public. This means that a cryptic approach to objections and 
appeals as adopted by Inland Revenue in the past will have to 
cease. It is unlikely that the limitation clause will be of any 
assistance. Furthermore once reasons have been given the 
taxpayer could well argue that the initial decision taken was not 
justifiable in relation to the reasons given and that it should be set 
aside.‟115  
 It is appropriate to consider the impact on taxpayers of the provisions 
contained in s 33 of the Constitution before turning to the legislation 
enacted under s 33(3), namely the Promotion of Administrative Justice 
Act.116  
 To rely on the right to administrative justice a taxpayer must show 
that the Commissioner‟s conduct constitutes „administrative action‟ as 
envisaged in s 33(1) of the Constitution. For example, the Constitutional 
Court had to determine whether a decision made by the President of the 
country to conduct an inquiry into the affairs of the South African Rugby 
Football Union constituted „administrative action‟ and was thus 
reviewable by the Court.117 The Court held:  
„[T]hat the test for determining whether conduct constitutes 
“administrative action” is not the question whether the action 
concerned is performed by a member of the executive arm of the 
government. What matters is not so much the functionary as the 
function. The question is whether the task itself is administrative or 
not … The focus of the enquiry as to whether conduct is 
“administrative action” is not on the arm of the government to which 
the relevant actor belongs, but on the nature of the power he or she 
is exercising.‟118   
 The Court decided that the power to appoint a commission of inquiry 
was not „administrative action‟ as envisaged and was thus not subject to 
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review by the Court but that it was nevertheless reviewable under the 
Constitution in terms of the principle of legality.119  
 I would argue that many of the decisions made by the Commissioner 
constitute „administrative action‟ and are thus subject to the right to 
administrative justice. In fulfilling his mandate under the SARS Act120 the 
Commissioner‟s officials will, for example: 
 issue assessments to taxpayers,  
 decide on requests made for postponement of tax pending an 
appeal, or  
 decide whether to waive interest on the underpayment of 
provisional tax.121  
 Section 33 of the Constitution requires that „administrative action‟ be 
„lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair‟. In analysing this requirement a 
question arises about the effect and status of the common law on 
„administrative action‟. In Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of 
SA: Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa122 the 
Constitutional Court decided that the Constitution subsumes the common 
law principles of administrative law.123 Thus, the common law continues 
to play an important role in administrative law. The Court explained the 
interaction between the Constitution and the common law as follows:  
„The common law is not a body of law separate and distinct from 
the Constitution. There are not two systems of law, each dealing 
with the same subject matter each having similar requirements, 
each operating in its own field with its own highest court. There is 
only one system of law. It is shaped by the Constitution which is the 
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supreme law, and all law, including the common law, derives its 
force from the Constitution and is subject to constitutional control. 
What would have been ultra vires under the common law by reason 
of a functionary exceeding a statutory power is invalid under the 
Constitution according to the doctrine of legality. In this respect, at 
least constitutional law and common law are intertwined and there 
can be no difference between them.‟124  
 The common law principles of natural justice will therefore remain 
relevant in deciding whether the „administrative action‟ is procedurally fair 
or not.  
 The fact that the legislature chose to use the phrase „procedurally fair‟ 
in s 33(1) of the Constitution means that the test is broader than 
envisaged in the rules of natural justice.125 Hoexter explains the 
significance of the use of the phrase „procedurally fair‟ as follows:   
„[I]t replaces the problematic idea of natural justice with a similarly 
wide and general term used in modern English law: “procedural 
fairness”. Section 33(1) of the 1996 Constitution thus effectively 
rids us of the straightjacket of the classification of functions. For 
this reason, apart from any others the Constitution and the relevant 
provisions of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act should not 
be treated as a mere codification of the existing common law. 
… 
However, the requirements and application of procedural fairness 
in particular situations may well be different from those of natural 
justice at common law. … Here the judge pointed out that one 
could not regard s 24(b) of the Interim Constitution as codifying the 
existing common law. Instead, the right to procedural fairness 
entitles a person to “the principles and procedures … which in [the] 
particular situation or set of circumstances are right and just and 
fair”.‟126  
 Section 33(1) of the Constitution also requires the „administrative 
action‟ to be „reasonable‟. Hoexter expresses the view that for 
„administrative action‟ to be „reasonable‟ it must be rational.127 This 
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means that the decision must be justifiable in light of the information 
known to the administrator and the reasons supplied for that decision.128 
 In Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO 129the Court formulated the test 
for reasonableness as follows: „[I]s there a rational objective basis 
justifying the conclusion made by the administrative decision maker 
between the material properly available to him and the conclusion he or 
she eventually arrived at?‟130 
 Furthermore, for an „administrative action‟ to be reasonable it must 
also be proportional.131 Hoexter comments on this element of 
reasonableness as follows: 
„Proportionality may be defined as the notion that one ought not to 
use a sledgehammer to crack a nut. Its purpose is to “avoid an 
imbalance between the adverse and beneficial effects … of an 
action and to encourage the administrator to consider both the 
need for the action and the possible use of less drastic or 
oppressive means to accomplish the desired end”. Two of its 
essential elements, then are balance and necessity while a third is 
suitability – usually referred to the use of lawful and appropriate 
means to accomplish the administrator‟s objective.‟132 
 Section 33(2) of the Constitution provides that the taxpayer may 
request written reasons where the „administrative action‟ adversely 
affects his or her rights. It is necessary to evaluate the meaning of the 
terms „rights‟ and „adversely affected‟.  
 De Waal et al express the view that the term „rights‟ does not refer 
only to rights flowing from the Bill of Rights: 
„The term “right” is usually understood to mean an enforceable 
claim maintainable against a duty-holder. Presumably, it is not 
restricted to Constitutional rights and rights granted by the AJA, but 
means in general statutory- and private-law rights such as 
contractual or delictual rights. Moreover, the Constitutional Court 
has indicated that a “right”, for purposes of s 24IC, should probably 
be interpreted more broadly than the definition of the term in private 
law to include liability incurred by the State through the making of 
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unilateral promises or undertakings. If this approach is followed, the 
term rights approaches “legitimate expectations” in its ambit.‟133  
 Hoexter adopts a wide interpretation of the meaning of „rights‟ 
contained in s 33(2), concluding that : 
“[T]he decision [in Goodman Bros (Pty) Ltd v Transnet Ltd 1998 
(4) SA 989 (W)] has significant implications for s 33(2), and thus 
for s 5 of the PAJA, because it seems to mean that the right to 
reasons will automatically apply to anyone to whom s 33(1) 
applies. In other words, the right to lawful, reasonable and 
procedural fair administrative action inevitably entitles us to the 
right to reasons, since the s 33(1) right will always be adversely 
affected by the failure to give reasons.‟134 
 In the tax context, a decision made by the Commissioner or by his 
officials invariably affects the taxpayer‟s patrimony. I contend that a 
taxpayer‟s patrimony constitutes a right as envisaged in s 33(2) of the 
Constitution on the ground that a decision made by the Commissioner 
may affect the income tax payable by the taxpayer, the timing of 
payment, and whether such tax is subject to interest or additional tax.135  
 Administrative action must result in the taxpayer incurring a cost in 
the form of tax or must otherwise prejudice him or her. Based on Hoexter, 
the right to lawful „administrative action‟ as envisaged in s 33(1) of the 
Constitution results in taxpayers being entitled to written reasons to 
establish that a decision made by the Commissioner is procedurally 
fair.136 Difficulty arises as to what the legislature intended by the term 
„adversely affects‟. In this context the authorities refer to the 
„determination theory‟ and the „deprivation theory‟.137 Currie & Klaaren 
comment as follows:  
„The verb “affect” is ambiguous. It may mean either “deprive” or 
“determine”. Where, for example, a person applies for a licence for 
the first time, the refusal of the application will not deprive the 
applicant of any established right. The decision would, however, 
determine what the applicant‟s rights are. Taking “affect” to mean 
deprive (sometimes referred to in the literature as the “deprivation 
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theory”) will cover a narrow class of administrative action. Taking 
“affect” to mean „determine‟ (the “determination theory”) will cover a 
much broader class of administrative action.‟138  
 The provision under consideration exists in the Constitution itself and 
not in an ordinary statute. I contend that the wider meaning of „adversely 
affects‟ should apply, thereby extending the reach of the Constitution.139   
 Section 33(3) of the Constitution requires the enactment of legislation 
giving effect to the rights contained in s 33 within a prescribed period. 
PAJA is the Act enacted for this purpose. The following question arises: 
what happens if PAJA unduly curtails the right to administrative justice in 
the Constitution? May a taxpayer challenge PAJA on the ground that it 
violates the taxpayer‟s right to just administrative action? Alternatively, 
could a taxpayer challenge a decision made by the Commissioner on the 
ground that it violates the taxpayer‟s rights in s 33 of the Constitution?  
 I submit that if the taxpayer can show that PAJA unreasonably 
restricts his or her constitutional rights in violation of s 36 of the 
Constitution he or she may challenge the validity of PAJA.140 Section 74 
of the Constitution regulates amendments to the Constitution itself. PAJA, 
however, is not an integral part of the Constitution. Amendments to PAJA 
fall under s 73 of the Constitution, which contains less onerous provisions 
than s 74. My concern is that extensive amendments to PAJA will make 
the rights contained in s 33 more difficult to enforce.  
 
(3) The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act  
 At the time PAJA was drafted and debated the press reported that the 
Commissioner expressed the view that PAJA would threaten his 
„effectiveness and efficiency‟.141 In a submission to the Parliamentary 
Justice Portfolio Committee the Commissioner‟s legal representative 
indicated that the provisions of PAJA were inappropriate „to the work of 
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SARS‟.142 He explained that tax officials made many decisions relating to 
tax assessments, for instance, allowing claims for deductions and 
decisions on the import of goods into the country at customs posts.143 
The Commissioner‟s counsel argued that PAJA „would make it 
impossible to do tax assessments in the normal way‟.144 The 
Commissioner believed SARS had well defined administrative and 
appeal procedures that „offered fair treatment to taxpayers‟.145  
 In an editorial on the matter Business Day pointed out the dilemma 
faced by Parliament:   
„S A Revenue Service (SARS) legal counsel Nicholas Haysom is 
one of a number of people who have identified the central dilemma 
of the proposed Administrative Justice Bill. How does Parliament 
give effect to citizens‟ constitutional right to just and fair 
administrative action without making day-to-day government so 
onerous, and subject to challenge, that efficient administration 
(required by the same section of the constitution) is still 
possible?‟146   
 The Justice Portfolio Committee, and subsequently Parliament, 
considered the comments on the draft Bill and decided not to exclude any 
public bodies, including the Commissioner, from PAJA‟s ambit.  
 Section 2 of PAJA provides that: 
„The Minister may, by notice in the Gazette – 
(a) if it is reasonable and justifiable in the circumstances, 
exempt an administrative action or a group or class of 
administrative actions from the application of the provisions 
of section 3, 4 or 5; or 
(b) … 
(2) Any exemption or permission granted in terms of sub-section 
(1) must, before publication the Gazette, be approved by 
Parliament.‟ 























 Thus far, the Minister has not published any notice as envisaged in 
s 2(i) of PAJA. Therefore PAJA applies to all administrators and no part 
of the public service is exempt from its provisions.147 
 
(4) ‘Administrative Action’ and the Commissioner  
 PAJA defines „administrative action‟ for the purpose of the Act, and 
the definition, in turn, refers to the defined term „decision‟. To rely on the 
remedies provided in PAJA a taxpayer must show that the action or 
inaction in question falls within the definition in s 1:  
„[A]ny decision taken, or any failure to take a decision, by - 
(a) an organ of state, when - 
 (i) exercising a power in terms of the Constitution or a 
provincial constitution; or 
 (ii) exercising a public power or performing a public 
function in terms of any legislation; or …‟ 
 To rely on PAJA a taxpayer must show that SARS falls within the 
bodies referred to in s 1 of the Act. Section 2 of the South African 
Revenue Service Act148 provides as follows: „The South African Revenue 
Service is hereby established as an organ of state within the public 
administration but as an institution outside the public service.‟  
 It is clear that SARS is an organ of state as envisaged in s 239 of the 
Constitution and thus PAJA applies to decisions of the Commissioner 
and his officials.  
 In interpreting the term „administrative action‟ contained in s 1 of 
PAJA it is appropriate to refer to s 33 of the Constitution itself.149 It should 
thus be possible to rely on the decisions of the Court on the meaning of 
the term „administrative action‟ in s 33 of the Constitution.150  
 The definition of „decision‟ in s 1 of PAJA determines whether the 
conduct constitutes „administrative action‟. The Act defines „decision‟ as:  
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„[A]ny decision of an administrative nature made, proposed to be 
made, or required to be made, as the case may be, under an 
empowering provision, including a decision relating to - 
(a) making, suspending, revoking or refusing to make an order, 
award or determination;  
(b) giving, suspending, revoking or refusing to give a certificate, 
direction, approval, consent or permission; 
(c) issuing, suspending, revoking or refusing to issue a licence, 
authority or other instrument; 
(d) imposing a condition or restriction; 
(e) making a declaration, demand or requirement; 
(f) retaining, or refusing to deliver up, an article; or 
(g) doing or refusing to do any other act or thing of an 
administrative nature, 
and a reference to a failure to take a decision must be construed 
accordingly;‟ 
 Section 1 of PAJA models its definition of „decision‟ on s 3 of the 
Australian Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act.151 Currie & 
Klaaren comment as follows:  
„The leading case on the interpretation of the definition is the High 
Court decision in Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond. The 
Court held that, subject to one exception, only the final conclusion 
of an administrative or decisional process qualifies as a “decision”: 
“a reviewable „decision‟ … will generally, but not always entail a 
decision which is final or operative and determinative, at least in a 
practical sense, of the issue of fact calling for consideration.”‟152  
 It seems that a taxpayer may only rely on PAJA once the 
Commissioner has actually taken a decision or failed to take a decision. 
Where the taxpayer anticipates that the Commissioner will make a 
decision it is not possible to invoke the provisions of PAJA before the 
decision is made.  
 Section 1 of PAJA defines „failure‟ as follows: „in relation to the taking 
of a decision, includes a refusal to take the decision‟. Thus, where the 
Commissioner must make a decision and refuses to do so, that conduct 
falls within the provisions of PAJA. Section 6 deals with the timeframe 
within which an official should reach a decision. If the law or other 
empowering provision prescribes a period within which the Commissioner 
should take a decision his non-compliance falls into the review process 
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available under PAJA. If the empowering provision does not prescribe a 
timeframe, a court reviewing the failure to make a decision will take 
account of what constitutes a reasonable period in the circumstances.  
 To fall within the scope of PAJA the taxpayer must show that the 
Commissioner made the „decision‟ under „an empowering provision‟, 
defined in s 1 as follows: „[A] law, a rule of common law, customary law 
or an agreement, instrument or other document in terms of which an 
administrative action was purportedly taken‟. Taxpayers must submit a 
tax return to the Commissioner each year and the Commissioner must 
issue an assessment under s 77 of the Income Tax Act. That Act and 
other fiscal statutes clearly fall into PAJA‟s definition of „an empowering 
provision‟.  
 The formal act of issuing an assessment constitutes „administrative 
action‟ as envisaged in PAJA. The Commissioner‟s decision on the 
following matters also constitutes „administrative action‟:  
 a request for an extension of time in which to render a tax 
return;153  
 a request for the postponement of payment of tax subject to an 
objection or an appeal;154  
 a plea for mitigation for the imposition of no, or a reduced level, 
of additional tax;155  
 a request to waive interest on the underpayment of provisional 
tax;156  
 a decision on whether to conduct an audit on the taxpayer‟s 
affairs;157   
 a decision to file a statement at the court where the taxpayer 
owes assessed income tax;158 and  
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 a failure to finalise a refund due to a taxpayer.159  
 For PAJA to apply a taxpayer must show that the „decision‟ made by 
the Commissioner „adversely affects‟ his or her rights. For a decision to 
have legal effect it must constitute a final determination of the taxpayer‟s 
rights.160 PAJA requires the „decision‟ to have „direct‟ effect on the 
taxpayer and this means that the Commissioner has made a final 
decision.161 It does not include the steps involved in reaching the 
decision.162 Further, the „decision‟ must have external effect and impact 
on the taxpayer; a decision that only affects the Commissioner‟s day-to-
day operations would not typically fall into this requirement.163   
 The definition of „decision‟ contains exclusions, the most important 
being that decisions made under PAIA fall outside PAJA.164 This is 
because PAIA itself contains measures that a taxpayer may utilise if the 
Commissioner fails to release information requested. The definition of 
„decision‟ in s 1 of PAJA excludes a taxpayer from using PAJA to 
establish the reasons for the Commissioner‟s decision to institute a 
prosecution against him or her and the exclusion of „legislative functions 
of Parliament‟ contained in the definition of „decision‟ in s 1 of PAJA 
means that a taxpayer unhappy with new tax measures may not use the 
provisions contained in PAJA to question the reasons for those 
measures. 
 Where the Income Tax Act permits the Minister or the Commissioner 
to promulgate regulations, may a taxpayer challenge those regulations 
because they constitute „administrative action‟ as envisaged in s 1 of 
PAJA? 
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 In a minority judgment Chaskalson CJ, in Minister of Health and 
McIntyre NO v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Others, 165 stated 
as follows: 
„When the interim constitution was adopted the making of 
delegated legislation was regarded as administrative action subject 
to judicial review. There is nothing to suggest that the interim 
Constitution, or the Constitution that took its place, intended to 
exclude delegated legislation from what had previously been 
understood as being administrative action. On the contrary, the 
Constitutions point in the opposite direction.‟166 
 Chaskalson CJ concluded under PAJA that the Court could review 
the regulations issued by the Minister of Health under the Medicines and 
Related Substances Act, 1965.167 He decided that the „implementation of 
legislation, which includes the making of regulations in terms of an 
empowering provision, is therefore not excluded from the definition of 
administrative action‟.168 Chaskalson CJ‟s conclusion was supported by 
Ngcobo J and O‟Regan J.169 Moseneke J, however, decided it was 
unnecessary to consider whether PAJA applied to the case at hand.170 
The issue remains unsettled as the Court failed to reach consensus.171 
Thus, a taxpayer aggrieved by regulations promulgated by the Minister 
or the Commissioner under a fiscal statute may, based on Chaskalson 
CJ‟s views, challenge those regulations under the provisions contained 
in PAJA.172 
 
(5) ‘Procedurally Fair’ Administrative Action  
 Section 3 of PAJA describes „procedurally fair‟ administrative action 
as follows:  
„(1) Administrative action which materially and adversely affects 
the rights or legitimate expectations of any person must be 
procedurally fair. 
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(2) (a) A fair administrative procedure depends on the 
circumstances of each case. 
 (b) In order to give effect to the right to procedurally fair 
administrative action, an administrator, subject to 
subsection (4), must give a person referred to in 
subsection (1) - 
 (i) adequate notice of the nature and purpose of the 
proposed administrative action; 
 (ii) a reasonable opportunity to make 
representations;  
 (iii) a clear statement of the administrative action; 
 (iv) adequate notice of any right of review or internal 
appeal, where applicable; and  
 (v) adequate notice of the right to request reasons in 
terms of section 5. 
(3) … 
(4) (a) If it is reasonable and justifiable in the circumstances, 
an administrator may depart from any of the 
requirements referred to in subsection (2). 
 (b) … 
(5) Where an administrator is empowered by an empowering 
provision to follow a procedure which is fair but different 
from the provisions of subsection (2), the administrator may 
act in accordance with that different procedure.‟ 
 Section 3 of PAJA requires that the „administrative action‟ must 
„materially and adversely affect the rights or legitimate expectations‟ of a 
taxpayer. The section thus applies to a particular person and not to 
taxpayers generally. The provision‟s effect is narrower than that flowing 
from s 33(2) of the Constitution in that the „administrative action‟ must 
„materially‟ affect the taxpayer. Klaaren & Penfold, writing in Woolman & 
Roux et al, explain the provision as follows:  
„On the face of it, procedural fairness therefore appears in some 
respects, to be applicable to a narrower category of action than 
“administrative action” (the inclusion of the word “materially”) and in 
other respects, to a wider category of action (that which affects 
legitimate expectations and not only rights). The latter conclusion 
would, however, be logically inconsistent, as action must first 
constitute “administrative action” under the AJA before one can 
consider whether it is subject to the requirement of procedural 
fairness. The ambit of s 3(1) cannot be wider than the ambit of 
“administrative action” in s 1. 
One approach to solving this logical problem is to emphasize the 
word “materially”. The inclusion of the word indicates that a certain 
class of administrative action will not require the application of 
procedural fairness, that is, those actions which affect rights but do 













manner. In such a situation, the rules of procedural fairness will 
apply if the action materially affects the relevant person‟s legitimate 
expectations. According to this approach, legitimate expectations 
only matter when rights are adversely affected in a non-material 
manner.‟173   
 Unfortunately the legislature chose to insert the word „materially‟ in 
s 3 of PAJA. The comments made in Woolman & Roux et al assist, but 
there is a danger that a court will interpret the wording restrictively and 
deny a taxpayer recourse under PAJA when reviewing a decision made 
by the Commissioner.174 PAJA constitutes the legislation required under 
s 33(3) of the Constitution. However, those provisions of PAJA that 
constitute an unreasonable limitation of the taxpayer‟s right to 
administrative justice enshrined in s 33 of the Constitution should not 
survive.  
 Section 3(1) of PAJA appears broader than the definition of 
„administrative action‟ in s 1 of PAJA in that it refers to „legitimate 
expectations‟ and not only to rights. Woolman & Roux et al summarise the 
role of „legitimate expectations‟ as follows:  
„Indeed, reading from the Constitutional Court‟s decisions, it seems 
likely that the concept of legitimate expectations will continue to 
play an important role in assessing the scope of procedural 
fairness. In Premier, Mpumalanga O‟Regan J restated Corbett CJ‟s 
decision in Administrator, Transvaal & others v Traub & others in 
the following terms:  
“Corbett CJ also recognized that a legitimate expectation 
might arise in at least two circumstances: first, where a 
person enjoys an expectation of a privilege or a benefit 
of which it would not be fair to deprive him or her without 
a fair hearing; and, secondly, in circumstances where 
the previous conduct of an official has given rise to an 
expectation that a particular procedure will be followed 
before a decision is made.”‟175  
 The existing procedures adopted where the Commissioner queries 
the taxpayer‟s affairs illustrate the above. Currently, the Commissioner 
will require that the taxpayer answer the queries raised. Once the 
Commissioner has evaluated the reply the taxpayer receives a letter of 
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findings setting out which items the Commissioner intends subjecting to 
tax by issuing an additional assessment. At this stage there is no effect 
on the taxpayer‟s „rights‟ as he or she has not received an assessment. 
The Commissioner affords the taxpayer a last opportunity to reply to his 
letter of findings before he issues an assessment. If the Commissioner 
decides to do away with the issue of the letter of findings I contend that 
this adversely affects the taxpayer‟s legitimate expectations.  
 The fact that the Commissioner issues a letter of findings before 
issuing an assessment complies with the requirement that „administrative 
action‟ be procedurally fair. On the other hand, the Commissioner will 
often set an unrealistic deadline for the taxpayer‟s response. I submit that 
such an unreasonable deadline does not meet the requirement of 
procedural fairness.  
 The Commissioner must, subject to certain exceptions contained in 
s 3(4) of PAJA, comply with the requirements of procedural fairness 
prescribed in s 3(2)(b). It is clear from s 3(2)(a) that the appropriate 
administrative procedure depends on the circumstances of the case. The 
Commissioner may vary the procedure by taking account of the type of 
„administrative action‟ involved.  
 To ensure compliance with the fiscal statutes the Commissioner calls 
for information from taxpayers and conducts audits of their affairs.176 It is 
contended that the decision to call for information from a taxpayer 
constitutes „administrative action‟ that is subject to PAJA. In some cases 
the Commissioner‟s branch office issues letters to taxpayers demanding 
that the information be made available within seven business days and 
that the taxpayer‟s failure to comply with the deadline imposed will result 
in VAT refunds being forfeited or other legal steps being taken against the 
taxpayer.177  
 The deadline set by the Commissioner must take account of the 
volume of information requested. Frequently the information demanded 
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covers many months, sometimes various tax years and may be stored 
offsite.  
 The sections of the Income Tax Act dealing with the Commissioner‟s 
information-gathering powers do not define what is meant by 
reasonable.178 The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines „reasonable‟ as: „in 
accordance with reason; not absurd, within the limits of reason; not 
greatly less or more than might be expected‟.179  
 In Spassked (Pty) Ltd v FCT180 the Australian Court was required to 
decide if a subpoena issued by the Tax Commissioner requiring 
information within six days was reasonable. The Court held that, in the 
specific circumstances, the deadline of six days was „oppressive‟ and set 
the subpoena aside.181  
 Under PAJA taxpayers are entitled to request an extension of time if 
the deadline set by the Commissioner is unreasonable.  
 The Commissioner must advise the taxpayer of the nature and 
purpose of the „proposed administrative action‟, which accords with the 
audi alteram partem element of the rules of natural justice.182 Thus, the 
Commissioner must inform the taxpayer of the planned action before he 
implements it, so the taxpayer may make representations to the 
Commissioner before he finalises the decision. The Commissioner must 
supply the taxpayer with sufficient information about the „proposed 
administrative action‟, to enable him or her to understand the 
consequences thereof.183   
 Section 3(2)(b)(ii) of PAJA requires that the Commissioner afford the 
taxpayer the opportunity to make representations before he reaches a 
decision.184 In practice, before issuing an additional assessment imposing 
additional tax on a taxpayer because of an audit the Commissioner will 
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frequently call for such representation.185 In other cases, the 
Commissioner has imposed the maximum of 200 per cent additional tax 
before calling for representations. I contend that such conduct is contrary 
to the provisions of s 3(2)(b)(ii) of PAJA. However, the right to make 
representations to the Commissioner does not, under s 3(2)(b)(ii), confer 
on the taxpayer the right to insist on attending a hearing by the 
Commissioner to debate the „proposed administrative action‟.186   
 Under s 3(2)(b)(iii) the Commissioner must inform the taxpayer of the 
„administrative action‟ taken by him.187  
 Section 3(2)(b)(iv) requires the Commissioner to inform the taxpayer 
of any right to request a review or internal appeal against the decision. A 
taxpayer may approach a court to review a decision made by the 
Commissioner in accordance with the rights available under s 6 of PAJA. 
Where internal remedies are available it is necessary to exhaust them 
first, unless there is no merit in proceeding because the official concerned 
exhibits bias and the taxpayer is unlikely to receive a fair hearing.188  
 An important right conferred on taxpayers is the right to call for 
reasons, which flows from s 3(2)(a)(v) of PAJA. Section 5 sets out the 
procedure to follow if a taxpayer wishes to call for reasons. The 
Commissioner must give the taxpayer proper notice of the right to call for 
reasons and should supply adequate information.189  
 Section 3(3) of PAJA confers on the Commissioner the discretion to 
allow three further procedures in making a decision and he must decide if 
it is necessary to follow these procedures. Failure to permit such 
procedures does not mean that the „administrative action‟ is automatically 
unfair.190  
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 The first procedure (3(3)(a))is that the Commissioner consider 
allowing the taxpayer to obtain assistance and, in complex cases, legal 
representation.191 If a taxpayer wishes to consult with his or her 
accountant or tax advisor and the Commissioner denies him or her the 
right  to do so, it could indicate that the procedure followed is unfair. If the 
Commissioner raises complex issues of tax law and threatens to impose 
additional tax, the taxpayer should have the opportunity to employ legal 
advisors to assist in responding to the issues raised.  
 The second procedure (s 3(3)(b)) is that the taxpayer should have an 
opportunity to dispute the Commissioner‟s information and arguments. 
PAJA does not compel the Commissioner to grant the taxpayer an 
opportunity to contest the information on which he relies, but I submit that 
not to do so indicates that the procedure followed may be unfair.192  
 The third procedure (s 3(3)(c)) requires the Commissioner to consider 
allowing the taxpayer to appear in person. Currie & Klaaren comment as 
follows:  
„The common-law courts have always inclined against requiring 
oral proceedings in cases where written representations would 
suffice.  
This is a practical consideration: hearings on paper are cheaper 
and quicker. Oral proceedings run the risk of turning administrative 
tribunals into courts. At the same time, however, it may be unfair to 
require poorly educated or illiterate persons to articulate their 
position in writing. Indeed, in simple matters an oral hearing may in 
fact be more expeditious and efficient, from the point of view of 
both the administrator and the affected individual.‟193  
 The Commissioner has created Interest and Penalty Committees to 
adjudicate whether he should impose, reduce or even waive interest, 
penalties or additional tax in certain cases. Taxpayers must present their 
submissions in writing as to why the Commissioner should not impose 
additional tax or should, in a particular case, reduce or waive interest or 
penalties.  
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 It is not customary to invite a taxpayer to attend the meeting of the 
Interest and Penalty Committee that deliberates his or her case.194 I 
accept that PAJA does not grant a taxpayer a right to insist on attending 
the meeting. However, the decision to impose the maximum penalty 
under the Income Tax Act or VAT Act may have dire financial 
consequences and I contend that to exclude a taxpayer from attending 
the meeting held to discuss his or her affairs constitutes an unfair 
procedure. 195 The Commissioner has advised SAICA that it is his policy 
to allow taxpayers to attend meetings of the Interest and Penalty 
Committee.196 Unfortunately, the Commissioner‟s branch offices do not 
usually invite taxpayers to attend the meetings.197 
 By attending the meeting the taxpayer will have a better 
understanding of why the Commissioner is seeking to impose additional 
tax or penalties. A letter to the taxpayer cannot convey the same degree 
of understanding. Likewise, the Commissioner will gain a better 
understanding of the taxpayer‟s demeanour and reasons for his or her 
conduct. To allow the taxpayer to attend the meeting would ensure that 
the procedure adopted in imposing interest or penalties is, and is 
perceived as, procedurally fair, as required by PAJA.  
 Section 3(1) of PAJA requires that the „administrative action‟ be 
procedurally fair and s 3(2) contains five elements with which the 
Commissioner must comply for such action to be fair. Section 3(3) sets 
out a further three optional elements of fairness. In deciding whether the 
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„administrative action‟ is procedurally fair the Commissioner may need to 
consider factors not specifically mentioned in s 3.198  
 Section 3(4) of PAJA recognises that in certain cases it may be 
inappropriate to comply with the peremptory provisions in s 3(2) analysed 
above.199 An example is where public interest dictates the need to restrict 
the right of a taxpayer to „administrative action‟ that is procedurally fair.200 
The Commissioner may file a statement at a court under s 91 of the 
Income Tax Act for unpaid assessed tax without informing the taxpayer 
that he is taking such action. If the Commissioner advises the taxpayer 
that he is utilising the section the taxpayer might dissipate his or her 
assets to the detriment of the fisc. The difficulty that may arise with s 91 
of the Income Tax Act is the manner in which the Commissioner 
exercises the powers it confers on him and that an abuse of the provision 
may, in certain instances, occur.  
 Currie & Klaaren comment as follows:  
„The Business Practice Act was silent about granting a hearing 
prior to the issuing of an s 8(5) notice. Counsel for the government 
(sic applicant) argued that the audi alteram partem requirement 
should be read into the Act. The Constitutional Court rejected this 
argument, holding that the clear implication of the Act was to 
exclude a prior hearing, since the giving of notice would defeat the 
purposes for which the power was granted.‟201  
 In Hindry v Nedcor Bank Ltd and Another202 Wunsh J considered the 
validity of the provisions of s 99 of the Income Tax Act, which allows the 
Commissioner to appoint another person as the agent of a taxpayer, and 
obliges the agent holding any funds belonging to the taxpayer to pay 
those funds to the Commissioner instead.  
 Hindry contended, inter alia, that s 99 of the Income Tax Act violated 
the Constitution because the section did not provide for the taxpayer to 
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receive prior notice before such notices became operative.203 He argued 
that the section violated: 
 his right to administrative justice contained in s 33. 
 his right to privacy contained in s 14 of the Interim Constitution;204 
and 
 his right of access to courts contained in s 34.  
 Wunsh J held that s 99 of the Income Tax Act was valid even though 
the Commissioner did not grant a hearing to the taxpayer before he 
invoked the section.205 This was on the basis that the Commissioner 
corresponded extensively with the taxpayer, that the claim was properly 
made by the Commissioner and the taxpayer was afforded an opportunity 
to pay it.206 Wunsh J decided that s 99 of the Income Tax Act limited the 
taxpayer‟s rights for sound reasons, namely to facilitate and enhance the 
Commissioner‟s ability to recover promptly taxes due by taxpayers. He 
pointed out that the taxpayer‟s loss of property might, if necessary, be 
remedied by administrative relief. It was also held that the garnishee 
procedure is recognised in other open and democratic societies and any 
limitation of s 99 is reasonable and necessary.207  
 In Contract Support Services and Others v C:SARS208 the Court 
considered s 47 of the VAT Act, which, similarly to s 99 of the Income Tax 
Act, allows the Commissioner to appoint an agent to collect VAT due, 
Brett AJ stated as follows:  
„I agree with the submission made by Mr Du Toit that not all 
administrative acts require the application of the audi alteram 
partem rule before they are given effect to. Indeed, s 47 itself 
requires no such prior hearing. I also agree with Mr Du Toit that to 
require a prior hearing would defeat the very purpose of the notice. 
It would alert the defaulting vatpayer to the intention to require 
payment from the latter‟s debtor and to enable the taxpayer to spirit 
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such funds away. Where prior notice and a hearing would render 
the proposed act nugatory, no such prior notice or hearing is 
required.‟209  
 Brett AJ refused to allow the challenge to the notices issued under 
s 47 of the VAT Act because the notices were not ultra vires the 
Constitution. Further, the taxpayer‟s challenge did not succeed even 
though the procedure adopted in issuing the notices did not comply with 
the audi alteram partem principle.210 The reason given was that if the 
Commissioner gave prior notice and granted a hearing, such conduct 
would undermine the provisions under consideration.211  
 The approach by Brett AJ in Contract212 is supported by the earlier 
decision of the Court in Gardener v East London Transitional Local 
Council and Others,213 where Erasmus J decided that:  
„Fairness is a relative concept. The meaning to be attached to 
“procedurally fair administrative action” must therefore be 
determined within the particular framework of the act in question 
viewed in the light of the relevant circumstances. … 
I do not understand s 24(b) to mean that the audi – principle is 
absolutely applicable to every administrative act. Such an 
interpretation would make possible the misuse of the Constitution 
to hold up necessary social reform measures, or for that matter any 
executive or administrative act.‟214  
 However, in Mpande Foodliner CC v Commissioner for South African 
Revenue Service and Others215 Patel AJ set aside notices issued under 
s 47 of the VAT Act declaring that the denial of the audi principle before 
issuing the notices infringed s 33 of the Constitution. Subsequently, in 
Smartphone SP (Pty) Ltd v Absa Bank Ltd and Another216 Ponnan J 
referred approvingly to Brett A J‟s comments in Contract Support 
Services. 217  
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 Ponnan J was critical of the decision delivered by Patel AJ in 
Mpande, commenting that it was: 
„[A] conclusion, which in my view, lost sight of a fundamental 
principle, namely that the fairness of administrative procedure 
depends on the circumstances of each case. I thus regret that I am 
unable to lend my support to his lone voice.‟218  
 In Smartphone219 the Court held, inter alia, that the taxpayer had not 
exercised its rights of objection and appeal, nor availed itself of other 
legal remedies and thus the application to set aside the s 47 notices 
failed.220 The Commissioner‟s power to issue a notice under s 47 of the 
VAT Act does not unlawfully violate the taxpayer‟s right to administrative 
justice as envisaged in PAJA. 
 Section 36 of the VAT Act confers a discretion on the Commissioner 
to postpone the payment of VAT pending an appeal. It is necessary to 
consider how the Commissioner must exercise that discretion taking 
account of the provisions contained in PAJA.  
 The Commissioner‟s counsel in Metcash221 stated in paragraph 5.61 
of the Heads of Argument: „The Commissioner, on application would 
obviously be required to exercise a proper discretion and would be 
subject to the discipline of administrative law.‟222  
 The Constitutional Court considered the discretion granted to the 
Commissioner to postpone payment of tax pending an appeal as 
enshrined in s 36 of the VAT Act.223  
 Kriegler J dealt with the exercise of the discretion contained in s 36 of 
the VAT Act, as follows: 
„The Commissioner, in exercising the power under s 36, is clearly 
implementing legislation and as such the exercise of the s 36 
power constitutes administrative action and falls within the 
administrative justice clause of the constitution. … It contemplates, 
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therefore that notwithstanding the “Pay Now, Argue Later” rule, 
there will be circumstances in which it would be just for the 
Commissioner to suspend the obligation to make payment of the 
tax pending the determination of the appeal. What those 
circumstances are will depend on the facts of each particular case. 
The Commissioner must, however, be able to justify his decision as 
being rational.‟224   
 The Commissioner may not summarily dismiss a taxpayer‟s request 
for the postponement of payment of tax pending the hearing of an appeal. 
Under the principles of administrative law he must properly exercise the 
discretion granted by taking account of all relevant facts.  
 It is unfortunate that neither the Income Tax nor the VAT Act 
prescribes what criteria the Commissioner must consider in exercising the 
discretion granted to him. Media Release 27 of 2000, issued by the 
Commissioner shortly after the Metcash judgement, stated that the 
Commissioner might, depending on the particular facts of the case in 
question, consider the following:  
„Where payment of the whole of the amount at issue would cause 
grave and serious hardship which could not be reversed if the 
taxpayer were to succeed in his appeal, and the circumstances of 
the case give rise to reasonable doubt;  
Other relevant circumstances, for instance, certainty that the 
amount at issue will be paid were the appeal to fail.‟225  
 I suggest that the fiscal statutes should contain clear guidelines 
stating what factors the Commissioner must consider in deciding whether 
to agree to a postponement of tax pending an appeal.226  
 In an opinion prepared for the South African Commissioner, Arnold 
compares the constitutionality of s 88 of the Income Tax Act with 
Canada‟s statutory provisions.227 Arnold recommends certain changes to 
s 88 of the Income Tax Act. 
„Under s 88 of the South African Income Tax Act, the 
Commissioner has the authority to suspend the payment of tax 
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pending an appeal. It might be appropriate to consider setting out 
in the legislation the factors that the Commissioner must consider 
or the conditions which must be met in order for the Commissioner 
to exercise his discretion. Also, it might be appropriate to provide 
taxpayers with a right of appeal if the Commissioner does not 
exercise his discretion. The Commissioner‟s discretion in this 
regard is important because there may be legitimate circumstances 
in which taxpayers cannot pay their taxes pending an appeal 
without significantly adverse consequences. Also, it might be 
appropriate in certain circumstances for taxpayers to be entitled to 
provide security for the taxes owing in lieu of payment.‟228  
 The Commissioner is concerned that taxpayers may lodge an 
objection that has no merit merely to postpone the payment of the tax.229 
A practical difficulty arises in deciding which objections have merit and 
which do not.230 I contend that the Commissioner should possess the 
power to insist on the timeous payment of tax where a taxpayer lodges an 
objection lacking merit and where failure to pay would place the fisc in an 
invidious position.  
 VAT represents tax collected by a vendor and held in trust for, due to 
and belonging to the State. Income tax, however, comprises an amount 
payable only once SARS assesses the tax return submitted by the 
taxpayer. If the Commissioner wishes to enforce payment of income tax 
unreasonably, pending the hearing of a tax appeal, the aggrieved 
taxpayer should consider bringing an action in court based on the 
principles of administrative law. Thus, it is not necessary to show that 
s 88 of the Income Tax Act is unconstitutional. Even though the 
Constitutional Court has upheld the „pay now argue later‟ rule contained 
in the VAT Act, a taxpayer may still challenge the Commissioner‟s 
decision to enforce payment.231 A violation of the rules of administrative 
justice provides the ground for such challenge.232 Depending on the facts, 
this may be the most suitable remedy available to the taxpayer.  
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 Arnold confirms that taxpayers in Canada generally do not have to 
pay taxes owing when the amount payable is in dispute.233 He points out 
that, in the case of certain large corporations, the Canadian Revenue may 
take immediate collection action for half the tax assessed until the 90-day 
period for filing an objection has passed.234 With these corporations, the 
Canadian Revenue may collect the balance of the tax after the 90-day 
period has passed, even though the corporation may appeal against the 
assessment.235 Arnold concludes that s 88 of the Income Tax Act „is both 
reasonable and justifiable in a democratic society‟.236 Further, he states 
as follows:  
„If taxes payable under dispute do not have to be paid by 
taxpayers, there is a clear incentive for taxpayers to dispute tax 
assessments that they would not otherwise dispute. It is very 
difficult for the courts or the tax authorities to decide whether or not 
disputes are frivolous. If taxes are not paid when assessed, there is 
also the problem of the taxpayers not having the necessary funds 
to pay the taxes when the litigation is finally resolved and the taxes 
are found to be due and payable. Obviously, if the taxpayer is 
successful in disputing the amount of tax assessed, the amounts 
should be refunded with interest so that, as much as possible, the 
taxpayer is restored to the situation he would have been in if the 
tax had been correctly assessed in the first place.‟237  
 Under s 74D of the Income Tax Act the Commissioner is authorised 
to search a taxpayer‟s premises and seize records. In such cases the 
Commissioner applies to court for a warrant to conduct the search and 
seizure raid. He does not notify the taxpayer of the request before 
executing the warrant. Williams comments as follows:  
„It is certainly arguable that denying taxpayers the right of appeal 
on the merits against the issuing of a warrant of search and seizure 
is an infringement of the constitutional right to “administrative action 
that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair” (s 33(1) of the 1996 
Constitution), and it is regrettable that the taxpayers in the instant 
case did not make this argument …‟238 
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 To allow a taxpayer to receive prior notice of an application for a 
search and seizure warrant will undermine the power conferred on the 
Commissioner by the legislature. I contend that the power to call for a 
warrant without the knowledge of the taxpayer is a reasonable limitation 
of the taxpayer‟s right to administrative justice. Such power exists in other 
open and democratic societies such as the United Kingdom and Canada 
and thus s 36 would assist the Commissioner in the exercise of the power 
contained in s 74D of the Income Tax Act.239 
 The Commissioner has a discretion to reduce or waive any penalty 
incurred under the Customs and Excise Act.240 The rules of administrative 
justice require that the Commissioner exercise that discretion properly. In 
Deacon v Controller of Customs and Excise Horn AJ stated as follows:  
„In this matter it would not have been difficult for the respondent to 
afford the applicant the opportunity to be heard. This was clearly 
not the common situation where, for example, the applicant had 
knowingly been a party to the evasion of payment of customs duty. 
Here the applicant was an innocent party. His situation called for a 
proper investigation by the respondent and full ventilation by the 
parties of all the relevant facts before the respondent took the 
decision to seize the motor vehicle. I gain the distinct impression 
that the respondent took the view that once it had been confirmed 
that duty was payable in terms of the Act, he was entitled to invoke 
the provisions of ss 87 and 88 without the need to have regard to 
the provisions of s 33 of the Constitution. The respondent ignored 
the fact that s 33 had broadened the basis upon which a court will, 
on review, interfere with the decision of a function in matters of this 
nature.‟241  
The Court, therefore, held that the authorities must consider the 
Constitution and cannot apply the Customs and Excise Act in vacuo.242 
Horn A J directed the authorities to conduct a full and proper hearing of all 
relevant facts and consider the principles of fairness and the rules of 
natural justice and the taxpayer‟s right to a hearing.243 Further, he 
directed the customs and excise officials to apply the provisions of s 93 of 
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the Customs and Excise Act and to act in accordance therewith.244 The 
Court set aside the decision to treat the motor vehicle as forfeit as well as 
the levying of duties and penalties.245  
 The decision of the Court in Deacon246 confirms the opinion that a 
taxpayer may succeed in setting the section aside because the 
Commissioner has failed to comply with the rules of administrative justice. 
Horn AJ stated the following:  
„There will be numerous cases where the respondent would not be 
required to give effect to the natural rules of justice. One can 
visualise a situation where the respondent had complied with the 
relevant provisions of the Act and the person concerned has no 
answer to the respondent‟s entitlement to the duty imposed or 
alternatively, to the respondent‟s concomitant right to seize the 
goods in terms of the Act. It would be unreasonable to expect the 
respondent to adhere strictly to the audi-principle in such sharply 
defined cases. It would be different, however, where the 
respondent has knowledge of a person‟s innocence or is aware of 
the existence of other mitigating factors with regard to an imported 
article and there was clearly potential prejudice for such a person 
should the respondent act in terms of the legislation without having 
regard to the rules of natural justice.‟247  
 In Raymond Wong and Four Others v the Commissioner for the 
South African Revenue Service,248 the Court considered the taxpayer‟s 
right to administrative justice. The Court also evaluated the manner in 
which the officials exercised the powers to seize goods from taxpayers 
under s 88 of the Customs and Excise Act.249  
 Bertelsmann J decided as follows:  
„As I have said, the application of the vast powers which the Act 
grants to the respondent‟s officials must be exercised with 
discretion and elasticity. The greatest measure of transparency and 
observance of due administrative process must be allowed as far 
as possible. This includes audi alteram partem. Upon the facts of 
the present case, the applicants ought to have been given the 
opportunity to be heard and to produce the documentation upon 
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which they rely for their claims that the goods were lawfully 
imported and that the necessary duty was paid.  
Under the circumstances, and in the light of the failure on the part 
of officialdom to do so the attachment and removal was unlawful. I 
therefore granted the order which the applicants prayed for.‟250  
 It is clear that a Court will, on the basis of a breach of a taxpayer‟s 
right to administrative justice, grant relief to one who believes customs 
officials have infringed his or her rights by not granting a fair hearing,.251 
However, the Commissioner may, in certain cases, satisfy a Court that 
there is no need to inform the taxpayer before taking the „administrative 
action‟ because his conduct complies with the exceptions in s 3(2)(b) read 
with s 3(4) of PAJA.  
 Section 3(5) of PAJA allows an official to adopt a procedure that 
differs from that contained in s 3(2) as long as that procedure is fair. 
PAJA permits exemptions from the provisions of the statute under s 2. 
Initially, as mentioned, the Commissioner wanted effectively to be exempt 
from PAJA, but to date no State bodies have been declared exempt.252   
 
(6) The right to call for reasons under PAJA 
 Under s 5 of PAJA taxpayers may call for reasons, in writing, for 
decisions made by the Commissioner and his officers. The section 
provides:  
„(1) Any person whose rights have been materially and 
adversely affected by administrative action and who has not 
been given reasons for the action may, within 90 days after 
the date on which that person became aware of the action, 
request that the administrator concerned furnish written 
reasons for the action. 
(2) The administrator to whom the request is made must, within 
90 days after receiving the request, give that person 
adequate reasons in writing for the administrative action. 
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(3) If an administrator fails to furnish adequate reasons for an 
administrative action, it must, subject to subsection (4) and 
in the absence to the contrary be presumed in any 
proceedings for judicial review that the administrative action 
was taken without good reason.‟ 
 Currie & Klaaren describe the rationale underlying the release of 
reasons justifying an „administrative action‟ as follows:   
„The principal purpose of furnishing reasons is to justify the 
administrative action that has been taken, thereby furthering the 
goals of accountability, openness and transparency in the use of 
public power.  
…  
The effect of a reason-giving duty is therefore to make the 
decision-making process more structured and rational. This effect 
can also be institution-wide, leading to a more rational institutional 
decision-making process.‟253  
 It is possible to call for reasons only where the „administrative action‟ 
materially and adversely affects the taxpayer‟s rights. If the Commissioner 
may show that a particular decision does not fall into s 5 of PAJA because 
its effect is insignificant it is not necessary to supply reasons for the 
decision.  
 The Commissioner is authorised by s 74B of the Income Tax Act to 
conduct an audit at the taxpayer‟s premises. Is a taxpayer entitled to call 
for reasons why the Commissioner conducts such an audit?  
 Commenting on the international position, Bentley writes:  
„Taxpayers should be given prior notification of an audit and the 
opportunity to request postponement of the audit if they have good 
reasons. As in any administrative decision, the tax authority should 
explain to taxpayers why they are chosen for an audit, what taxes 
and what years the audit will cover, what documents, books and 
other records will be required, how the audit will proceed, and give 
the taxpayer the opportunity to contact and use a legal or other 
representative in dealing with the tax authority.‟254  
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 He also expresses the view that taxpayers should, at the 
commencement of the audit, receive clear guidelines from the revenue 
authority, setting out the audit procedures, the rights and duties of 
taxpayers during the audit as well as details of the tax authorities‟ 
settlement practices and rules governing objection and appeals against 
assessments.255 
 According to Daiber the German revenue authority is authorised to 
conduct audits and inspect records of taxpayers, but it must comply with 
the administrative procedures contained in the German legislation.256 It is 
unfortunate that the South African fiscal legislation does not contain similar 
guidelines on how the Commissioner‟s officials must conduct the audit. I 
recommend that the South African legislature revise the sections 
empowering the Commissioner to conduct audits to include provisions 
similar to those found in the German legislation.  
 Often the South African Commissioner subjects the taxpayer to an 
audit and issues an assessment imposing penalties without holding a 
meeting with the taxpayer. In those cases where the Commissioner does 
not issue an assessment the taxpayer is never formally advised that the 
Commissioner has finalised the audit. In other cases the Commissioner 
will conduct an audit and issue a letter of findings to the taxpayer, calling 
on the taxpayer to explain certain facts before finalising the audit. 
Thereafter, the taxpayer receives an assessment. However, when an audit 
commences the Commissioner does not inform the taxpayer about the 
procedures he will follow in conducting an audit, nor is the taxpayer 
advised of his or her rights during such an audit.  
 Several other countries set out the procedures the revenue authority 
should follow when conducting audits of taxpayers‟ affairs.257 In such 
cases the revenue authority informs taxpayers about the process and 
advises them of their rights.  
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 Section 5 of PAJA requires the taxpayer to request reasons for the 
application of the section. The Commissioner has no obligation to supply 
reasons without having received a request from the taxpayer. In practice, 
however, the Commissioner‟s officers usually supply reasons for all 
assessments issued, without the taxpayer having to call for reasons.  
 The Income Tax Act contains detailed provisions dealing with the 
objection and appeal process in relation to disputes over assessments.258 
Taxpayers are entitled to call for reasons for an assessment issued by the 
Commissioner under either s 5 of PAJA or Rule 3(1)(a) of the rules 
governing objections and appeals.259 Rule 3(1)(a) provides as follows: 
„Any taxpayer who is aggrieved by any assessment may by written 
notice delivered to the Commissioner within 30 days after the date 
of the assessment, request the Commissioner to furnish reasons 
for the assessment.‟  
 Rule 3(2), which clarifies the nature of the reasons the Commissioner 
must supply, expands on the above rule: 
„Where in the opinion of the Commissioner adequate reasons have 
already been provided, the Commissioner must within 30 days after 
receipt of the notice contemplated in subrule (1), notify the taxpayer 
accordingly in writing which notice must refer to the documents 
wherein such reasons were provided.‟  
 If a taxpayer calls for reasons it is clear that he or she needs only to 
lodge detailed grounds of objection once the Commissioner has supplied 
reasons for the assessment.260 The Commissioner has expressed the view 
that where a taxpayer requests reasons under PAJA he or she must 
submit a letter of objection within 30 days of the date of the assessment.261 
The Commissioner may, on fulfilment of certain specified criteria, grant an 
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extension of time within which to lodge the detailed grounds of 
objection.262 If a taxpayer calls for reasons under s 5 of PAJA, his or her 
position should not differ from that if he or she had used Rule 3(1)(a) to do 
so. It is unreasonable to expect a taxpayer to submit detailed grounds of 
objection without knowing the Commissioner‟s reasons for the 
assessment. The Commissioner may grant an extension of time within 
which to lodge the objection. The fact that the taxpayer is awaiting reasons 
for the assessment under PAJA constitutes a reasonable ground for him or 
her to call for an extension.  
 In terms of s 5 of PAJA the taxpayer has 90 days from the date he or 
she becomes aware of the Commissioner‟s decision to call for reasons.263 
A taxpayer calling for reasons under Rule 3(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act 
must do so within 30 days of the date of the assessment.264 The rules 
governing objections and appeals are time-linked to ensure speedier 
finalisation than was the case in the past.265 Section 5(5) of PAJA allows 
an administrator, where authorised by an empowering provision, to follow 
a procedure that is fair but different from that contained in s 5(2) of PAJA, 
which requires reasons to be requested within 90 days. The only 
distinction between Rule 3(1)(a) and s 5(2) is the time within which 
reasons must be requested. There does not appear to be a rational 
explanation for or justification of the discrepancy. It is unclear if a court will 
uphold a taxpayer‟s challenge that Rule 3(1)(a) violates the right to just 
„administrative action‟ on the basis that it violates s 5(2) of PAJA.  The 
court may decide that the procedure is different but remains fair and is 
valid. 
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 I submit that, since both s 5 and Rule 3(1)(a) require that the 
Commissioner supply „adequate reasons‟ for decisions made on a 
taxpayer‟s affairs, the taxpayer should receive the same quality of reasons 
from the Commissioner..  
 The reasons for a decision will determine how the taxpayer responds, 
that is, whether he or she accepts the decision or challenges it. Thus, it is 
important to establish what constitutes „adequate reasons‟ as neither s 5 
nor Rule 3(1)(a) explains what the term means.266  
 Considering the right to reasons under s 24 of the Interim Constitution 
in Moletsane v Premier of the Free State and Another267 Hancke J said:  
„This, in my view, connotes a correlation between the action taken 
and the reasons furnished: the more drastic the action taken, the 
more detailed the reasons which are advanced should be. The 
degree of seriousness of the administrative act should therefore 
determine the particularity of the reasons furnished.‟268  
 In my practice I have dealt with the matter of a company taxpayer 
who disposed of an asset before the introduction of tax on capital gains, 
which, it believed, constituted a receipt of a capital nature and was not 
liable to tax.269 The Commissioner issued an assessment subjecting the 
gain to income tax. The Commissioner advised that the amount was 
taxable, as the taxpayer had failed to discharge the onus contained in s 82 
of the Income Tax Act. Under s 5 of PAJA it is insufficient for the 
Commissioner to cite only a section of the Income Tax Act as the reason 
for subjecting an amount of income to tax without applying the taxpayer‟s 
specific circumstances to the law.  
 The comments made about affidavits by Joffe J in Swissborough 
Diamond (Pty) Ltd and Others v Government of the Republic of South 
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Africa and Others270 are a useful guide to the adequacy of the reasons the 
Commissioner must furnish:  
„The facts set out in the founding affidavit (and equally in the 
answering affidavit and replying affidavit) must be set out simply, 
clearly and in chronological sequence and without argumentative 
matter …  
Regard being had to the function of affidavits, it is not open to an 
applicant or a respondent to merely annex to its affidavit 
documentation and to request the Court to have regard to it. What 
is required is the identification of the portions thereof on which 
reliance is placed and an indication of the strength thereof.‟271  
 I submit that a taxpayer should not have to sift through a significant 
number of documents to glean the reasons for the Commissioner‟s 
decision. In The Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and 18 
Others v Phambili Fisheries (Pty) Ltd and Another272 the Court was called 
on to decide whether the Minister had supplied adequate reasons. In the 
unanimous decision of the Court Schutz JA stated:  
„What constitutes adequate reasons has been aptly described by 
Woodward J, sitting in the Federal Court of Australia, in the case of 
Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) (Pty) Ltd and Another v 
Wraith and Others (1983) 48 ALR 500 at 507 (23-41), as follows:  
“The passages from judgements which are conveniently 
brought together in Re Palmer and Minister for the Capital 
Territory (1978) 23 ALR 196 at 206 - 7; 1 ALD 183 at 193 - 4, 
serve to confirm my view that s 13(1) of the Judicial Review 
Act requires the decision-maker to explain his decision in a 
way which will enable a person aggrieved to say, in effect: 
„Even though I may not agree with it, I now understand why 
the decision went against me. I am now in a position to decide 
whether that decision has involved an unwarranted finding of 
fact, or an error of law which is worth challenging.‟ 
This requires that the decision-maker should set out his 
understanding of the relevant law, any findings of fact on 
which his conclusions depend (especially if those facts have 
been in dispute), and the reasoning processes which led him 
to those conclusions. He should do so in clear and 
unambiguous language, not in vague generalities or the 
formal language of legislation. The appropriate length of the 
statement covering such matters will depend upon 
considerations such as the nature and importance of the 
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decision, its complexity and the time available to formulate the 
statement. …”  
…  
Detailed reasons were spelt out for not granting entry to any new 
applicants.‟273  
 The Commissioner’s Guide on Tax Dispute Resolution refers to the 
above comments of Schutz JA in an attempt to indicate the quality of 
reasons his assessors should supply to taxpayers.  
 Hoexter summarises the position as follows: 
„[I]t is apparent that reasons are not really reasons unless they are 
properly informative. They must explain why action was taken or not 
taken; otherwise they are better described as findings or other 
information.‟274   
 A taxpayer has a right to be informed of the underlying thinking that 
resulted in the decision. The Commissioner must expand on the statutory 
provisions relied on and justify why he reached that particular conclusion.  
 In Rèan275 Kirk-Cohen ADJP was required to decide whether the 
authorities had supplied adequate reasons to the applicant for a gaming 
licence. He commented as follows:  
„On the one hand it is not necessary for an administrative body to 
spoon feed an aggrieved party seeking reasons; on the other hand 
the administrative body cannot expect an aggrieved party to seek 
justification for the reasons from a myriad of documents where 
such reasons cannot reasonably be determined.  
In my view the applicants in the present case can easily ascertain 
any further information they need from the documentation and 
audio transcripts etc made available to them, the vast majority 
having been made available before the application was launched. 
Having regard to the facts of this case, the present attack upon the 
reasons given by the respondent indicates an attempt to alter the 
concept of reasons into an interrogation via question and answer 
and an unjustifiable request for further particulars.‟276   
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 In 2005 the Johannesburg Tax Court heard the first case relating to 
the term „adequate reasons‟.277 In that case the taxpayer had called for 
reasons under Rule 3(1)(a) of the regulations governing objections. The 
Commissioner took the view that he had supplied „adequate reasons‟ in 
various letters sent to the taxpayer. Jajbhay J described the test for 
adequacy of reasons as follows:  
„De Ville suggests that the adequacy of reasons should be 
determined with reference to the rationale for the duty to provide 
reasons. These are firstly, that it encourages rational and 
structured decision making; secondly it encourages open 
administration; thirdly it satisfies the desire on the part of the 
individual to know why a decision was reached, and fourthly it 
makes it easier for that person to appeal against the decision. In 
this regard it also assists a Court in reviewing administrative 
action.‟278  
 Jajbhay J decided that the Commissioner had not supplied adequate 
reasons and directed him to do so.279 The Court expressed the view that 
„the hand of the Commissioner can rest heavily on the taxpayer‟.280 
Based on the decision in Tax Court Case No 4 of 2005 the 
Commissioner must furnish reasons that are understandable and 
explicit.281 Jajbhay J stated that the taxpayer and the Court need not 
examine the letters received from the Commissioner to establish the 
reasons for the decision.282 The taxpayer had raised specific questions 
about why the Commissioner made the decision to issue the 
assessments and why he had imposed additional tax at a particular rate. 
The Commissioner had never supplied answers to the taxpayer‟s 
questions and Jajbhay J ruled that the taxpayer must receive answers:283  
„[T]he Applicant was, and still is, entitled to answers to its 
questions. They are essential to enable the Applicant to formulate 
its objection to the assessment. If the Court sanctions the 
Respondent‟s attitude, the Applicant will have to perform the 
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impossible task of distilling the Respondent‟s (sic) reasons from 
twenty letters which do not speak for themselves and none of 
which contain clearly formulated reasons before formulating its 
objection.‟284  
 The Court ordered the Commissioner to supply the taxpayer with 
properly structured reasons for issuing the assessments. In doing so, the 
court directed the Commissioner to refer to the relevant statutory 
provisions and the findings of fact that supported the conclusions 
reached.285 Jajbhay J directed the Commissioner to advise the taxpayer 
of the reasoning process followed in reaching his conclusions.286   
 The Australian Administrative Review Council has published a 
document that is of assistance in determining what constitutes adequate 
reasons.287 The document, entitled Commentary on the Practical 
Guidelines for Preparing Statements of Reasons,288 suggests that a 
decision-maker should address the following points in the statement of 
reasons made available to an affected person:   
„The statement must: 
 set out the decision; and 
 contain the findings on material questions of fact; and  
 refer to the evidence or other material on which those 
findings were based; and  
 give the real reasons for the decision.‟289  
 If the Commissioner were to adopt these guidelines the standard of 
reasons supplied would comply with s 5 of PAJA and Rule 3(1)(a) of the 
regulations governing objections and appeals.290  
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 Where the Commissioner has failed to supply proper reasons under 
Rule 3(1)(a) the taxpayer must approach the Tax Court for relief under 
Rule 26 of the objection and appeal regulations.291 If the taxpayer requests 
reasons under s 5 of PAJA, he or she may commence proceedings for 
judicial review under s 6 of the Act.292 This requires launching proceedings 
in the High Court and incurring the attendant legal costs. It is unfortunate 
that PAJA did not create a less costly and more informal tribunal to 
consider requests for reasons, although it does foresee the designation of 
Magistrate‟s Courts by the Minister for purposes of widening access to 
review.293   
 
(7)  Judicial Review under PAJA 
 A taxpayer dissatisfied with a decision made by the Commissioner, or 
with the reasons or lack of reasons supplied in support thereof, may seek 
judicial review under s 6 of PAJA which provides: 
„(1) Any person may institute proceedings in a court or a tribunal 
for the judicial review of an administrative action.  
(2) A court or tribunal has the power to judicially review an 
administrative action if - 
 (a) the administrator who took it - 
 (i) was not authorised to do so by the empowering 
provision; 
 (ii) acted under a delegation of power which was not 
authorised by the empowering provision; or 
  (iii) was biased or reasonably suspected of bias; 
 (b) a mandatory and material procedure or condition 
prescribed by an empowering provision was not 
complied with; 
 (c) the action was procedurally unfair; 
 (d) the action was materially influenced by an error of law; 
 (e) the action was taken - 
 (i) for a reason not authorised by the empowering 
provision;  
 (ii) for an ulterior purpose or motive; 
 (iii) because irrelevant considerations were taken 
into account or relevant considerations were not 
considered;  
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 (iv) because of the unauthorised or unwarranted 
dictates of another person or body; 
 (v) in bad faith; or 
 (vi) arbitrarily or capriciously; 
 (f) the action itself - 
 (i) contravenes a law or is not authorised by the 
empowering provision; or 
  (ii) is not rationally connected to -  
   (aa) the purpose for which it was taken; 
   (bb) the purpose of the empowering provision;  
   (cc) the information before the administrator; or 
   (dd) the reasons given by the administrator;  
 (g) the action concerned consists of a failure to take a 
decision; 
(h) the exercise of the power or the performance of the 
function authorised by the empowering provision, in 
pursuance of which the administrative action was 
purportedly taken, is so unreasonable that no 
reasonable person could have so exercised the power 
or performed the function; or  
 (i) the action is otherwise unconstitutional or unlawful.‟ 
 The grounds of judicial review are based on those found in the 
common law before the current constitutional dispensation.294 Section 6 
gives effect to the constitutional imperative of entrenching a taxpayer‟s 
right to administrative justice. If a taxpayer can show that the 
administrative action in dispute has failed to meet one of the tests set out 
in s 6 a court or other tribunal may review that action. Section 8 of PAJA 
then allows the court to grant an order for an appropriate remedy.  
 Section 6(2)(a) caters for the position where the Commissioner has 
acted beyond the powers contained in a fiscal statute. In Commissioner for 
South African Revenue Service v Hawker Air Services (Pty) Ltd and 
Hawker Aviation Services Partnership and Others295 Patel J decided that 
the imposition of 300 per cent additional tax was unlawful.296 This was 
because s 60 of the VAT Act only empowered the Commissioner to levy 
additional tax of up to 200 per cent. Hawker is an example of the 
Commissioner acting beyond the powers conferred on him by the VAT Act.  
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 It is unfortunate that the Commissioner has not yet released 
guidelines relating to the imposition of additional tax in those cases where 
taxpayers default in disclosing their income, as is the case in New 
Zealand.297 A South African assessor often imposes additional tax without 
calling for representations from the taxpayer as to why such additional tax 
should not be imposed. A review is necessary to streamline these 
provisions to take account of international experience. I suggest that, for 
the benefit of taxpayers, the statutory provisions should clarify the manner 
in which the Commissioner exercises the discretion granted to him to levy 
additional tax. The fiscal laws provide for the Commissioner to make 
certain decisions personally while in other cases he may authorise his 
officials to act on his behalf. 298 If the Commissioner‟s officials make a 
decision that is not authorised under, for example, the Income Tax Act, a 
taxpayer may have that decision reviewed under s 6(2)(a)(i) of PAJA.299 If 
a fiscal provision authorises the minister to publish regulations and the 
Commissioner does so, the Court may review that decision under 
s 6(2)(a)(ii) of PAJA. 
 A further ground of review flowing from s 6(2)(a)(iii) is if an official is 
biased or reasonably suspected of bias. Currie & Klaaren summarise the 
test for bias as follows:  
„The AJA uses the constitutional standard for the rule against bias: 
actual bias is not required, but a reasonable suspicion of bias is 
sufficient (footnote The Constitutional standard is based on the 
common-law standard. See President of the Republic of South 
Africa v South African Football Rugby Union 1999 (4) SA 147 (CC) 
para 36. The Constitutional Court adopted the following test for 
judicial bias from BTR Industries South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Metal and 
Allied Workers’ Union 1992 (3) SA 673 at 690A-695C: “[I]n our law 
the existence of a reasonable suspicion of bias satisfies the test; 
and that an apprehension of a real likelihood that the decision 
maker will be biased is not a prerequisite for disqualifying bias.” 
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See also S v Roberts 1999 (4) SA 915 (SCA) paras 32 and 34, 
which set out the test for judicial bias as follows: 
(1) There must be a suspicion that the judicial officer might, not 
would, be biased.  
(2) The suspicion must be that of a reasonable person in the 
position of the accused or litigant.  
(3) The suspicion must be based on reasonable grounds.  
(4) The suspicion is one which the reasonable person referred 
to would, not might, have.‟300  
 In Gold Fields Ltd v Connellan NO and Others301 Snyders J had to 
decide whether the Securities Regulation Panel („SRP‟) acted 
prejudicially against Gold Fields. Snyders referred to the fact that Gold 
Fields was, inter alia, „given an inordinately short time in which to 
respond‟ and „did not get an opportunity to make submissions before the 
ruling was made‟.302 The Court decided that there was sufficient evidence 
before it to show that a reasonable person in Gold Fields‟s position would 
suspect or believe the SRP acted prejudicially against Goldfields303 and 
that the SRP was biased against the company.304  
 There is a perception amongst many taxpayers that the 
Commissioner‟s officers make their decisions because they receive 
incentive bonuses based on the value of additional income assessed to 
income tax or VAT.305 PAJA would treat officials with a pecuniary interest 
in the outcome of the decisions they make as biased because this impairs 
their objectivity. On review a court may set aside decisions made by 
biased officials.  
 In the United States the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 1 prohibited, for the 
first time, audit quotas.306 Before enactment of that statute the United 
States tax administration „set arbitrary targets of tax dollars to be collected 
regardless of the specific facts of the auditors‟ caseloads‟.307 There were 
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concerns that targets would negatively affect the objectivity of the tax 
auditors and thus the United States legislature outlawed the reliance on 
audit results and audit quotas as tools utilised in performance 
management.308  
 This approach to tax collection is commendable. The Commissioner 
should ensure that the manner in which he evaluates the performance of 
his auditors is not related to the quantum of tax they assess. It is important 
that taxpayers believe that the Commissioner‟s officials are conducting tax 
audits to ensure compliance with the fiscal statutes and not for the ulterior 
purpose of possibly enhancing their own remuneration.  
 Under s 6(2)(b) of PAJA a taxpayer may seek review of a decision if 
the Commissioner fails to adhere to a mandatory and material procedure 
contained in a fiscal statute or in the provisions of PAJA.309 If the 
Commissioner has not followed a fair procedure the taxpayer is entitled to 
approach a court for review under s 6(2)(c). The yardstick used to 
determine whether the „administrative action‟ was procedurally unfair is the 
same as that contained in s 33(1) of the Constitution.310 In Commissioner 
of Customs and Excise v Container Logistics (Pty) Ltd; Commissioner of 
Customs and Excise v Rennies Group Ltd t/a Renfreight311 Hefer JA held 
that the Commissioner had acted unreasonably and unfairly and set his 
decision aside.312 In another customs matter, Van Reenen J, in Trend 
Finance (Pty) Ltd and Another v Commissioner for South African Revenue 
Service and Another313 held that because the Commissioner had failed to 
allow the taxpayer to make representations before he took the decision on 
forfeiture he had acted unfairly in contravention of s 8(1)(c) of PAJA.314 .  
 In terms of s 6(2)(d) of PAJA the taxpayer may seek a review where 
the Commissioner bases his decision on an error of law.315 Section 6(2)(e) 
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of PAJA caters for the manner in which the Commissioner exercises 
„administrative action‟. Willis J in Sasol Oil (Pty) Ltd and Another v 
Metcalfe NO316 considered whether the official had the authority to decide 
on the construction of filling stations and whether that decision complied 
with s 6(2)(e)(i) of PAJA. The court ruled that the empowering statute did 
not authorise the decision taken by the official and set the decision 
aside.317  
 If the „administrative action‟ taken has an ulterior purpose or motive 
the taxpayer may seek review under s 6(2)(e)(ii) of PAJA. Should the 
official rely on irrelevant factors in reaching the decision a court may 
review the decision under s 6(2)(e)(iii). In Sasol318 Willis J held that the 
official had relied on „irrelevant considerations‟ in reaching her decision 
and set the decision aside.319  I submit that where an official makes an 
error because he or she has considered irrelevant facts or, alternatively, 
has not considered relevant facts, such conduct is reviewable by a court 
and may be set aside. In Pepkor Retirement Fund and Another v Financial 
Services Board320 Cloete JA held that a court could review a decision 
made in ignorance of material facts.321  
 Under s 6(2)(e)(iv) a court may review a matter if the Commissioner 
makes a decision at the behest of anyone else, including, for example, a 
Cabinet Minister.322 Section 6(2)(f) requires examination of the 
administrative action itself. If the action violates an empowering provision, 
or the decision is not rational when weighed against the reasons given for 
the decision, a Court may review that decision.323   
 The failure to make a decision constitutes „administrative action‟ as 
defined in s 1 of PAJA. Thus, s 6(2)(g) allows a taxpayer to take the 
Commissioner on review if he fails to make a decision. If the empowering 
provision contains a time frame within which the Commissioner must reach 
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a decision a taxpayer may proceed on review if he declines to do so.324 
Where the empowering provision does not refer to a period within which 
the Commissioner must reach a decision the taxpayer may seek review 
where he does not do so within a reasonable period.325 Some taxpayers 
experience frustration because the Commissioner withholds indefinitely 
issuing an assessment of a submitted tax return.326  
 Taxpayers also complain that the Commissioner does not expedite 
the payment of refunds.327 In these cases, I contend that the 
Commissioner has failed to implement a decision as required under s 1 of 
PAJA and a taxpayer may rely on the relief available under that Act.328  
 Further, a taxpayer may challenge an unreasonable decision under 
s 6(2)(h) of PAJA. The test for reasonableness flows from the provisions of 
s 33(1) of the Constitution. Currie & Klaaren comment on s 6 of PAJA as 
follows:  
„The aim of the power is to discipline decision-makers, requiring 
them to make certain that the record adequately supports their 
decision, in that the decision is supported by persuasive reasons 
and it makes logical sense. Mureinik suggests that the effect of the 
subsection is to make an administrative decision unjustifiable 
unless:  
1. the decision-maker has considered all the serious objections to 
the decision taken and has answers which plausibly meet them;  
2. the decision-maker has considered all the serious alternatives to 
the decision taken, and has discarded them for plausible 
reasons;  
3. there is a rational connection between the information (evidence 
and argument) before the decision-maker and the decision 
taken.‟329  
 O‟Regan J in Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v The Minister of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others330 commented on the test 
for reasonableness as follows: 
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„Section 6(2)(h) should then be understood to require a simple test, 
namely, that an administrative decision will be reviewable if, in Lord 
Cooke‟s words, it is one that a reasonable decision-maker could 
not reach. 
What will constitute a reasonable decision will depend on the 
circumstances of each case, much as what will constitute a fair 
procedure will depend on the circumstances of each case. Factors 
relevant in determining whether a decision is reasonable or not will 
include the nature of the decision, the identity and expertise of the 
decision-maker, the range of factors relevant to the decision, the 
reasons given for the decision, the nature of the competing interest 
involved and the impact of the decision on the lives and well-being 
of those affected. … Its task is to ensure that the decisions taken 
by administrative agencies fall within the bounds of reasonableness 
as required by the Constitution.‟331 
 In Minister of Health and McIntyre NO v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) 
Ltd332 Chaskalson CJ pointed out that „reasonableness and procedural 
fairness are context specific‟.333 Evaluating the dispensing fee at issue 
Chaskalson CJ stated that if the fee was „appropriate‟ it would not be 
unreasonable within the meaning of s 6(2)(h) of PAJA. If the fee was 
inappropriate it did not comply with the empowering statute and would be 
inconsistent with the provisions of PAJA.334 
 Where a taxpayer can show that the decision made by the 
Commissioner bears no relation to the facts under consideration a court 
should set such a decision aside. PAJA requires that the official seriously 
and properly consider the taxpayer‟s representations and not call for facts 
that he intends to disregard.  
 If the „administrative action‟ is unlawful or unconstitutional for any 
reason not covered by s 6 of PAJA a court may set it aside under s 6(2)(i) 
of that Act. However, s 6(2)(f)(i) of PAJA also refers to „administrative 
action‟ that „contravenes a law‟. Why did the legislature enact s 6(2)(i)? 
Currie & Klaaren offer the following explanation:  
„Our submission is that, on a purposive interpretation, s 6(2)(i) has 
to be interpreted as part of an Act with the purpose of giving effect 
to the rights in s 33 of the Constitution, and not to the Constitution 
in general. The s 33 rights permit review of administrative action on 
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grounds of lawfulness, procedural fairness, and reasonableness. 
They do not exhaust the possibilities of a constitutional challenge to 
administrative action.‟335   
 The provision thus seeks to extend the reach of the taxpayer‟s right to 
review. I support this interpretation because it gives effect to the 
constitutional right to administrative justice contained in s 33.  
 
(8) Procedures to follow in initiating judicial review under PAJA 
 A taxpayer must follow the procedures in s 7 of PAJA to proceed with 
the judicial review of „administrative action‟ taken by the Commissioner. 
Section 7(1) provides that:  
„Any proceedings for judicial review in terms of section 6(1) must 
be instituted without unreasonable delay and not later than 180 
days after the date –  
(a) subject to subsection (2)(c), on which any proceedings 
instituted in terms of internal remedies as contemplated in 
subsection (2)(a) have been concluded; or  
(b) where no such remedies exist, on which the person concerned 
was informed of the administrative action, became aware of the 
action and the reasons for it or might reasonably have been 
expected to have become aware of the action and the reasons.‟ 
 If a taxpayer wishes to proceed on review he or she must first 
exhaust any available internal remedies.336 Plasket comments on s 7(2) of 
PAJA as follows: 
„It places a particularly onerous burden on those who wish to 
review the lawfulness, reasonableness or procedural fairness of 
administrative action first to exhaust internal remedies and curtail 
the power of the courts to review administrative action when 
internal remedies have not been exhausted. 
In this note it will be submitted that s 7(2) of the Act is an 
unconstitutional infringement of the right of access to court 
entrenched in s 34 of the 1996 Constitution. Even if it is not 
unconstitutional, it will be submitted, it is ill-conceived, unfair, 
impractical and ought to be reconsidered by the legislature.‟337 
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 O‟ Regan J stated in Bato338 that a court, in deciding whether a 
litigant may request a review of a decision made before exhausting the 
internal remedies available, must „ensure that the possibility of duplicate or 
contradictory relief is avoided‟.339 Thus a court may review a case before 
internal remedies are exhausted.340  
 In Gold Fields341 Snyders J decided that the regulator showed bias 
against Gold Fields and that there would be no purpose in using the 
internal remedies available.342  
 A taxpayer dissatisfied with an assessment issued by the 
Commissioner must proceed with the objection and appeal procedures 
contained in s 81 of the Income Tax Act. A question not yet tested is 
whether a taxpayer may proceed to a court other than the Tax Court 
because the assessment is so unreasonable that a court should set it 
aside on review under PAJA. The initial stages of the approved objection 
procedure may constitute internal procedures as envisaged in s 7 of PAJA. 
However, once the Commissioner has disallowed a taxpayer‟s objection 
he or she must proceed on appeal to the Tax Court. That procedure, 
arguably, does not constitute an internal remedy as envisaged in s 7 of 
PAJA.  
 The Commissioner has not, as envisaged in PAJA, created an 
internal forum to consider a request for a review of a decision he has 
made.343 The Income Tax Act sets out a well-defined process for resolving 
disputes pertaining to assessments, that is, the so-called objection and 
appeal procedures governed by s 81. Before a matter proceeds to the Tax 
Court the Commissioner‟s Tax Appeal Committee will review the matter. 
The committee will decide whether the Commissioner should settle the 
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matter, or refer it to the Tax Court, or whether the matter is appropriate for 
Alternative Dispute Resolution („ADR‟). The Commissioner may agree to 
ADR if he decides that the informal process is appropriate. Where 
taxpayers wish to challenge a decision of the Commissioner under PAJA 
they may utilise the procedures contained in that Act.  
 The Commissioner may frustrate a taxpayer‟s attempt to finalise a 
dispute using the prescribed objection and appeal procedures by failing to 
comply with the time frames specified in the regulations promulgated 
under s 107A of the Income Tax Act. A tax counsel, during consultation, 
has expressed the view that the taxpayer may succeed in approaching a 
court for review in these circumstances.344  
 Because the Commissioner has not introduced any internal remedies 
a taxpayer would need to commence review proceedings under PAJA 
within 180 days of becoming aware of the administrative action and the 
reasons for it.345 By comparison with the period of 30 days in which to 
lodge an objection under s 81 of the Income Tax Act, the period of 180 
days in s 7 is reasonable. If, however, a taxpayer cannot meet the 
deadline it may be possible to seek an extension under s 9 of PAJA.  
 A taxpayer wishing to rely on s 7 of PAJA would need to institute 
action in the High Court or the Constitutional Court. It would be preferable 
if there were another forum or tribunal that could review such matters on a 
less costly basis. It will be a most unusual case that would justify a 
taxpayer approaching the Constitutional Court directly under s 167(6)(a) of 
the Constitution. It is more than likely that the case would commence in 
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the High Court and from there may proceed to the Supreme Court of 
Appeal or to the Constitutional Court.346  
 I would argue that the requirement in s 7(2) of PAJA to exhaust 
internal remedies may violate the taxpayer‟s right to administrative justice 
under s 33 of the Constitution, read with the right of access to court 
contained in s 34.347 
 
(9) Remedies available under PAJA 
 Section 8 of PAJA sets out the remedies available where 
„administrative action‟ is reviewed by the court. The section provides that:  
„(1) The court or tribunal, in proceedings for judicial review in 
terms of section 6(1), may grant any order that is just and 
equitable, including orders - 
 (a) directing the administrator - 
  (i) to give reasons; or 
  (ii) to act in the manner the court or tribunal requires; 
 (b) prohibiting the administrator from acting in a particular 
manner; 
 (c) setting aside the administrative action and - 
  (i) remitting the matter for reconsideration by the 
administration, with or without directions; or 
  (ii) in exceptional cases - 
   (aa) substituting or varying the administrative 
action or correcting a defect resulting from 
the administrative action; or 
   (bb) directing the administrator or any other party 
to the proceedings to pay compensation; 
 (d) declaring the rights of the parties in respect of any 
matter to which the administrative action relates; 
 (e) granting a temporary interdict or other temporary relief; 
or 
 (f) as to costs. 
(2) The court or tribunal, in proceedings for judicial review in 
terms of section 6(3), may grant any order that is just and 
equitable, including orders - 
 (a) directing the taking of a decision; 
 (b) declaring the rights of the parties in relation to the 
taking of the decision; 
 (c) directing any of the parties to do, or to refrain from 
doing, any act or thing the doing, or the refraining from 
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the doing, of which the court or tribunal considers 
necessary to do justice between the parties; or 
 (d) as to costs.‟ 
 If the Commissioner fails to supply reasons, or supplies reasons that 
are inadequate, a taxpayer may seek relief directly under s 8(1)(a) of 
PAJA. The Court is authorised to direct that the Commissioner give 
reasons for his decision. Alternatively, the Court may direct the 
Commissioner to act in a particular way. This remedy equates to a 
mandamus, available under the common law.348  
 Section 8(1)(b) of PAJA allows the court to grant the applicant a 
prohibitory interdict, which prevents the Commissioner from acting in a 
particular manner. This measure differs from s 8(1)(a), which allows the 
Court to compel the official to act in a particular way.349  
 The court hearing the matter may set the Commissioner‟s 
administrative action aside under s 8(1)(c) of PAJA. Under the common 
law, a court could hear the matter and direct that the official reconsider 
it.350 Baxter indicates that courts are slow to substitute a decision made by 
an official, for the following reasons:  
„The function of judicial review is to scrutinise the legality of the 
administrative action, not to secure a decision by a judge in place 
of an administrator. As a general principle, the courts will not 
attempt to substitute their own decision for that of the public 
authority; if an administrative decision is found to be ultra vires the 
court will usually set it aside and refer the matter back to the 
authority for a fresh decision. To do otherwise „would constitute an 
unwarranted usurpation of the powers entrusted [to the public 
authority] by the Legislature‟.351  
 Kruger AJ expressed a similar view in Noupoort Christian Care 
Centre v Minister of National Department of Social Development and 
Another352 where he said:  
„As a general point of departure, the court will be slow to substitute 
its own decision for that of a functionary. Also as a general 
proposition, a court should not lose sight of the distinction between 
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its function as an appellate tribunal and as a tribunal reviewing 
decisions of an administrative functionary; judicial deference is 
called for.‟353  
 He raised the question of „deference‟, that is, the approach whereby a 
court should not descend into the legislative arena and should recognise 
the distinct functions of the court and a State official.354 It is important for a 
court not to attach too much weight to the concept of „deference‟ because, 
in appropriate cases, aggrieved taxpayers may unfairly fail to secure a 
remedy against the Commissioner.  
 Importantly, a court may, under s 8(1)(c)(ii)(aa) of PAJA, substitute 
the decision made by the Commissioner in exceptional circumstances. 
The court may correct, under review, a defect arising from the 
„administrative action‟.  
 In exceptional cases a court may award compensation under 
 8(1)(c)(ii)(bb).355  Where the Commissioner acts unfairly and 
unreasonably against a taxpayer the taxpayer should have the right to 
seek compensation from the Commissioner.  
 An example is the best way to illustrate circumstances in which it 
might be appropriate to award compensation. Assume the Commissioner 
decides to subject a taxpayer to an audit, issues amended assessments 
and then institutes legal action to recover the tax reflected as owing. 
Should the taxpayer not have the right to recover the legal and other costs 
incurred if the Commissioner eventually reverses the assessments 
incorrectly issued and with no legal foundation?356  
 Another example is where the Commissioner sent a letter to a 
company taxpayer informing it of an assessment to be issued and adding 
to the tax therein, the maximum of 200 per cent additional tax.357 The 
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Commissioner has not received a tax return, as it was not yet due, and the 
taxpayer does not know how the Commissioner arrived at the income 
subjected to tax. Further, the Commissioner did not comply with his own 
practice of enquiring from the taxpayer why he should not levy additional 
tax.358 Challenged, the Commissioner eventually confirmed that he issued 
the letter incorrectly. The taxpayer incurred costs in dealing with the 
Commissioner. Why should the taxpayer, in these circumstances, not have 
a right under s 8(1)(c)(ii)(bb) of PAJA to recover the costs incurred?  
 The courts have not been forthcoming in granting orders for 
compensation where a State official has violated an applicant‟s right to 
administrative justice.359  In Olitzki Property Holdings v State Tender 
Board360 Cameron JA rejected the applicant‟s claim for damages and said 
that a more effective remedy than compensation was available, namely, 
the applicant could seek an interdict.361  
 The court may issue a declaration of the rights of the parties affected 
by the administrative action under s 8(1)(d) of PAJA. This provision 
recognises the common law right to seek a declaratory order from a court 
whereby the court determines the rights of a party to a dispute.362  
 A taxpayer may seek a temporary interdict against the Commissioner 
or other temporary relief under s 8(1)(e) of PAJA. Currie & Klaaren submit 
that „temporary relief could include the striking down of subordinate 
legislation‟.363 The fact that relief available under this subsection is 
temporary means that another court must rule on the matter. A court may 
grant a temporary interdict where no other relief is available.364  
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 Section 8(1)(f) of PAJA allows a court reviewing administrative action 
to award costs.365 Such an award will clearly include the legal costs 
incurred in proceeding on review. A question that remains unanswered is 
whether the award includes the costs incurred pursuant to the 
„administrative action‟.366 Where a State official has acted mala fide the 
court may award costs de bonis propriis, that is, the official must pay such 
costs personally.367 Further, a court may award costs on a punitive basis, 
that is, on attorney and client scale, and should do so if an official has 
abused his or her position.368 Hoexter supports the view expressed by 
Plasket.  
„As far as the Constitution is concerned, Plasket suggests that 
“appropriate relief” under s 38 could take the form of a punitive 
costs award against an administrator. He also suggests that -   
“if any administrative conduct is motivated by bad faith of a 
sufficiently gross degree, it may be appropriate for a court to 
make an order that the administrative official concerned repay 
the state for the costs incurred by it in defending his or her 
actions, in addition to paying the costs of the applicant de bonis 
propriis.”‟369  
 Thus, if the Commissioner has acted unreasonably against a 
taxpayer or has acted beyond the provisions in a fiscal statute, the 
taxpayer should succeed in obtaining a punitive costs order.  
 In Motsepe v Commissioner for Inland Revenue370 Ackermann J 
stated that the court should not award costs against a litigant that seeks to 
enforce his or her rights against the State.371 However, the Court will not 
hesitate to award costs against a vexatious litigant372.  
 If the Commissioner has failed to take a decision the court reviewing 
such failure may, under s 8(2)(a), direct the Commissioner to do so. Under 
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s 8(2)(b) the court may also declare the rights of the parties involved with 
that decision. Alternatively, it may, under s 8(2)(c), direct the parties to do 
something or refrain from doing something to achieve justice between 
themselves. Further, the court may once again grant an award of costs 
under s 8(2)(d). Thus, a court may assist the taxpayer to receive a 
decision from the Commissioner to which he or she has a right. The court 
has a wide discretion because it has an obligation to make an award 
treating both parties equitably.373  
 The Commissioner‟s officials have indicated that the Commissioner 
will prepare a manual setting out how PAJA affects taxpayers in their 
dealings with him.374 The Commissioner has failed to release that manual. 
This neglect detrimentally affects taxpayers‟ awareness of their rights 
under PAJA.  
 
(10) Foreign Commentators on Administrative Justice  
 The views of foreign commentators on the right of taxpayers in some 
other countries to call for reasons and the need for due process are 
instructive.  
 Baker & Groenhagen propose that tax legislation and tax 
administration should adhere to the rule of law.375 He expresses the view 
that all „acts of the tax administration should have a legal basis‟.376 Ideally, 
taxpayers have the right to certainty on tax matters.377 They state:  
„The right to be treated fairly is clearly an essential aspect of the 
administration of tax. There is an argument that it should apply both 
to administration and to the enactment of tax legislation. In 
Canada, rights to procedural fairness and to substantive fairness 
have been considered. In practice, however, the right to be treated 
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fairly is probably too vague to be utilised as a specific right of 
taxpayers.‟378  
 The right to administrative justice contained in s 33 of the Constitution 
achieves the objective of treating taxpayers fairly. I contend that taxpayers 
in this country may rely substantively on this clearly defined right to 
procedural fairness.  
 In Australia the courts have taken the view that the wording of that 
country‟s Constitution confers certain rights on taxpayers.379 The 
Australian courts recognise a taxpayer‟s right to „due process‟ or the rules 
of natural justice flowing from the separation of power doctrine.380 Australia 
enacted the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act381 which 
confers on taxpayers the right to call for reasons for certain decisions 
made by the Commissioner.382 The State official must supply adequate 
reasons for the decision.383 The Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) 
Act also allows taxpayers to seek judicial review of decisions made by the 
Commissioner.384 The Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 allows 
taxpayers the right to have administrative decisions reviewed and, if 
necessary, replaced.385  
 A summary of some Australian tax cases on the standard and 
availability of reasons is set out below.  
 In Queensland Trading & Holding Co Ltd v Federal Commissioner of 
Taxation386 the Court held that the taxpayer must receive reasons for the 
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decision not to remit the penalties imposed. Conti J commented on the 
position as follows:  
„Experience demonstrates incidentally that in the case of the 
Commissioner of Taxation, there is normally provided an 
adjustment sheet indicating the reasons for alterations made to the 
quantification of the assessable income of a taxpayer. The insertion 
of para (ga) into Sch 1 reflects implicitly the legislative intent that in 
circumstances outside those involving the exaction of a “tax charge 
or duty”, as normally understood, a taxpayer is entitled to the 
benefit of the legislative reforms of the ADJR Act, at least to the 
extent of providing reasons for decision-making.‟387  
 In MLC Investments Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation388 the 
court had to decide whether the Australian Commissioner was correct in 
not granting the ruling requested by the taxpayer. The taxpayer applied to 
adopt a substituted accounting period, which the Australian Commissioner 
declined because he had previously issued a general ruling indicating that 
he would refuse such requests. The Court decided that the Commissioner 
had not evaluated the merits of the case but had merely followed previous 
rulings.389 The Court held that the Commissioner considered irrelevant 
factors in reaching his decision.390 Thus, the Court set the Commissioner‟s 
decision aside and remitted it for further consideration.391 I contend that a 
South African court reviewing similar facts would reach a similar decision 
under PAJA.  
 The Australian Commissioner must make a decision and the failure to 
do so will result in the Court directing him to do so. In Commissioner of 
Taxes v Tourism Holdings Limited and Anor392 the Commissioner declined 
to exercise his discretion. The Court indicated that it is unacceptable for a 
State official to refuse to perform a duty imposed by Parliament.393  
 The Australian Commissioner must supply reasons for the 
assessments he issues. In Bailey and Others v The Commissioner of 
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Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia394 the High Court ruled that the 
taxpayer was „entitled to know the basis on which the assessment has 
been made‟.395 Consequently, the taxpayer had the right to the particulars 
of the scheme that caused the Commissioner to invoke the anti-avoidance 
provisions in subjecting the taxpayer to tax.  
 Taxpayers in Australia have rights of review and appeal under the 
Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Commonwealth). The Court refused a 
request for reasons in Meredith v Federal Commissioner of Taxation and 
Ors396 because the process of assessment fell outside the Administrative 
Decisions (Judicial Review) Act.397  
 Spry sets out a useful summary of principles the Australian 
Commissioner should follow in dealing with taxpayers.  
„1. A taxpayer ought not to be made subject to adverse 
administrative action because, although acting in accordance 
with his legal rights, he has taken steps lawfully to prevent 
unwanted liabilities to tax from arising.  
2. A taxpayer ought not to be made subject to adverse 
administrative action because the Commissioner is of the 
view that he falls within a class of persons upon whom an 
advantage is conferred by particular legislative provisions.  
3. Officers of the Commissioner ought not to assess adversely 
by reference to extraneous motives, such as a desire to 
intimidate or make an example of taxpayers who have 
conducted their affairs lawfully but as to prevent unwanted 
liabilities to tax from arising or who have criticized the 
Commissioner.  
4. Especial care must be taken that the Commissioner and his 
officers do not conceive of their function as being of an 
adversary nature. Their function is, as has been noted, to 
administer their duties impartially for the purposes for which 
those duties were imposed.‟398   
 It seems that the factors Spry lists exist in some form or another in 
s 6 of PAJA, which sets out the grounds for review of „administrative 
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action‟. Spry makes the submission that in performing his duties the 
Commissioner cannot consider that certain legislative provisions are 
unsatisfactory.399 The official must administer the tax laws as passed by 
Parliament and not as the Commissioner would like them to be. If an 
official were to decide in such a manner in South Africa PAJA would assist 
the taxpayer in having the decision set aside.400   
 If the Australian Commissioner is negligent in his dealings with a 
taxpayer it appears that he could be liable for damages.401 This situation is 
comparable to that envisaged in s 8(1)(c)(i) of PAJA.  
 Further, Australia has introduced the concept of „merits review‟, 
defined as:  
„1.1 [T]he process by which a person or body: 
 Other than the primary decision-maker; 
 Reconsiders the facts, law and policy aspects of the 
original decision; and 
 Determines what is the correct and preferable decision. 
1.2 The process of review may be described as “stepping into 
the shoes” of the primary decision-maker. The result of 
merits review is the affirmation or variation of the original 
decision.‟402 
 „Merits review‟ ensures that administrative decisions accord with the 
law and that the decisions are the best possible given the facts available to 
the State official at the time.403 Further, „merits review‟ will enhance the 
„quality and consistency of the decisions of primary decision-makers‟.404 
 Australia has published comprehensive documents on the quality of 
reasons State officials must provide. Furthermore, its courts have 
examined the standard of reasons relied on by the Australian 
Commissioner to justify decisions and these are instructive in determining 
the quality of reasons to be provided by the Commissioner. 
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 In Canada a decision-maker who has power over a person‟s life, 
liberty or security must comply with the principles of fundamental justice.405 
Section 2(e) of the Canadian Bill of Rights guarantees „the right to a fair 
hearing with the principles of fundamental justice for the determination of 
his rights and obligations‟.406 The meaning of the term „fundamental 
justice‟ is similar to that of „natural justice‟ as used in this country.407  
 Commenting on the position in Canada Li writes:  
„According to the Federal Court of Appeal in Ludmer, it is 
impossible to judge Revenue Canada‟s conduct by “varying and 
flexible criteria such as those dictated by the principles of natural 
justice”. In other words, in determining whether or not the decisions 
made by Revenue Canada are valid, one does not ask whether it 
has exercised its powers correctly or in an abusive fashion, but 
whether or not it has acted in accordance with the statute by which 
it is governed. The duty to act fairly applies only where Revenue 
Canada has discretion, such as under the fairness legislation.‟408  
 The right to fair administrative action in Canada appears to be 
narrower than that in other countries.  
 German taxpayers have a right to reasons for administrative orders 
issued by the German fiscal authority and to a hearing.409 The German 
courts may review decisions under the Basic Law as an important part of 
the Rechtsstaat.410  
 Under the principles of administrative law, Indian taxpayers have the 
right to a fair hearing, and State officials must comply with the rules of 
natural justice.411  
 Unfortunately for Japanese taxpayers the Administrative Procedure 
Law applicable to actions of State officials generally does not apply to the 
tax administration.412  
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 In the United Kingdom the courts have ruled that the Inland Revenue 
(„IR‟) is subject to judicial review.413 Lord Scarman stated as follows:  
„I must make clear my view that the principle of fairness has an 
important place in the law of judicial review: and that in an 
appropriate case it is a ground upon which a court can intervene to 
quash a decision made by a public officer or authority in purported 
exercise of a power conferred by law.‟414  
 Lord Templeton agreed that the IR owes a duty of fairness to 
taxpayers but noted that it must make decisions under the statute that 
confers the power to collect tax.415 In Reg v I.R.C416 the House of Lords 
indicated that a taxpayer has a claim to finality, but only if he or she has 
made full and proper disclosure of important facts.  
 Richardson suggests that State agencies should supply proper 
reasons for decisions made.417 As to the nature of the reasons, he states:  
„A statutory duty to give reasons can only be fulfilled by the 
provision of “adequate” reasons. Again Re Poyser and Mill‟s 
Arbitration provides the classic authority: “proper, adequate 
reasons must be given … which not only will be intelligible, but also 
can reasonably be said to deal with the substantial points that have 
been raised”. … It is clear that that “the substantial points” 
encompass both fact and law and that the reasons must indicate 
“what it is to which the tribunal is addressing its mind”. But they can 
be brief and need not state every point expressly. Such 
generalisations, however, are of little value in the abstract.‟ 
[footnotes omitted].418  
 Richardson refers to the „due process‟ requirement in the United 
States and the need for proper reasons supporting decisions in that 
country.419  
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 In France and New Zealand taxpayers also have the right to a 
hearing before a State official makes a decision that adversely affects 
them.420  
 South African courts must consider foreign law under s 39 of the 
Constitution. The policies and practices in other countries may assist in 
developing South African law in the area of the taxpayer‟s right to 
administrative justice.  
 
(11) Finality of Assessments issued by the Commissioner 
 The Commissioner may amend an assessment issued to a taxpayer 
within three years from the date of issue.421 The three-year period does 
not apply if the taxpayer has failed to disclose material facts or if there 
was no tax levied on the income due to fraud or misrepresentation.422 If 
the Commissioner and taxpayer agree before three years has elapsed 
that the Commissioner should revise the assessment, he may issue an 
additional assessment even after the three-year period has passed.423  
 Thus, if a taxpayer has made full and proper disclosure he or she has 
a right to the certainty that the Commissioner may not amend an 
assessment more than three years after issue.  
 Where a taxpayer receives an assessment and lodges an objection 
and the Commissioner upholds that objection, may the Commissioner 
revisit the assessment within three years from the date of the original 
assessment? This was the issue before the Tax Court in Carlson 
Investments Share Block (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for South African 
Revenue Services. 424   
 In Carlson the company incurred interest and claimed it as a 
deduction for tax purposes. Originally the Commissioner allowed the 
interest as a deduction for tax purposes. He later queried why he should 
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do so. When the taxpayer responded the Commissioner decided to 
disallow the deduction. The taxpayer lodged an objection to the revised 
assessments, which was upheld by the Commissioner, relying, inter alia, 
on the decision of the Tax Court in ITC 1500.425 The Commissioner 
reinstated the original assessments. Subsequently, the Supreme Court 
of Appeal in its decision in CIR v Brollo Properties (Pty) Ltd426 reversed 
the decision of the court a quo in ITC 1500.427 As a result, the 
Commissioner revised the assessments issued to the taxpayer 
disallowing the interest once again despite the fact that he had 
previously allowed the taxpayer‟s objection. The Commissioner did so 
under s 79(1) of the Income Tax Act and the taxpayer challenged the 
constitutional validity of the action on the ground that the Commissioner‟s 
decision violated its right to administrative justice because it had a right 
to certainty about its tax affairs.  
 The taxpayer‟s counsel argued that the Commissioner was functus 
officio and the Court should set aside the second additional assessment. 
Counsel contended that s 79(1) of the Income Tax Act was invalid to the 
extent that it allowed the Commissioner to revisit an assessment 
amended pursuant to an objection.428 Referring to Miller v Commissioner 
for Inland Revenue (SWA),429 counsel commented:  
„The Ordinance contained provisions which were similar to the 
Income Tax Act, but did not have any words corresponding to the 
phrase “notwithstanding the provisions of section 81(5)” in 
section 79. In the Miller case Centlivres CJ stated (at 483B-C):  
“[T]he policy of the legislature seems to be that the taxpayer 
should be entitled to some finality in the matter of 
assessments and that he should not be liable to be 
harassed from time to time as he would be if the 
Commissioner were given the power to rip up what he has 
deliberately done in the past.” 
It appears that the Income Tax Act, 1941 was amended in order to 
deliberately deprive the taxpayer of the right to “finality in the matter 
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of assessments”, so that he should “not be liable to be harassed 
from time to time” by the Commissioner.‟430  
 The taxpayer submitted that it had a legitimate expectation that the 
Commissioner would not amend the reduced assessment further after 
allowing the objection.431 It sought to show that the wording in s 79(1) 
violated the taxpayer‟s right to administrative justice in s 24 of the Interim 
Constitution.  
 The Court did not agree with the taxpayer‟s argument. It held that the 
Commissioner was not functus officio because the Income Tax Act 
conferred a power on the Commissioner to amend the assessment 
despite his having previously allowed an objection on the same 
principle.432 Navsa J commented on the taxpayer‟s challenge to the 
validity of s 79 as follows:  
„Since all the administrative principles debated in this judgement 
have as their end fair administrative procedures that will lead to 
lawful and just administrative decisions I am constrained to pose 
the question: Why against the totality of the circumstances of this 
case can the respondent be said to have acted improperly or 
unfairly? The applicant asserts that the unfairness lay in the fact 
that the respondent allowed an objection and then changed his 
mind. The response to this is that the statute in question permits 
him to do so within a three-year period and that this is known to 
taxpayers in advance.  
The statute enables the respondent to rectify mistakes of fact and 
law. The respondent has a statutory obligation to act in the face of 
stipulated jurisdictional facts. Furthermore, this statutory power to 
revisit is in the national interest. Section 79(1) of the Act does not 
sanction arbitrary and capricious behaviour and is not 
unconstitutional. Statutes such as the one in question are found in 
comparable legal systems and the underlying rationale is 
accepted.‟ 433   
 I submit that the Court‟s decision is correct. However, in terms of 
s 81(1) of the Income Tax Act, a taxpayer has no right to seek an 
amendment to an assessment unless he or she lodges an objection 
within 30 days of date of issue. If a taxpayer makes an error in his or her 
tax return, the taxpayer will not succeed in having the assessment 
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amended unless the Commissioner agrees. The Commissioner 
prescribes strict rules that taxpayers must adhere to before he will 
condone a late objection under s 81(2) of the Income Tax Act.434 The 
Commissioner is in a strong position because he may amend an 
assessment within three years, whereas the taxpayer has no guarantee 
that the Commissioner will give effect to the amendment he or she 
requires. This is unfair. The Commissioner could ameliorate the problem 
if he agreed to grant taxpayers a more reasonable period during which to 
note an objection. 
 
(12) The relevance of the doctrine of legitimate expectations in the tax 
arena435 
 The doctrine of legitimate expectations allows an extension of the 
applicability of the rules of natural justice. A taxpayer, subject to certain 
exceptions contained in s 3(4)(a) of the Act, has a right to a hearing 
before the Commissioner makes a decision under s 3(2)(b) of PAJA. I 
contend that the doctrine would, under PAJA, form part of the evaluation 
to determine whether the „administrative action‟ is procedurally fair. In 
Administrator, Transvaal, and Others v Traub and Others436 Corbett CJ 
held that, in ignoring the audi principle, the official erroneously decided 
not to appoint the doctors to the posts they had applied for.437 As a result, 
the Court set the decision aside.  
 Writing on the doctrine of legitimate expectations, Schweitzer 
comments:  
„Generally the doctrine of legitimate expectation contains a 
procedural as well as a substantive component. In terms of the 
procedural component of the doctrine, the aggrieved person has a 
legitimate expectation that he will be given a right to a hearing and 
that rules relating to procedural fairness are applied. The 
substantive law component of the doctrine means that the 
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aggrieved person has a legitimate expectation that a decision will 
be favourable to him.‟438  
 If the Commissioner grants the taxpayer a ruling and the taxpayer 
later seeks another ruling on similar facts the taxpayer has a legitimate 
expectation that it will be comparable to the first ruling.439 The doctrine 
not only results in securing a hearing on the matter but may have a 
substantive effect in that the taxpayer might obtain a right that the 
Commissioner will act in a particular way or reach a particular decision.  
 This doctrine is recognised in the SARS Income Tax Practice 
Manual,440 which refers to ITC 1674, 441 where a taxpayer in Zimbabwe 
relied on a ruling given by the Commissioner that sales tax should not be 
levied on certain motor vehicles.442 The court a quo held that the doctrine 
comprises the expectation of the taxpayer that there will be a hearing and 
that the State official will act fairly.443 The Court reversed the decision on 
appeal in COT v Astra Holdings (Private) Ltd trading as Puzey and 
Payne.444 It decided that the taxpayer could not rely on the ruling as the 
Commissioner had made an error of law and it would be unfair to the fisc 
to uphold the incorrect ruling.445   
 In ITC 1682446 the taxpayer contended that it had implemented a so-
called salary sacrifice arrangement based on a ruling issued by the 
Commissioner. Davis J stated:  
„It is clear that the … Constitution has been interpreted by the 
Constitutional Court in support of a recognition that there are cases 
where the concept of a legitimate expectation conferring a right to 
substantive relief may be recognised. There is considerable merit 
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in the recognition of such a doctrine in a case such as the present 
dispute, where Mr H of the Commissioner‟s office acknowledged 
that the principle [of a salary sacrifice] applied in the circumstances 
of a similar nature and where a clear unequivocal statement 
appears in respondent‟s own manual.‟447  
 A taxpayer may only rely on a ruling issued by the Commissioner if 
he or she makes a full and proper disclosure of facts when applying for 
the ruling. The Court considered this issue in R v Board of Inland 
Revenue, ex parte MFK Underwriting Agencies Ltd & Ors & Related 
Applications448 and Judge J stated:  
„In those cases where the taxpayer has approached the Revenue 
for guidance the court will be unlikely to grant judicial review unless 
it is satisfied that the taxpayer has treated the Revenue with 
complete frankness about his proposals. Applying private law tests 
to the situation calls for utmost good faith on the part of the 
taxpayer. He should make full disclosure of all the material facts 
known to him.‟449   
 Louw expressed the opinion that the Commissioner should follow a 
ruling issued to a taxpayer if the taxpayer has disclosed the facts and 
implemented the transaction as advised to the Commissioner.450 The 
Commissioner issues press releases, guides and interpretation notes for 
use by taxpayers. Taxpayers have the right to rely on those documents in 
completing their tax returns. The right to administrative justice together 
with the doctrine of legitimate expectations should assist taxpayers in 
ensuring that the Commissioner follows the interpretation notes issued by 
him.  
 Under ss 76B to S of the Income Tax Act the Commissioner may 
issue advance rulings to taxpayers. The rulings will comprise three types 
once the President has published the required notice in the Government 
Gazette:  
 binding general ruling;  
 binding private ruling;  
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 binding class ruling.  
 The Income Tax Act prescribes how taxpayers should apply for 
rulings and the conditions that apply in ensuring that a ruling binds the 
Commissioner. I submit that the taxpayer‟s right to just administrative 
action will assist taxpayers who seek rulings under ss 76B to S.451  
 The doctrine of legitimate expectations comprises the argument that 
estoppel binds the fiscal authority.452 Rider makes the following 
interesting observations on this subject:  
„The traditional view on estoppel derives from a time when the 
application of taxation statutes was a more straightforward matter, 
and the financial consequences for taxpayers less onerous, than is 
the case today. The question of the amount of tax which is lawfully 
due from a particular taxpayer in relation to particular transactions 
is not always a certain matter. ... In many cases, the only practical 
approach which a taxpayer can take in seeking a certain resolution 
of their tax liabilities is to form a view as to how the Commissioner 
might be expected to exercise his administrative powers in relation 
to the powers concerned.  
If the Commissioner, on the basis of a proper understanding of the 
relevant facts, creates in the taxpayer a legitimate expectation that 
the Commissioner‟s powers will be exercised in a certain way, and 
is aware that this expectation has been created it is hard to see 
what prejudice to the public interest in due administration of the tax 
law will be done if a court restrains the Commissioner from 
subsequently acting in disregard of his previous conduct towards 
the taxpayer.‟453   
 Commenting on the doctrine of legitimate expectations in the tax 
arena in Brierley Investments Limited v CIR 454 Casey J, in New Zealand, 
said: 
„[I]n an appropriate case a decision by the Commissioner to act 
inconsistently with a taxpayer‟s legitimate expectation in the 
process leading up to an assessment could constitute unfairness 
amounting to an abuse of powers so as to justify intervention by 
way of judicial review‟.455  
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 Thus, New Zealand taxpayers may be able to approach a court for 
relief where the Inland Revenue Department fails to treat taxpayers 
consistently.456 It is argued that South African taxpayers may be able to 
rely on the doctrine of legitimate expectations to ensure not only 
procedural fairness in their dealings with the Commissioner but to 




 In summary, it is clear that taxpayers have obtained an enforceable 
right in their dealings with the Commissioner because of s 33 of the 
Constitution and the enactment of PAJA. They may now insist on proper 
reasons from the Commissioner for decisions made by his officers in 
performing their duties under the fiscal statutes.458 Many of the decisions 
taken by the Commissioner in administering the tax system constitute 
„administrative action‟ as envisaged in PAJA, and are subject to judicial 
review by the courts under s 6 of that Act.  
 Taxpayers should be able to secure an award of costs against the 
Commissioner when their action succeeds. In exceptional cases they 
should also have the right to recover damages from the Commissioner. 
The hurdle facing a taxpayer who wants to recover damages is relatively 
high because the taxpayer will incur significant costs in instituting action 
in the High Court and must show that the case is exceptional. It is 
unfortunate that there is not a more cost effective remedy for the 
taxpayer. Corder‟s comments are insightful: 
„Perhaps a more urgent issue here, however, is the consideration 
and possible establishment of one or more administrative review 
tribunals, as forums which could apply the new system of review 
expeditiously, fairly and affordably, with restricted rights of appeal 
to the courts as a safety net. The Constitutional requirement of 
independence and impartiality dictates that such tribunals not be 
mere “in-house, further-up-the-hierarchy” appeals, although such 
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avenues would obviously be appropriate as a sifting device in many 
situations.‟459 
 Further, the introduction of „merits review‟, as exists in Australia, 
would, I contend, enhance the quality of administrative decisions made in 
South Africa.460  
 It appears that many taxpayers and, indeed, the Commissioner‟s own 
officers, are not aware of the full impact of the provisions of PAJA on the 
fiscal statutes administered in South Africa. The Commissioner should 
meet his earlier undertaking to release a manual on how PAJA affects tax 
collection in the country. The Commissioner should undertake extensive 
training to improve the understanding of his staff of PAJA, its 
requirements of fair „administrative action‟ and how the Act affects the 
powers exercised by the Commissioner under the fiscal statutes.461 I 
submit that in the future courts, in adjudicating tax matters, will need to 
consider the interaction of the fiscal statues with PAJA, as has been the 
experience in Australia in particular.  
 Commenting on the effect of the right to just administrative action in 
South Africa, Bentley writes: „Provisions such as the South African 
constitutional entrenchment of the right to administrative justice could 
impact powerfully on tax administration.‟462  
 I contend that neither the Commissioner nor the taxpayer has yet 
grasped the full extent of PAJA‟s effect on tax administration in this 
country.  
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IV ACCESS TO COURTS 
(1) The Right of Access to Courts 
 Section 34 of the Constitution confers the right of access to courts:  
„Everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the 
application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where 
appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or forum.‟ 
The right of access to court ensures that there is no recurrence of the 
legacy of the pre-democratic era, where statutes contained ouster 
clauses prohibiting courts from reviewing statutes or the conduct of State 
officials.463  
Cachalia comments:  
„In itself this is [an] unusual provision. The right of access to courts 
is generally guaranteed through a right safeguarding equal 
protection of the law or a provision which ensures that no person 
will be deprived of a right without due process of law or the more 
specific provision dealing with detained, arrested and accused 
persons.‟464  
In Bernstein and Others v Bester NO and Others465Ackermann J 
interpreted s 22 of the Interim Constitution, the predecessor to s 34 of the 
Constitution, as follows:  
„When section 22 is read with section 96(2), which provides that 
“[t]he judiciary shall be independent, impartial and subject only to 
this Constitution and the law”, the purpose of section 22 seems to 
be clear. It is to emphasise and protect generally, but also 
specifically for the protection of the individual, the separation of 
powers, particularly the separation of the judiciary from the other 
arms of the State. Section 22 achieves this by ensuring that the 
courts and other fora which settle justifiable disputes are 
independent and impartial. It is a provision fundamental to the 
upholding of the rule of law, the constitutional state, the 
“regstaatide”, for it prevents legislatures, at whatever level from 
turning themselves by acts of legerdemain into “courts”. One recent 
notorious example of this was the High Court of Parliament Act. By 
constitutionalising the requirements of independence and 
impartiality the section places the nature of the courts or other 
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adjudicating fora beyond debate and avoids the dangers alluded to 
by Van den Heever JA in the Harris case.‟466  
Ackermann J held that s 22 of the Interim Constitution had not 
constitutionally entrenched a right of fairness between opposing parties in 
civil litigation.467 However, the wording in s 34 of the Constitution differs 
in that it specifically requires that the hearing is open and fair.468  
Chaskalson describes the right of access to courts as „another right of 
administrative justice‟.469 This view has merit, as a taxpayer may, under 
PAJA, seek judicial review of decisions made by the Commissioner.470 
Thus, when considering the taxpayer‟s rights of access to information,471 
administrative justice472 and access to courts473 all interested parties 
should take account of how the three procedural rights interact.  
Before PAJA‟s enactment a court would not normally hear argument 
on a dispute unless the taxpayer had exhausted his or her internal 
remedies.474 PAJA endorses this approach except in exceptional 
circumstances.475 An example of „exceptional circumstances‟ is where 
the Commissioner clearly exhibits bias against the taxpayer and the 
internal remedy will not assist the taxpayer.476 Thus, if a taxpayer has 
noted an appeal against the disallowance of an objection to an 
assessment, another court will not hear the appeal until the Tax Court 
has pronounced thereon.  
Section 34 of the Constitution refers to „any dispute‟ and it is 
necessary to establish what this term means. Chaskalson P analysed it in 
S v Pennington and Another,477 stating:  
„The words “any dispute” may be wide enough to include criminal 
proceedings, but it is not the way such proceedings are ordinarily 
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referred to. That section 34 has no application to criminal 
proceedings seems to me to follow not only from the language 
used but also from the fact that section 35 of the Constitution deals 
specifically with the manner in which criminal proceedings must be 
conducted.‟478  
A taxpayer may not rely on s 34 of the Constitution if the 
Commissioner has instituted criminal proceedings against the taxpayer – 
it is s 35 that governs the conduct of criminal proceedings.  
Section 34 applies if a taxpayer seeks to challenge the constitutional 
validity of a provision in a fiscal statute or commences review 
proceedings against the Commissioner because of decisions made by 
his officials.479  
May a taxpayer use s 34 of the Constitution to challenge the 
Commissioner‟s decision to file a statement at court for taxes reflected as 
owing without the taxpayer having received prior notice thereof?480 Once 
the Commissioner has filed such a statement it has the effect of a civil 
judgment against the taxpayer. The question is whether a taxpayer may 
approach a court for relief where the Commissioner has filed such a 
statement.  
Before addressing the procedure in the tax context, it is appropriate 
to refer to Lesapo v North West Agricultural Bank and Another481. In this 
case the court decided that a provision of the North West Agricultural 
Bank Act482 allowing the bank to dispose of a defaulting debtor‟s property 
without the court‟s intervention was invalid.483 The court held that „self-
help‟ is invalid and a debtor facing such circumstances may exercise the 
right of access to court.484 Cheadle, Davis and Haysom endorse the 
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court‟s opinion that „self-help expressly contravenes section 34‟.485 
Mokgoro J summarised the position as follows:  
„Section 38(2), however, limits the debtor‟s rights in section 34 by 
vesting that authority in the Bank. The Bank itself decides whether 
it has an enforceable claim against the debtor; the Bank itself 
decides the outcome of the dispute and the subsequent relief; and 
the Bank itself enforces its own decision, thereby usurping the 
powers and functions of the courts. The fact that the debtor may 
have recourse to a court of law after the attachment takes place 
does not cure the limitation of the right; it merely restricts its 
duration. For the period of the limitation, the debtor has been 
deprived of possession of the assets in question without the 
intervention of a court of law and in a manner inconsistent with 
section 34.‟486  
In the light of the decision in Lesapo487 an observer would expect a 
court to strike down the not-too-dissimilar provisions found in the fiscal 
statutes allowing the Commissioner to collect taxes. In adjudicating the 
Commissioner‟s powers in Metcash488 Snyders J commented on the way 
ss 36 and 40 of the VAT Act and s 34 of the Constitution interact:  
„There is no doubt that the relevant provisions are inconsistent with 
the provisions of s 34 of the Constitution in that:  
(a) It substitutes the first respondent for the court in determining 
every facet of the vendor‟s liability and the enforcement 
thereof;  
(b) It precludes any interlocutory relief by a court of law for the 
aggrieved. 
The prospect that an eventual successful appeal might reverse the 
situation is no answer to the actual infringement which endures 
until then.‟489  
The Court then analysed the limitation of rights provision contained in 
s 36 of the Constitution to determine whether it justified the infringement 
of rights. Snyders J referred to the comments of the Constitutional Court 
in Lesapo,490 which indicated that the right to access to the courts is 
important and only exceptional circumstances can limit that right. 
Snyders J decided that the limitation of the right of access to court was 
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neither reasonable nor justifiable.491 As a result, she held that parts of 
ss 36 and 40 of the VAT Act were unconstitutional and invalid because 
they denied the taxpayer the right to approach a court for relief.492   
The Commissioner disagreed with the Court‟s decision because it 
resulted in the suspension of important provisions in the VAT Act used by 
him to enforce the collection and recovery of tax. The matter proceeded 
to the Constitutional Court where Kriegler J analysed the provisions of 
the VAT Act and pointed out that VAT is different from income tax in that 
it is, for practical purposes, a self-assessment system.493 He pointed out 
that the noting of an appeal against an assessment did not automatically 
suspend payment of the amount reflected as payable to the 
Commissioner.494 Kriegler J interpreted s 36(1) as dealing with the 
question of payment of VAT pending the outcome of a taxpayer‟s appeal 
and not as preventing a taxpayer from approaching a court for relief.495 
The Court indicated that s 36(1) contains a discretionary provision, 
because the Commissioner may agree to postpone the payment of tax in 
dispute.496 According to Kriegler J, the Commissioner‟s counsel 
confirmed this interpretation.  
„Counsel, conceding that s 36(1), read in context with the other two 
impugned provisions, effectively barred any judicial relief being 
extended to an aggrieved vendor, argued that the existence of the 
discretion coupled with the fact that the exercise of discretion would 
be reviewable on administrative law principles saved the section 
from unconstitutionality.‟497   
The Court referred to the fact that the Commissioner exercises 
various discretions under the fiscal statutes and any decisions he makes 
constitute „administrative action‟ that may be reviewed in terms of the 
principles of administrative law.498 Commenting on the Commissioner‟s 
discretion to postpone the payment of disputed VAT Kriegler J said:  
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„I cannot agree with Snyders J to the extent that she considered the 
exercise of the discretion conferred upon the Commissioner in s 36 
of the Act not to be reviewable. The Act gives the Commissioner 
the discretion to suspend an obligation to pay.  
…  
The action must also constitute “just administrative action” as 
required by s 33 of the Constitution and be in compliance with any 
legislation governing the review of administrative action.‟499  
Thus, the Court held that s 36(1) of the VAT Act did not oust its 
jurisdiction.500 The Court summarised the legal process followed where a 
taxpayer disputes an assessment issued by the Commissioner.501 A 
taxpayer may note an appeal against the disallowance of his or her 
objection to an assessment.502 If the taxpayer succeeds in his or her 
appeal and the Commissioner accepts the court‟s decision the 
assessment falls away, thus finalising the matter. Where the taxpayer is 
unsuccessful in his or her appeal a further appeal lies to a higher court 
and that right is not excluded under the VAT Act.503  
Kriegler J dealt with the High Court‟s inherent jurisdiction to hear tax 
matters as follows:  
„Indeed, it has for many years been settled law that the Supreme 
Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine income tax cases 
turning on legal issues.  
…  
McCreath J concluded as follows as to his competence to 
determine the case:  
“I am in agreement with the finding of the Court in that case 
that where the dispute involved no question of fact and is 
simply one of law the Commissioner and the Special Court 
are not the only competent authorities to decide the issues – 
at any rate when a declaratory order such as that in the 
present case is being sought.”‟504  
The Constitutional Court thus recognises the right of taxpayers to 
seek clarification from a court on fiscal legal questions. Thus, if a 
taxpayer takes a particular view of a fiscal provision and the 
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Commissioner does not agree with it, the taxpayer may seek a 
declaratory order in the manner described by Kriegler J.505  
In practice there is significant uncertainty as to whether a taxpayer 
must withhold employees‟ tax (PAYE) on fees paid to certain persons for 
services rendered.506 The proposed advance rulings regime contained in 
ss 76B to S of the Income Tax Act provides that the Commissioner need 
not consider rulings on this difficult area of tax law. Is a taxpayer entitled 
to seek a declaratory order from a court on this question? Based on 
Kriegler J‟s comments it would appear possible for a taxpayer to do so. I 
contend that the reason taxpayers do not adopt this route is the 
prohibitive legal costs. It is easier for the taxpayer to deduct the PAYE 
and pay that over to the Commissioner.  
When Kriegler J examined s 40(5) of the VAT Act and the „pay now, 
argue later‟ rule he stated that the rule is „one which is accepted as 
reasonable in open and democratic societies based on freedom, dignity 
and equality‟.507 Having considered the matter before him he decided that 
s 36(1) did not oust the taxpayer‟s right to court and thus set aside the 
order made by Snyders J in the court a quo.508  
I submit that Kriegler‟s decision is correct in that taxpayers retain the 
right to approach a court for relief.509 This is particularly the case where 
the fiscal statutes confer a discretion on the Commissioner and he either 
makes an unreasonable decision or makes no decision at all. The 
taxpayer has the right to administrative justice and may seek a review of 
the Commissioner‟s decision or his failure to make a decision.510 Failing 
an internal remedy from the Commissioner the taxpayer may approach a 
court for relief.511  
Section 88 of the Income Tax Act is similar to s 36 of the VAT Act. It 
is unlikely that the Constitutional Court would hold that s 88 is 
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unconstitutional in that it allows a taxpayer to approach a court for relief. 
A court must enquire whether the Commissioner has complied with his 
obligations under the right to administrative justice contained in s 33 of 
the Constitution. I would advise an aggrieved taxpayer to challenge, on 
administrative law grounds, the Commissioner‟s decision to refuse to 
defer the payment of tax pending the hearing of an appeal. This is 
preferable to seeking the striking down of the „pay now argue later‟ 
provisions contained in the various fiscal statutes.  
Unfortunately, the Income Tax Act does not currently deal with the 
payment of tax pending a decision on an objection lodged against an 
assessment.512 Clearly, s 88 of the Income Tax Act allows for payment of 
tax to be postponed until the hearing of an appeal. The Income Tax Act is 
deficient, because it does not address the intervening period, that is, from 
the date of lodging an objection until the Commissioner decides whether 
to allow or disallow the objection. In practice the Commissioner will, 
depending on the circumstances, grant an extension of time to pay the 
tax pending a decision on the objection. I propose that the legislature 
amend the fiscal statutes to deal with the period between the date the 
objection is lodged and the Commissioner‟s decision whether to allow or 
disallow the objection.  
The legislature created the Tax Court to hear appeals lodged by 
taxpayers against the disallowance of objections to assessments.513 It is 
appropriate to discuss the nature of the Tax Court and whether it 
constitutes a High Court performing a specialised function.514 In Tax 
Case VAT 304 the appellants argued that because its status is similar to 
the High Court the Tax Court may determine whether a fiscal provision is 
constitutionally valid for the following reasons:  
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„These indicia include the High Court Rules which apply in respect 
of the general practice and procedure of the court insofar as such 
rules are applicable; the power of the court to make costs orders 
which costs shall be determined in accordance with the fees 
prescribed by the rules of the High court; the tax court is a court of 
record; judgements or decisions of the tax court may be published; 
appeals from the tax court lie to the Full Court of the Provincial 
Division having jurisdiction and, with the consent of the President, 
directly to the Supreme Court of Appeal just as appeals from a 
single judge of the High Court do. On the other hand the 
respondent emphasises that the tax court is a creature of statute, 
that its powers are to be found within the four corners of the act 
and that the limited powers of the tax court are not comparable with 
those of the High Court.‟515  
Southwood J examined the characteristics of a High Court and 
pointed out that the rules of stare decisis do not apply to the Tax Court.516 
He decided that the Tax Court is not a court of similar status to the High 
Court and thus does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate on the 
constitutionality of a fiscal statute.517 It would appear that the Tax Court 
took a similar view in Carlson518 because the constitutional challenge 
came before Navsa J in the High Court and not in the Tax Court.  
A taxpayer wishing to challenge the constitutionality of a fiscal 
provision must lay the ground for that challenge in the letter of objection 
lodged under s 81 of the Income Tax Act. A taxpayer may not raise a 
constitutional issue for the first time in the Tax Court or a higher court if 
his or her letter of objection did not contain that ground.519 I contend that 
the Tax Court cannot consider the constitutional validity of a taxing 
statute and that the High Court must adjudicate the matter.520 The Tax 
Court may only decide on appeals envisaged in s 81 of the Income Tax 
Act and cannot adjudicate on the Commissioner‟s administrative acts 
under PAJA. Thus, a taxpayer must approach a High Court, and not the 
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Tax Court, if seeking judicial review of „administrative action‟ by the 
Commissioner.521  
The high costs of litigation in this country may deter taxpayers from 
exercising their rights vis-à-vis the Commissioner. Under s 35 of the 
Constitution a person facing criminal charges has the right to a fair trial. 
This right places an obligation on the State to assist the person financially 
to secure legal representation if failure to do so would lead to an 
injustice.522 How are taxpayers to benefit from the right of access to court 
enshrined in s 34 of the Constitution if they cannot afford to pursue a 
matter in a court? Should the State not be obliged to assist a taxpayer 
financially in approaching a court for relief in resolving a tax dispute?  
De Waal et al comments on whether s 34 of the Constitution requires 
the State to provide financial assistance to citizens to resolve legal 
disputes as follows:  
„It is unlikely that s 34 imposes a positive obligation on the state to 
provide people with access to appropriate forums for resolution of 
legal disputes. Such a positive interpretation of s 34 will mean that 
individuals will be entitled to financial assistance to have their 
disputes resolved by a court or another forum, and to legal 
representation in some cases. Budgetary constraints will obviously 
discourage such an interpretation of s 34. This is unfortunate, since 
the biggest single impediment to access to justice is of course the 
prohibitive cost of litigation. As we point out below, the courts have 
started to recognise the impact of legal costs on access to justice 
by refusing to make costs orders against losing applicants in what 
can be described as “public interest” litigation.‟523  
The above analysis implies that s 34 of the Constitution does not 
place an obligation on the State to assist taxpayers to pursue civil 
litigation. To expect the State to assist taxpayers financially would impose 
a significant financial burden on the State that it can only fund out of 
taxes collected from other taxpayers. Further, such a scheme would be 
fraught with difficulty in terms of ensuring fairness and, especially, in 
determining which cases warrant State financial support.  
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The right of access to court also requires that a „fair public hearing‟ 
decide the dispute.524 Section 14 of the Constitution affords taxpayers a 
right to privacy. Thus, the Commissioner may not disclose details about a 
taxpayer without that taxpayer‟s consent or unless the fiscal statute 
allows him to do so.525 When a taxpayer prosecutes an appeal in the Tax 
Court the public may not attend the hearing, thereby protecting the 
taxpayer‟s right to privacy.526 I submit that this should not detract from the 
fairness of the taxpayer‟s hearing at the Tax Court.  
A taxpayer has the prerogative to waive his or her right to privacy and 
may decide to allow the media or members of the public to attend his or 
her tax case.527 Importantly, the Commissioner effects the publication of 
the decisions of the Tax Court after removing the taxpayer‟s name and 
other possible means of identification. This secures the taxpayer‟s 
constitutional right to privacy but ensures transparency of the approach of 
the court to tax matters and the conduct and practices of the 
Commissioner.  
In Metcash528 Kriegler J expressed the view that the composition of 
the Tax Court, and the way it conducts proceedings, ensures that the 
taxpayer receives a fair hearing in that forum.529 Cheadle, Davis & 
Haysom comment:  
„That section 34 deals with fairness rather than with the substance 
of a decision was confirmed in Lane and Fey NNO v Dabelstein as 
follows:  
“The Constitution does not and could hardly ensure that litigants 
are protected against wrong decisions. On the assumption that 
s 34 of the Constitution does indeed embrace that right, it would 
be the fairness and not the correctness of the court proceedings 
to which litigants would be entitled.” 
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In short, section 34 entrenches principles of natural justice, not only 
in respect of court procedures but also with regard to appropriate 
other tribunals.‟530  
Harms JA commented on the meaning of „fair‟ in Pharmaceutical 
Society of SA v Minister of Health; New Clicks SA (Pty) Ltd v Tshabalala-
Msimang531 where he stated:  
„Although the Constitution does not guarantee a right of appeal in 
civil proceedings explicitly, a general right to a “fair” hearing is 
entrenched in section 34. Applied to the provisions of the Supreme 
Court Act, this means that the proceedings there described must, 
procedurally be “fair”.  
…  
The Supreme Court Act assumes that the judicial system will 
operate properly and that a ruling of either aye or nay will follow 
within a reasonable time.‟532  
In Pharmaceutical Society533 the court a quo had declined to decide 
whether it should grant the request for leave to appeal and Harms JA 
held that the delay was unreasonable, and thus unfair.534 
Under the fiscal statutes a taxpayer may utilise other tribunals to 
resolve a tax appeal. One option is to request that the Tax Board, as 
envisaged in s 83A of the Income Tax Act, hears the appeal. The Tax 
Board may hear appeals if the taxpayer and the Commissioner agree and 
the tax in dispute does not exceed R500 000.535 Hearings before the Tax 
Board are not as formal as those in the Tax Court and the procedure 
aims to provide a cost effective means of resolving tax appeals. If the 
taxpayer succeeds before the Tax Board the Commissioner may appeal 
to the Tax Court.536 If the taxpayer‟s appeal is upheld in the Tax Court the 
Commissioner must pay the taxpayer‟s legal costs.537 If the taxpayer 
loses his or her appeal in the Tax Board, a further appeal lies to the Tax 
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Court.538 If the Tax Court confirms the Tax Board‟s decision the taxpayer 
will be liable for the Commissioner‟s costs.539 
A taxpayer dissatisfied with a decision of the Tax Court may note an 
appeal. He or she may then proceed to a full bench of the provincial 
division that has jurisdiction or, with leave from the President of the Tax 
Court, directly to the Supreme Court of Appeal. Taxpayers should 
perceive the hearing granted by the Tax Court or another court as fair, as 
required by s 34 of the Constitution.  
The Tax Court does not normally award costs against either the 
taxpayer or the Commissioner.540 Where the Court finds that the „… 
actions of the respondent‟s [Commissioner‟s] officials fall short of the 
standard of professional conduct that the public is entitled to expect of 
them‟541 the costs will be awarded on the scale of attorney and client. 
Another option available to the taxpayer is to request that the appeal 
proceeds to ADR instead of directly to the Tax Court.542 The aim of ADR 
is to facilitate an efficient and cost-effective means of resolving tax 
disputes. The one disadvantage is that the Commissioner must decide 
that the appeal is appropriate for ADR, as a taxpayer has no legal right to 
insist that the ADR process finalises his or her appeal.543 In practice, 
some officials do not appear to exercise properly the discretion granted to 
the Commissioner to decide whether the appeal should proceed to ADR. 
In other cases the Commissioner unduly delays decisions on taxpayer‟s 
requests to proceed to ADR, in contravention of the rules governing 
objections and appeals. In many cases where appeals have proceeded 
to ADR a mutually beneficial resolution alleviates the need to prosecute 
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an appeal in the Tax Court. The calibre of the facilitator appointed by the 
Commissioner largely determines the outcome of the ADR process.544  
 
(2) Other Countries  
The right of access to courts in other countries and the procedures 
taxpayers should follow in resolving tax disputes are informative.  
According to Venter, Japan, Germany and Canada confer a right of 
access to courts on taxpayers in some form or another.545 Article 32 of 
the Japanese Constitution provides that „[n]o person shall be denied the 
right of access to the courts.‟ 546  
Courts in Japan may make findings of fact and must apply the law of 
that country.547 A Japanese court may make „its own decisions regarding 
the facts even in administrative review procedures‟.548 When the court 
faces a so-called „political question‟ it adheres to a form of self-imposed 
restriction by not interfering with political decisions.549   
Under the German Grundgesetz all persons may approach the court if 
the State has violated their rights.550 Venter describes the position as 
follows:  
„This last provision of the catalogue of basic rights is considered to 
protect a key right and to serve as a corner stone of the German 
Rechtsstaat. This provision affords the judiciary the final deciding 
competence in all matters involving subjective rights and gives it 
jurisdiction over practically all executive and administrative 
action.‟551   
German judges are independent and persons proceeding to court 
have the right to procedural information.552  
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It appears that Canada does not have a right entrenching access to 
the courts.553 The limited right of access relates only to those rights 
entrenched in the Canadian Charter of Rights.554 Further, a person 
cannot approach the court for access on behalf of another.555 If a 
person‟s Charter rights have been threatened, they may approach a court 
for relief.556  
In the OECD countries taxpayers may appeal against decisions made 
by the tax authorities.557 The OECD summarises the position in the 
member countries as follows:  
„In all countries taxpayers with a grievance have resort to a 
hierarchical range of appeals procedures which will enable them to 
contest the merits of a tax assessment. The description of country 
practices in Part IV shows that normally an appeal will first be 
lodged with an administrative tribunal, in some cases consisting of 
lawyers and experts; in others of specifically designated tax 
officials only.‟558  
Taxpayers in the OECD may challenge tax assessments and 
administrative rulings issued to the taxpayer.559  
In Europe it appears that there are usually remedies available against 
assessments issued to a taxpayer.560 However, objections and appeals 
may only be lodged against decisions specifically provided for in the 
law.561 Albregste & Van Arendonk summarise the position if the tax 
authority imposes a penalty.  
„[A]ccess to the courts is generally the starting point if the 
difference of opinion is not resolved. This holds true in particular 
when the protection of human rights is at stake. For example, if an 
administrative penalty has been imposed, it is settled case-law of 
the European Court of Human Rights that access to the courts 
must be guaranteed. In the Golder decision the Court held as 
follows:  
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“It would be inconceivable, in the opinion of the Court, that art. 
6 para 1 should describe in detail the procedural guarantees 
afforded to parties in a pending lawsuit and should not first 
protect that which alone makes it in fact possible to benefit 
from such guarantees, that is, access to a court. The fair, and 
public and expeditious characteristics of judicial proceedings 
are of no value at all, if there are no judicial proceedings.”‟562  
In many European countries, the public may not attend a court 
hearing a tax dispute, thereby protecting the taxpayer‟s right to privacy.563 
This supports the approach that cases in the Tax Court in this country are 
not open to the public. Albregste & Van Arendonk say that if taxpayers 
fear a violation of their right to privacy they may refrain from prosecuting 
a tax appeal.564  
A concern that arises in Europe is whether the hearing of the tax 
dispute will take place within a reasonable time.565 Albregste & Van 
Arendonk suggest that fiscal legislation should contain time limits within 
which a court must hear and adjudicate a dispute.566 The South African 
rules governing objections and appeals prescribe strict time frames, 
which should expedite the resolution of tax disputes.567 
Some European countries reduce court registry fees because of a 
taxpayer‟s inability to pay.568 Legal aid is unavailable to taxpayers who 
wish to prosecute a tax appeal.569 Their only recourse is to seek 
reimbursement of legal costs from a court if the appeal succeeds.570 In 
some cases taxpayers may recover „a higher reimbursement via the 
difficult route of a civil tort action‟.571  
Commenting on the right to a fair trial in tax matters Partouche writes:  
„By nature, tax litigations, where taxpayers must fight against the 
tax authorities, look like “fights between David and Goliath”. Tax 
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matters are therefore one of the fields where the right to a fair trial 
set forth in Art 6-1, appears essential.‟572  
The case law in France reduces the scope in that country of the 
application of Article 6-1 of the European Convention on the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms („ECPHR‟).573  Partouche is 
of the view that Article 6-1 may still apply where the fiscal authority 
prosecutes a taxpayer criminally.574 It appears that if a penalty imposed 
by the tax authority is not proportional to the offence the European judges 
may reduce the penalty.575  
 
(3) Conclusion  
Taxpayers around the world are generally entitled to have an appeal 
heard by an independent tribunal. The right of access to courts in South 
Africa is an important procedural right available to taxpayers, which they 
should utilise together with their right to information576 and just 
administrative action.577 Usually the Tax Court will hear tax disputes 
under the rules promulgated under s 107A of the Income Tax Act. The 
current rules governing objections and appeals should reduce the time 
taken to finalise a tax dispute. Where there is an unreasonable delay in 
having a tax appeal adjudicated the taxpayer may commence 
proceedings against the Commissioner in the Tax Court to expedite the 
matter. I contend that an unreasonable delay in finalising an appeal 
violates the taxpayer‟s right to access to the courts. 578  
Where the Commissioner fails to make a decision or refuses to 
exercise his discretion in favour of a taxpayer the taxpayer should 
challenge that conduct in the High Court using the framework provided 
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for in PAJA. Further, a taxpayer should consider approaching a court for 
a declaratory order where a question of law warrants an answer.579   
The right of access to courts is valuable and taxpayers should not 
underestimate its efficacy.  
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THE FUTURE OF TAXPAYERS’ RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
„Ubi ius ibi remedium. There can be no right without remedies.’1 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 In this chapter the status of taxpayer‟s rights in South Africa is 
reviewed and suggestions are made about what changes will better 
protect those rights. The enactment of a Bill of Rights in the Constitution 
has improved the position of taxpayers who, before 1994 had limited 
rights in their dealings with the Commissioner. Bentley comments as 
follows: 
„The beneficial effect of the Canadian Charter and the South 
African Constitution is that they provide clear legal parameters 
within which the revenue laws must operate. This is essential for 
the guidance of the executive arm of any government as it seeks to 
maintain its revenue base in an international environment where 
taxpayers and other governments are trying to erode it for their own 
advantage. In desperate times, governments take desperate 
measures. In revenue matters, a bill of rights would ensure the 
operation of the rule of law.‟2 
 In his 1997 Budget the Minister of Finance released a draft SARS 
„Client Charter‟, setting out taxpayers‟ rights and obligations.3 The Charter 
did not create any new rights, nor did it indicate how taxpayers might 
enforce their rights. The release of the Charter was intended to increase 
taxpayers‟ awareness of their rights and obligations and to create and 
improve the service culture of the Commissioner‟s staff in their dealings 
with taxpayers. Caiden supports this approach, commenting that: „It must 
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always be remembered that rights can be enjoyed only by those who are 
aware of them and sufficiently well informed to ensure their possession.‟4  
 The Commissioner released an updated „Service Charter‟ in 2005, 
setting out taxpayers‟ rights as well as the levels of service they may 
expect in their dealings with the Commissioner.5 The „Service Charter‟ 
acknowledged that the Commissioner required time to meet the deadlines 
prescribed in the new charter and intended meeting the self-imposed 
service levels in 2007.  
 In 2002 the Minister of Finance proposed creating a SARS „Service 
Monitoring Office‟ („SMO‟) to assist taxpayers whose complaints remain 
unresolved at the local Receiver of Revenue level.6  
 The Minister launched the SMO in October 2002.7 The SMO may not 
consider the merits of a dispute between a taxpayer and the 
Commissioner but will assist where there is an abuse of taxpayers‟ rights 
or if a taxpayer receives poor service. The Minister of Finance stated 
during the launch of the SMO that the SMO might one day become a fully-
fledged Ombudsman‟s office to deal with taxpayers‟ complaints.8  
 The rules governing objections and appeals have been amended to 
reduce the time taken to resolve disputes between taxpayers and the 
Commissioner.9 These rules streamline the objection and appeal process 
and introduce the ADR procedure which should facilitate a quicker and 
more cost-effective method of resolving disputes.  
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 The difficulty faced in practice is that the Commissioner does not 
comply with the time periods laid down in the rules governing objections 
and appeals. Further, many SARS officials advise that a dispute should 
not proceed to ADR because the case is, in the Commissioner‟s opinion, 
not appropriate for ADR. The Commissioner does not always supply 
reasons for these decisions, thereby violating the provisions of PAJA and 
s 33 of the Constitution. However, once the case reaches the 
Commissioner‟s head office in Pretoria it may be possible to settle the 
matter without proceeding to the Tax Court. The relatively new rules 
governing objections and appeals are an improvement on the old rules 
and should enable legal disputes to be resolved more quickly.  
 Section 88D of the Income Tax Act now allows the Commissioner to 
settle a dispute where it is in the State‟s interest to do so. These 
provisions facilitate settlements that were not possible in the past.  
 
II CURRENT REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO TAXPAYERS 
 Chaskalson comments on the need for remedies as follows: 
„In the midst of the 1950s crisis over the removal of coloureds from 
the voting roll, Centlivres C J reminded South African lawyers of 
the importance of the question of remedies: 
“There can to my mind be no doubt that the authors of the 
Constitution intended that those rights (that is, the rights 
entrenched in the Constitution) should be enforceable by the 
Courts of law. They could never have intended to confer a right 
without a remedy. The remedy is, indeed, part of the right. Ubi 
jus, ibi remedium.” 
Remedies can take different forms: legislative, executive, judicial, 
even private or self-help remedies. Significantly, the interim and 
final Constitution created an impressive range of remedial agencies 
with Constitutional status such as the Human Rights Commission, 
the Public Protector, and others.‟10  
 The fiscal laws of the country and, indeed, the manner in which the 
Commissioner administers them are subject to the provisions of the 
Constitution.11 Commenting on the impact of certain of the provisions of 
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the Interim Constitution on the fiscal laws of the country the Katz 
Commission wrote in its Interim Report: 
„In order to achieve compliance with the Constitution, it is 
recommended that the Branches of Customs & Excise and Inland 
Revenue conduct an immediate audit of the applicable legislation 
with a view to amending such legislation and with a view to 
ensuring that the administration of such legislation and the 
Departmental practices are in harmony with the Constitution.‟12   
 The Joint Standing Committee on Finance commented on the above 
recommendation as follows: 
„The Committee fully endorses the proposal of a thorough audit of 
legislation to ensure harmony with the Constitution. Clearly set out 
rules, procedures and guide-lines should be drawn up, with due 
regard being had to section 24(c) of the Constitution, and publicised 
as widely as possible.‟13   
 Thereafter, the legislature introduced amendments to the Income Tax 
Act eliminating discriminatory provisions to ensure compliance with the 
rights to equality and freedom of religion in ss 9 and 15 of the Constitution, 
respectively.14 The Commissioner also published for use by taxpayers the 
Income Tax Assessing Handbook, previously an internal guide used by 
his officers. The Handbook contains the Commissioner‟s practice on tax 
law.15 To comply with the right to privacy in s 14 of the Constitution, ss 74, 
74A to D of the Income Tax Act replaced the information-gathering powers 
contained in the old s 74.16 Although the Katz Commission questioned the 
constitutional validity of the recovery provisions contained in the Income 
Tax Act, the legislature has not amended those provisions.17  
 Government accepted the Katz Commission‟s proposal that the 
Commissioner should conduct a constitutional audit of South Africa‟s fiscal 
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legislation.18 It is unclear whether the Commissioner has undertaken such 
audit as I could not identify any references to it.  
 Under s 39 of the Constitution a taxpayer may approach a court for 
relief where he or she believes the Commissioner has infringed a right 
contained in ch 2 of the Constitution. Unfortunately, the cost of proceeding 
to court to enforce rights under the Constitution is high and such an 
approach may not yield the desired results.19 
 It seems that it is exceptionally difficult for a taxpayer to satisfy a 
court that it should strike down a fiscal provision because it violates his or 
her right to property or privacy as protected by ss 14 and 25 of the 
Constitution. Silke supports this conclusion: 
„Our courts have, up to now, taken the view, when confronted with a 
constitutional attack on a particular fiscal provision, that the relevant 
provisions of the ITA represent a legitimate limitation of a taxpayer‟s 
Constitutional rights. The balance between the need of the 
Commissioner to recover taxes promptly and prevent a taxpayer‟s 
assets being put beyond his reach and the taxpayer‟s right to 
protection under the Constitution is a very fine one …‟20  
 Because Parliament must be satisfied before passing a fiscal law that 
it complies with the provisions of the Constitution a taxpayer is unlikely to 
succeed in satisfying a court that such a provision is constitutionally 
invalid.21 
 Under the information-gathering powers contained in the fiscal 
statutes the Commissioner may call for information from the taxpayer or 
from third parties, or seek a warrant from the Court authorising a search 
and seizure operation.22  The Constitution requires that the Commissioner 
use the least intrusive means possible to obtain the required information. 
This approach complies with the requirement that in an open and 
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democratic society any limitation of a taxpayer‟s rights must be 
reasonable and justifiable.23  Thus, should the Commissioner require 
information from a taxpayer he should call for it from the taxpayer in the 
first instance.24 If the taxpayer fails to supply the information the 
Commissioner should then conduct an audit of the taxpayer‟s affairs under 
s 74B of the Income Tax Act. Where the taxpayer does not co-operate it 
may be necessary to conduct a search and seizure operation under s 74D 
of the Act. I submit that it would be a breach of the taxpayer‟s right to 
privacy if, at the outset, the Commissioner sought a warrant under s 74D. 
The Commissioner must first exhaust other less intrusive remedies to 
secure the requisite information.25  
 It appears that a taxpayer‟s remedy for relief does not lie in seeking to 
strike down fiscal legislation.26  However, it may lie in challenging the 
procedure adopted by the Commissioner in exercising the powers 
available to him and his officers under the fiscal statutes.  
 The procedural rights of a taxpayer, namely, the right of access to 
information,27 administrative justice28 and access to the courts,29 offer a 
more effective means of challenging the conduct of the Commissioner. In 
addition, the enactment of the PAIA30 and PAJA31 creates a framework  
taxpayers may use effectively against the Commissioner to access 
information and administrative justice. The difficulty is that, in order to 
obtain an effective remedy against the Commissioner the taxpayer may 
need to approach a court for relief. Regrettably, the heavy costs of a court 
action mean that frequently the amounts in dispute or the nature of the 
dispute will not justify seeking such relief.32 
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 Commenting on the situation in the United States Lederman 
advocates the need for a remedy for breaches of procedural rights as 
follows: 
„[P]rocedural “rights” do not necessarily protect taxpayers from 
mistakes or abuses by individual IRS [Internal Revenue Service] 
employees, and  
… 
procedural rules are useless without remedies for their violation.‟33  
 Thus, to properly protect taxpayers‟ rights there must be an effective 
remedy. Lederman proposes that, in appropriate cases, taxpayers should 
have a right to recover costs and fees incurred in obtaining relief, as well 
as monetary damages from the IRS, where no other relief exists.34 She 
suggests amendments to the United States Internal Revenue Code to 
allow for the payment of damages for material breaches of the standards 
set by the IRS.35  Such amendment should cater for the harm done to 
taxpayers by the IRS, its agents and employees.36  Lederman points out 
that the amendment would target the IRS as an organisation and not 
individual employees, improving the protection of taxpayers‟ rights in the 
United States.37  I would argue that the legislature should introduce an 
amendment similar to that proposed by Lederman to improve the 
protection of taxpayers‟ rights in South Africa.38 
 Under PAIA taxpayers may call for information about their own tax 
affairs and this should assist them in exercising their rights against the 
Commissioner. The difficulty that arises is if the Commissioner refuses to 
accede to a request for access to information. The taxpayer must then 
exhaust the internal appeal process and, if that fails to yield the desired 
result, approach a court for relief.  
 Many of the decisions made by the Commissioner in administering 
the fiscal laws of the country constitute „administrative action‟ as defined in 
                                                 
33
 L Lederman „Of Taxpayers‟ Rights, Wrongs, and a Proposed Remedy‟ (22 May 2000) 87 Tax Notes, 
Tax Analysts Special Report 1138 available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=233580, accessed 
25 January 2008. 
34






 Ibid 1142. 
38













s 1 of PAJA. Thus, the Commissioner must comply with the provisions of 
PAJA when making decisions affecting taxpayers. 
 Currently, taxpayers are concerned that the Commissioner‟s officers 
are receiving incentives based on taxes assessed. This remuneration 
policy undermines the taxpayer‟s right to administrative justice because 
the officers have a pecuniary interest in the decisions that they make 
about the taxpayer‟s affairs.39  It appears that the Commissioner evaluates 
his staff only according to the amount of tax they assess and collect rather 
than on how rapidly officers attend to taxpayers‟ objections and appeals, 
or how they treat taxpayers or whether they respect taxpayers‟ rights.40 
 In the United States the IRS evaluates its officials by, inter alia, 
reference to the level of awareness they have of taxpayers‟ rights.41 
Further, the Taxpayer Bill of Rights,42 in order to enhance the objectivity of 
tax officials, outlawed the use of audit quotas.43 I submit that the 
Commissioner should reward his staff by taking account of stated criteria, 
including the manner in which they uphold taxpayers‟ rights. The reliance 
on monetary targets as a factor in evaluating the Commissioner‟s staff 
causes tax officials to concentrate more on achieving their targets than on 
ensuring that taxpayers receive the correct assessments.44 The 
Commissioner should appraise his officials by comparing their levels of 
compliance with the service levels contained in the SARS Service Charter.  
 A taxpayer who is dissatisfied with the way the Commissioner has 
dealt with his or her affairs must initially lodge a complaint with the person 
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who has been dealing with the affairs or that person‟s manager.45 Where a 
taxpayer remains dissatisfied he or she must complain to the call centre, 
which will supply a reference number recording the complaint.46 If the 
complaint remains unresolved the taxpayer may lodge a complaint with 
the SMO.47 
 Currently, the SMO is a complaints office that reports to the 
Commissioner and is not independent of the Commissioner.48 The SMO 
should seek compliance with ISO 1002: 2004, the International 
Organisation for Standardization, „Quality Management – Customer 
Satisfaction – Guidelines for complaints handling in organisations‟ as is 
the case in Australia.49 Thus far the Commissioner has released no 
reports detailing the nature or volume of complaints made by taxpayers 
and how the SMO resolved those complaints.50 The SMO seeks to assist 
in resolving taxpayers‟ complaints but does not issue binding directives to 
the Commissioner‟s officers on how to resolve a complaint. Further, the 
SMO has no legal authority to direct that the Commissioner recompense 
taxpayers for wasted costs or for damages suffered because of the 
Commissioner‟s conduct. 
 Taxpayers are loath to lodge complaints against the Commissioner 
for fear of victimisation.51 The Commissioner needs to educate taxpayers 
and his own staff that taxpayers have a right to complain where they 
allege unfair treatment. The SMO does assist in resolving some 
procedural difficulties encountered by taxpayers. 
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 The Commissioner has suggested that when his officials have not 
dealt appropriately with taxpayers his intention is to correct the matter: 
„When things go wrong we don‟t want to cost you extra time and 
expense and will do our best to sort things out quickly and fairly. So 
when we have made a mistake we will: 
 Apologise 
 Explain what went wrong and why 
 Correct the mistake so that, where possible, your affairs 
will be in the same position as if we hadn‟t made the 
mistake, and  
 Learn from our experience.‟52 
 An apology from the Commissioner to an aggrieved taxpayer will 
often assuage that taxpayer. Unfortunately, the Commissioner does not 
often apologise, even though treatment of the taxpayer would suggest that 
an apology would be appropriate.53  Furthermore, where the 
Commissioner issues provisional tax returns late or errors occur on the 
Commissioner‟s system, an apology to taxpayers generally would 
enhance the relationship between the Commissioner and taxpayers.  
 The Commissioner has advised that the SMO will not investigate a 
taxpayer‟s complaint where that matter is before a court or where the 
taxpayer has complained to the Public Protector.54  Furthermore, the SMO 
cannot investigate complaints about Government policy or the 
Commissioner‟s policy and will not investigate suggested changes to 
legislation.55  
 The National Treasury and the Commissioner advise the Minister on 
fiscal legislation. It is unfortunate that the SMO cannot suggest changes to 
that legislation even though such changes might improve the procedures, 
thereby enhancing the levels of service rendered to taxpayers. Moreover, 
the SMO cannot initiate an investigation into how the Commissioner deals 
with taxpayers nor is the office required to submit an independent report 
on its work to Parliament. The Commissioner‟s Annual Report does not 
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comment on the complaints received by the SMO nor on how that office 
deals with complaints.56 
 Currently there is no independent office which identifies systemic 
problems in tax administration. South Africa should create an Inspector-
General of Taxation as is the case in Australia.57 
 Under s 182 of the Constitution taxpayers may complain to the Public 
Protector where they believe that the Commissioner‟s officers have acted 
improperly. The Public Protector Act58 creates the office of Public 
Protector in conformity with s 182 of the Constitution. Under s 6(4) of the 
Act the Public Protector has, inter alia, the following powers: 
„(a) to investigate, on his or her own initiative or on receipt of a 
complaint, any alleged – 
(i) maladministration in connection with the affairs of 
government at any level; 
(ii) abuse or unjustifiable exercise of power or unfair, 
capricious, discourteous, or other improper conduct or 
undue delay by a person performing a public function;‟59 
 The Public Protector has the jurisdiction to investigate allegations of 
abuse of power by the Commissioner or allegations that the 
Commissioner has unduly delayed dealing with a taxpayer‟s matter. The 
fact that the regulations prevent a taxpayer from proceeding to the SMO if 
he or she has lodged a complaint with the Public Protector indicates that 
the Commissioner recognises the right of taxpayers to lodge a complaint 
with the Public Protector.60 However, in practice, taxpayers do not resort 
to the Public Protector for assistance, partly because they perceive that 
the Public Protector‟s office exists to investigate corruption in government 
and other national-government related problems, and not to investigate 
complaints against the Commissioner and partly because tax is a 
specialised area.61 
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 The Commissioner should be obliged to encourage taxpayers to 
lodge complaints with the Public Protector if his internal complaints 
processes cannot resolve their grievance expeditiously.  However, it is 
unfortunate that this office does not employ persons specialising in tax 
matters and able to attend effectively to complaints. 
 Another avenue of complaint is the Human Rights Commission.62 
However, I submit that the Human Rights Commission, like the Public 
Protector, does not have the specialised skills required to deal with 
taxpayers‟ complaints and cannot offer them an effective remedy for 
alleged breaches of their rights.63 
 I conclude that South African taxpayers do not currently have a cost-
effective method of dealing with difficulties with the Commissioner. 
 It is appropriate to consider what changes are necessary to enhance 
the protection of taxpayers‟ rights in the country in order to improve the 
level of compliance with fiscal legislation. 
 
III WHAT REMEDIES SHOULD BE AVAILABLE TO TAXPAYERS IN 
SOUTH AFRICA?  
 The Katz Commission reviewed the Taxpayer Adjudicator and 
Parliamentary Ombudsman in the United Kingdom, concluded that a tax 
ombudsman was appropriate for South Africa and made the following 
recommendations in its Third Interim Report:64 
„12.3.7 … 
(a) the Tax Ombudsman should be appointed from 
outside the revenue authorities, and should function 
independently; 
(b) appropriate separate funding should be provided, 
although the staff complement may be drawn from the 
revenue; 
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(c) the Ombudsman should at all times be accessible to 
taxpayers, and have unfettered access to the revenue 
authorities; 
(d) the revenue authorities should in advance declare 
themselves to be bound by the Ombudsman‟s 
recommendations save in rare circumstances, the 
nature of which should be set down. 
  12.3.8 The Ombudsman‟s function would mainly be to deal with 
specific matters brought to its attention by the taxpaying 
public. It should also have the capacity to initiate 
suggestions to the revenue authorities regarding Codes 
of Practice, or to refer general problems in the 
administration of tax laws to the Public Protector or other 
authorities as appropriate.‟65  
 The Joint Standing Committee on Finance („JSCOF‟) reviewed the 
recommendation and commented as follows: 
„While accepting the principle contained therein, the 
recommendation to appoint a separate Tax Ombud is not 
supported at this stage. The JSCOF expressed a concern at the 
proliferation of such oversight bodies. Further consideration of 
alternatives is needed, including the possibility that the Public 
Protector‟s Office establish a specialised, skilled tax unit to achieve 
this purpose.‟66   
 The SMO does not fulfil the role envisaged by JSCOF. Further, 
JSCOF recommended that Parliament should not enact the SARS Client 
Charter, but that a specialised tax unit in the Public Protector‟s office 
should monitor the Charter‟s effectiveness.67 Currently, the 
Commissioner‟s Annual Report does not state how the organisation has 
fared in upholding the rights of taxpayers set out in the Charter. Once the 
SARS Service Charter comes into effect it should be easier to monitor the 
Commissioner‟s performance against the levels of service set out in the 
Charter. 
 The Katz Commission also recommended that taxpayers should have 
the right to recover costs from the Commissioner where he has made a 
mistake.68 The Commission proposed that the Public Protector or Tax 
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Ombudsman should have a role in assessing what costs the 
Commissioner should refund.69  Currently, taxpayers have no right under 
the fiscal laws to recover wasted costs or damages from the 
Commissioner. A taxpayer would have to seek costs under s 38 of the 
Constitution or under s 8(1)(c)(ii)(bb) of PAJA.70  
 In the United States and the United Kingdom taxpayers may recover 
wasted costs from the revenue authority.71 In this respect South Africa is 
out of step with other open and democratic societies.72 The legislature 
should amend the fiscal statutes to allow taxpayers to recover costs from 
the Commissioner where his officers have been negligent or have 
exceeded their powers.73 Such a measure is necessary to restore the 
balance between the rights of the taxpayer and the powers of the 
Commissioner and will enhance the levels of service rendered by the 
Commissioner. 
 Investors have encountered numerous difficulties with service 
providers in the financial services arena. This, with the provisions of the 
Financial Services Ombud Schemes Act,74 constitute the reasons for the 
creation of the following institutions, independent of the service providers, 
to deal with consumer complaints: 




 C Hoexter et al The New Constitutional & Administrative Law Volume Two Administrative Law 
(2002) 294. The prospects of succeeding under s 38 of the Constitution may be remote. 
71
 Section 7433 of the Internal Revenue Code. See s 801 of TBR 2, which increased the damages a 
taxpayer may claim from the IRS to $1 000 000. For the United Kingdom see Putting things right – 
How to complain Code of Practice 1 p 5. 
72
 Ibid. For the position generally see Bentley (note 2 above) 56. On the position in Sweden see A 
Hultqvist „Taxpayers‟ Rights in Sweden‟ in Bentley (note 2 above) 306 and for Australia see A Carey 
„ATO‟s Compensation Guidelines‟ (2003) Australian Weekly Tax Bulletin 38 item 1618 p 1444. For 
the United States see R.A. Scott (1996) „Suing the IRS and its employees for damages: David and 
Goliath‟ 20 Southern Illinois University Law Journal 507 p 587. See also J T Newth „Complaints, 
redressing compensation‟ (21 June 2004) Simon’s Tax Briefing 122. 
73
 It may be possible for a taxpayer to succeed in a claim against the Commissioner on delictual 
grounds but it will be difficult. See Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another 2001 
(10) BCLR 995 (CC) and L Baxter Administrative Law (1984) 600-16. On delict generally see J 
Neethling et al Law of Delict 2 ed  (1994) and C Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa (2007) 
467. See C Okpaluba „The Law of Bureaucratic Negligence in South Africa: A Comparative 
Commonwealth Perspective‟ (2006) Acta Juridica 117 for comments on bureaucratic negligence and 
Blois v The City of Halifax, 56 DLR 239; Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd v Heller and Partners Ltd, 1964 AC 
[HL] 465 and M’Alister (or Donoghue) v Sevenson, 1932 AC [HL] 562. 
74













 Ombudsman for short-term insurance;75 
 Ombudsman for long-term insurance;76 
 Pension Funds Adjudicator;77 and 
 Ombudsman for banking services.78 
 The Pension Funds Act79 created the Pension Funds Adjudicator and 
provides that determinations made by the Adjudicator are binding on the 
parties to the dispute.80 The respective sectors created the other three 
bodies and decisions they make are generally binding on the parties to a 
dispute. The various institutions offer a cost effective way for aggrieved 
persons to complain about the service received from their financial service 
provider. I submit that if problems faced by consumers in the financial 
sector require an ombudsman, taxpayers also need the assistance of an 
ombudsman, as more people interact with the Commissioner than with 
financial service providers. Research shows that the fact that taxpayers 
may complain to a third party, independent of the Commissioner, may 
cause them to settle disputes more readily with the Commissioner.81  
 Taxpayers in the United Kingdom may lodge a complaint with the 
Adjudicator, an office independent of Her Majesty‟s Revenue and 
Customs and similar to an ombudsman in other countries.82 The 
Adjudicator may consider complaints about mistakes, delays, poor or 
misleading advice, staff behaviour or the use of discretions by Revenue.83 
The services of the Adjudicator‟s office are free, thus taxpayers do not 
incur any costs in complaining to that office.84 The Adjudicator‟s office will 
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review Revenue‟s files and may meet with the taxpayer or Revenue.85 If a 
taxpayer incurs costs because of meetings with the Adjudicator‟s office 
such costs may be reimbursed.86 
 The Adjudicator seeks to resolve complaints either through mediation 
or by issuing a letter of recommendation.87 In mediation the Adjudicator 
seeks to resolve the complaint in a manner that is acceptable both to the 
taxpayer and to Revenue.88 Where the Adjudicator issues a letter of 
recommendation it forwards a letter to Revenue proposing how the 
complaint should be resolved.89  
 Guidelines issued by the Adjudicator on the requirements that must 
be met to resolve a complaint state: 
„However we resolve the complaint, it must be consistent with the 
organisation‟s own instructions and Codes of Practice. This could 
include asking the organisation to apologise and to meet any 
additional costs that you have incurred as a direct result of their 
mistakes or delays – things like postage, telephone calls or the cost 
of professional advice. Or we might ask the organisation to make a 
small payment to recognise any worry and distress that you have 
suffered. 
We cannot ask the organisations to act outside their own 
instructions and we do not provide personal or general advice 
about tax, VAT and duty, or National Insurance matters.‟90 
 According to an Inland Revenue publication a payment of £25 to 
£500 may be made to a taxpayer where the taxpayer has suffered distress 
because of the manner in which his or her tax affairs were managed.91 
South Africa should consider the introduction of an Adjudicator‟s office 
similar to that in the United Kingdom. 
 The SMO is not the ideal office to deal with taxpayers‟ complaints. 
Among other problems, the office is not independent of the Commissioner, 
it is an integral part of his office and cannot award costs. Further, the SMO 
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does not report on its caseload, nor on how it deals with complaints. The 
SMO cannot issue a Taxpayer Assistance Order similar to that issued by 
the Taxpayer Advocate in the USA.92 It would be preferable if the SMO 
were independent of SARS and reported directly to Parliament. The SMO 
should be authorised to make decisions binding on the Commissioner and 
recommend improvements to the fiscal laws and the Commissioner‟s 
procedures. 
 The Taxpayer Advocate in the United States may issue binding 
„Taxpayer Assistance Orders‟ if the taxpayer is suffering undue hardship 
because of the manner in which the IRS applies the law. Greenbaum 
describes the effect of the Orders as follows: 
„The Orders are of broad application. They can require the 
Secretary of the Treasury to release seized property of the 
taxpayer, or compel the Secretary to cease any action or refrain 
from taking any action which he or she is empowered to take under 
the Code… 
The Taxpayer Assistance Order can be of great assistance to a 
taxpayer whose position is being abused by the tax 
administration.‟93 
Further, the Taxpayer Advocate may issue „Taxpayer Advocate 
Directives‟.94 These directives require the IRS to take action to ensure the 
protection of taxpayers‟ rights or, to prevent an undue burden on 
taxpayers, or to ensure equitable treatment.95 The Taxpayer Advocate 
Directive may confer relief on a group of taxpayers or on all taxpayers.96 
This differs from a Taxpayer Assistance Order, which the Taxpayer 
Advocate may only issue to a specific taxpayer. South African taxpayers 
would obtain proper relief if there were an Ombudsman who could make 
orders similar to those available in the United States. 
 The only current means of obtaining relief for taxpayers who 
experience an abuse of power by the Commissioner is to approach a High 
Court, which is costly, time consuming and the application is difficult to 
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frame.97 It would be preferable if the taxpayer could complain to an 
ombudsman or advocate who could direct the Commissioner to suspend 
the enforcement action until the complaint is resolved. The taxpayer 
should only receive such relief where he or she has a proper complaint 
that is not vexatious, capricious or intended to prevent the Commissioner 
from performing his duties under the fiscal legislation.  
 Caiden defines ombudsman as: 
„[A]n independent, non-partisan officer appointed by one of the 
principal organs of state, [who] deals with specific complaints from 
the public and is in a position to research these cases and make 
public findings and recommendations.‟98 
 Caiden contends that an ombudsman provides both procedural and 
substantive justice.99 He asserts, correctly, that the existence of such an 
office discourages abuse of power by State officials and encourages 
people to question official conduct.100 He writes: 
„In the case of the ombudsman, it is well to recall that its true role, in 
the words of one of its advocates, “is to supplement the existing 
institutions – courts, legislatures, executives, administrative courts, 
and administrative agencies, which institutions must be 
strengthened and made more responsive to the grievances of 
citizens.” Another warns that the ombudsman is a useful 
administrative critic but no pathfinder or panacea.‟101  
Because most ombudsman‟s offices do not charge for their services 
the creation of such an office promotes the resolution of taxpayers‟ 
complaints against the revenue authority without creating the need to 
proceed to court and without incurring costs.102 
In Australia the intervention of the Ombudsman has resulted in: 
 expedited action; 
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 admission of error or apology; 
 a reversal or significant variation of the original act; 
 payment of compensation or act of grace payment;  
 other remedies.103 
The purpose of the ombudsman is not to evaluate whether the 
official‟s decision was right or wrong, but rather to determine whether the 
complainant received fair treatment.104 
The ombudsman usually reports directly to Parliament and the threat 
of publicity about a State agency‟s maladministration is often sufficient to 
ensure that the agency takes corrective action.105 On this subject Jacobini 
writes: 
„Although it is not always the case, ombudsmen usually cannot 
prosecute and are in fact normally empowered only to recommend, 
persuade, and conciliate, and via reporting bring the issues to 
public or higher authority. These are not mean weapons in the 
hands of a tactful and respected commissioner, and the evidence 
appears to be that they have on the whole, been successful.‟106 
Jacobini notes that some sectors of society are unaware of the 
existence of an ombudsman and thus do not seek relief from that office.107 
The Commissioner has a responsibility to educate taxpayers about their 
rights in their dealings with his officials. 
The Public Protector‟s office currently lacks the specialised tax 
expertise which would enable it to investigate taxpayers‟ complaints and 
Hoexter et al indicate that there is a general perception that the Public 
Protector is not as effective as it might be.108 
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The creation of a specialised tax unit with access to taxpayers‟ files109 
might improve the situation.110 This would require an amendment to the 
secrecy provisions contained in the fiscal legislation.111 However, it would 
be preferable for an independent office of Tax Ombudsman to be created. 
The Public Protector should have the power to order the 
Commissioner to recompense the taxpayer for his or her wasted costs 
and damages caused by the Commissioner‟s inaction or negligence. 
Section 1 of the Constitution sets out the founding values of the new 
democracy in South Africa. The section enshrines the supremacy of the 
Constitution and confirms that South Africa is a democratic State 
upholding the rule of law. In accordance with s 1 the Commissioner and 
his officials must adhere to the rule of law in exercising their powers. It 
appears that the founding provisions contained in s 1 of the Constitution 
do not create justiciable rights but prescribes the manner in which the 
Constitution is to be interpreted. 112  
Section 195(1) of the Constitution prescribes the basic values and 
principles governing public administration.113 The section applies to the 
Commissioner and means that SARS is governed by the democratic 
values and principles contained in the Constitution. The Commissioner is 
specifically required to maintain a high standard of professional ethics. 
Taxpayers are, under s 195(1)(d) of the Constitution, entitled to impartial, 
fair and equitable service from the Commissioner. 114 Thus, the 
Commissioner must render services to taxpayers in conformity with s 195 
of the Constitution and in accordance with the founding values set out in 
s 1 of the Constitution. The failure by the Commissioner to comply with the 
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Constitution could result in taxpayers seeking redress from the 
Commissioner under PAJA or the Constitution itself. 
Further, under s 172(1)(a) any court must declare that „any law or 
conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid to the extent of 
its invalidity‟.115 However, a taxpayer must apply to court to achieve this 
result, which involves incurring legal costs. 
Where a taxpayer satisfies a court that the Commissioner‟s officials 
acted in bad faith the court may make an award of costs de bonis propriis 
against those officials.116 Plasket comments as follows: 
„This type of costs order is, however, probably best suited to, and 
more easily justifiable for, the vindication of constitutional rights 
where the public interest in relief such as this is often obvious and 
apparent: such an order may amount to appropriate relief for the 
purposes of s 38 of the Constitution when unconstitutional 
administrative conduct is of such an order that it does not only harm 
the individual against whom it is primarily directed, but also 
“impedes the fuller realization of our constitutional promise”. In 
other words, if administrative conduct is motivated by bad faith of a 
sufficiently gross degree, it may be appropriate for a court to make 
an order that the administrative official repay the State for the costs 
incurred by it in defending his or her actions, in addition to paying 
the costs of the applicant de bonis propriis.‟ [footnotes omitted].117 
Plasket argues that the high cost of litigation should induce State 
officials to do their jobs properly and honestly, promoting an efficient 
public administration.118 This would contribute to fulfilling the democratic 
values contained in s 195 of the Constitution. 
I submit that the legislature should introduce a measure whereby in 
certain well-defined circumstances taxpayers may recover damages from 
the Commissioner for the harm caused by his officials. Under PAJA a 
taxpayer may recover the legal costs incurred and Plasket‟s comments 
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are useful.119 To obtain the required relief, a taxpayer must incur 
significant costs, which acts as an unnecessary obstacle.120 
The Public Protector should be capable of independently reviewing 
the Commissioner‟s refusal of a taxpayer‟s request for access to 
information, as is the case in New Zealand.121 Where the taxpayer has not 
received adequate reasons from the Commissioner or where there has 
been any other breach of the taxpayer‟s right to just administrative action 
the Public Protector should assist. Alternatively, Parliament should create 
a less costly tribunal than a court to deal exclusively with difficulties 
encountered by taxpayers in their interaction with the Commissioner.  
Section 10(2)(a)(iii) of PAJA provides that the Minister may make 
regulations relating to:  
„[T[he appropriateness of establishing independent and impartial 
tribunals, in addition to courts, to review administrative action and of 
specialist administrative tribunals, including a tribunal with general 
jurisdiction over all organs of state or a number of organs of state, 
to hear and determine appeals against administrative action.‟ 
It is unfortunate that the above provision is not peremptory  
Taxpayers in South Africa have the perception that the Commissioner 
and his officers feel that most, if not all taxpayers, are failing to comply 
with their fiscal obligations. This perception has a negative effect on the 
level of compliance and encourages tax officials to treat taxpayers 
unfairly, thereby breaching the rights available to them under the law. 
Bentley comments on this global problem as follows: 
„Where there are discrepancies, there will tend to be an automatic 
presumption of taxpayer dishonesty. … It highlights the tension 
between the tax authorities and taxpayers. Unless there is 
appropriate protection for taxpayers against presumptions of 
dishonesty, there is a serious risk of victimisation. 
The risk is evident in the debt collection, search and seizure, and 
criminal prosecution areas. It is usually particularly evident where a 




 Ibid; see further H Corder „Administrative Justice: A Cornerstone Of South Africa‟s Democracy‟ 
(1998) 14 SAJHR 53 and Bentley (note 19 above) para 3.3.3 p 183. 
121
 Media Release 4 August 1999, Inland Revenue Department, New Zealand, available at 













taxpayer has already failed to comply with the requirements of the 
law or is viewed as likely to fail.‟122 
Taxpayers who applied for amnesty under the Exchange Control 
Amnesty and Amendment of Taxation Laws Act123 were impressed with 
the professionalism, courtesy and sensitivity of the staff of the Amnesty 
Unit, who were seconded by the Commissioner and the South African 
Reserve Bank. I contend that if other officials in the Commissioner‟s 
employ had the mindset of their colleagues seconded to the Amnesty Unit, 
the level of service rendered to taxpayers would improve. A professional 
culture of respect and fair treatment would encourage taxpayers to comply 
with the fiscal legislation. 
One of the problems facing the Commissioner is that his employees 
lack full knowledge of the provisions of the Constitution, PAIA and PAJA 
and the way they affect the administration of the tax laws. The 
Commissioner only recently released the SARS Service Charter, but both 
his staff and the taxpayers need comprehensive education about its 
contents.124  In all correspondence with taxpayers the Commissioner‟s 
officials should advise them of their rights because they can only seek fair 
treatment if they are aware of these rights.125 
To improve compliance by his staff with PAJA the Commissioner 
should publish a manual on how PAJA affects tax administration.126 Such 
a manual would assist taxpayers to enforce their rights against the 
Commissioner. Further, the Commissioner should draft and publish 
guidelines on making administrative decisions, similar to the Australian 
Administrative Review Council‟s „A Guide To Standards Of Conduct For 
Tribunal Members‟.127 This would improve the quality of decisions made 
by the Commissioner‟s officials, thus complying with the obligations 
imposed on the Commissioner under s 195 of the Constitution. 
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The Commissioner may levy additional tax up to twice the tax due 
under the Income Tax Act but there are currently no guidelines indicating 
when he will levy such additional tax.128 This results in taxpayers in similar 
circumstances being treated differently. In one tax office a taxpayer who 
omits interest income from his or her tax return may face additional tax of 
100 per cent, yet, in another, a taxpayer may face the full 200 per cent 
additional tax under s 76 of the Income Tax Act as well as a criminal 
prosecution under either s 75 or s 104.129 This lack of uniformity in 
taxpayer treatment violates the taxpayer‟s right to equality contained in s 9 
of the Constitution.130  
The Minister of Finance stated in his 2006 Budget Speech that the 
Commissioner would release guidelines on penalty imposition during 2006 
and it was hoped that these would result in more uniform treatment of 
taxpayers.131  Unfortunately, the Commissioner has not yet finalised the 
guidelines. The publication of such guidelines would bring South Africa in 
line with other democratic societies and address the constitutional 
concerns in this area.132 
Currently, taxpayers may lodge an appeal against the disallowance of 
an objection and proceed to the Tax Court or the Tax Board if the tax in 
dispute does not exceed R500 000.133 The Tax Board is less formal and 
proceedings should be less costly than those in the Tax Court.  However, 
the legal formalities at the Tax Board have increased as a result of its 
increased monetary jurisdiction. This means taxpayers require legal 
representation and the costs of pursuing an appeal may exceed the tax in 
dispute. 
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It would be preferable if the SMO or a special body were empowered 
to review the merit of decisions made by the Commissioner without 
taxpayers incurring significant legal costs. Australia has introduced the 
concept of „merits review‟.134  South Africa should introduce „merits 
review‟, thereby assisting taxpayers without forcing them to incur costs. 
Alternatively, the authorities should introduce a new forum to hear tax 
disputes, where the amount of tax in dispute is small, say, for example, 
less than R10 000. This new forum should be modelled on the lines of the 
Small Claims Court, where civil disputes can be settled relatively 
cheaply.135 The decisions of the new forum should be binding on both the 
Commissioner and the taxpayer, neither of whom should be entitled to 
proceed to the Tax Court if there is dissatisfaction with the forum‟s 
decision. 
A particular category requiring protection is taxpayers who cannot 
pay for professional assistance. Either the Commissioner should make 
officers available to review the affairs of such taxpayers, or legal aid 
should be made available to assist them. In criminal matters the State will 
assist indigent defendants and there is no reason why some form of 
assistance should not be available to taxpayers who are not financially 
educated and do not have the means to pay for professional tax advice. 
 
IV CONCLUSION 
 The relationship between taxpayer and tax collector is invariably 
adversarial because the taxpayer does not enter into the relationship 
willingly but must do so under the force of law.136  Failure to comply may 
result in penalties and other sanctions. It is important that the correct 
balance is struck between the powers of the tax gatherer and the rights of 
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taxpayer, ensuring that taxpayers respect the fiscal laws and comply 
therewith. 
It is unfortunate that the Commissioner has not finalised the review of 
fiscal legislation in the light of the Bill of Rights. This review should be 
undertaken and its findings made available to the public. 
I assert that the enactment of the SARS Service Charter will not 
improve the lot of taxpayers in South Africa unless a cost-effective remedy 
is introduced. 
Taxpayers have the right to an assessment that reflects the correct 
amount of tax due. In addition, the Commissioner should treat them fairly 
when finalising that assessment and collecting taxes. 
Taxpayers require an appropriate, cost-effective and expeditious 
remedy whereby they may enforce their rights against the Commissioner. 
The greatest protection flows from the rights contained in ch 2 of the 
Constitution and enhanced by PAJA and PAIA. 
The legislature should create a tax ombudsman, drawing on the best 
elements of similar institutions in Australia,137 Canada,138 Pakistan,139  the 
United Kingdom,140 New Zealand141 and the USA.142  Alternatively, 
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Parliament should create a specialised tax unit within the Public 
Protector‟s office. Either of these institutions should have the power and 
integrity to deal fairly with taxpayers‟ complaints and to recommend the 
award of costs or damages, as is the case in other open and democratic 
societies. 
If the Commissioner does not treat taxpayers fairly and effective 
remedies are unavailable this will negatively affect taxpayer compliance in 
the future.143  Therefore, the Commissioner must strike the correct 
balance between the rights of taxpayers and the degree of enforcement 






Among those who came to be baptized were tax-gatherers, 
and they said to him, ‘Master, what are we to do?’ 
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